Wat was die aansporing om by die Romeinse weermag aan te sluit voor die Mariaanse hervormings?

Wat was die aansporing om by die Romeinse weermag aan te sluit voor die Mariaanse hervormings?



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Voor die Mariaanse hervormings moes soldate hul eie toerusting voorsien. Dit het niemand juis geïnspireer om 'n professionele staande weermag te stig nie, veral omdat die meeste boere was wat na die militêre veldtog na hul veld moes terugkeer.

Dus, in die tydperk van die sewe konings of in die vroeë republiek, waarom sou iemand dan by die weermag wou aansluit, veral as hulle dit uit hul eie sak moes betaal?

Daar was waarskynlik sommige wat dit uit pure patriotiese ywer gedoen het, maar wat van die res? Die lang periodes van onrus tussen die patricii en plebeii, wat dikwels veroorsaak word deurdat die laer klasse verarm en skuldig was weens die koste van hul diensplig, dui daarop dat 'n soldaat nie winsgewend was nie. Mense het hul beroepe laat vaar, na die weermag gegaan om dit uit hul eie sak te betaal, en om te sien hoeveel van hulle in die skuld kom, blyk dit dat die buit nie gewoonlik hul uitgawes ten volle betaal het nie.


As infanteris in die Romeinse leërs van die koninkryk en die vroeë republiek was dit nie altyd winsgewend nie. Vir die gewone Romeinse burger was daar altyd 'n verre hoop op buit aan die einde van 'n veldtog, selfs in die tydperk waaroor u navraag doen, maar dit was afhanklik van die rykdom van die huidige vyand. Die buit van die oorlog was nie ongewoon gedurende hierdie tydperk van die Romeinse geskiedenis nie, soos ons in 5.12 deur Livy vertel word:

M. Furius in die Faliscaanse gebied en Cnaeus Cornelius in die van Capenae het geen vyand buite sy mure gevind nie; buit is weggevoer en die gebiede is verwoes, die plase en gewasse is verbrand.

En 5.16:

Hiermee vorder hulle deur kruisoptogte deur die gebied van Caere en verras die Tarquinians terwyl hulle swaar belaai met buit terugkeer.

Die feit is egter steeds dat die meerderheid Romeinse burgers in werklikheid verplig was om diensplig te tref as hulle onder een van die eerste vyf sensusklasse val, 'n groep burgers wat as die adsidui. Hierdie burgers was onder 'n wetlike verpligting uit 'n plig teenoor die staat waarin hulle 'n aandeel gehad het om bymekaar te kom op bevel van 'n uitvoerende gesag imperium soos beskryf in 2.27:

Appius was woedend; hy het sy kollega daarvan beskuldig dat hy die guns van die mense bevoordeel, hom as 'n verraaier van die Statebond veroordeel omdat hy geweier het om vonnis te gee waar skuldenaars voor hom gebring word, en boonop weier hy om troepe in te samel nadat die senaat 'n heffing gelas het.

En in 5.10:

Dan was weereens weermagte ingeskryf vir vier afsonderlike oorloë in een heffing, en selfs seuns en ou manne is uit hul huise geskeur.

Vroeër in 5.16 word opgemerk dat twee konsulêre tribunes, A. Postumius en L. Julius, deur die tribunes van die plebs verhinder is om die heffing te verhoog:

A. Postumius en L. Julius het 'n mag opgehef, nie deur 'n gewone heffing nie - want hulle was belemmer deur die tribunes van die plebs - maar bestaan ​​meestal uit vrywilligers wat hulle deur sterk oproepe aangespoor het om na vore te kom.

Selfs in die buitengewone omstandighede dat 'n heffing deur regsinmenging voorkom is, was daar duidelik aansporings vir Romeinse burgers om vir diens in die geledere in te skakel. As ons dit in ag neem, sou daar diegene gewees het wat bereid was om deel te neem aan die vooruitsig op heerlikheid en buit (nie te ongewoon in 'n krygsgeselskap nie), wat moontlik was om 'n skuld terug te betaal of bloot hul rykdom te verhoog, en diegene wat dit uit patriotiese ywer en ter verdediging van hul vaderland gedoen het. Miskien was selfs vergelding 'n aansporing vir diegene wat gely het onder die hande van 'n mededingende nasie.


Ek het die indruk dat die pre-Mariaanse Romeinse leër 'n soort milisie was. Vrye manne was min of meer outomaties ingeskryf toe hulle oud genoeg was, en hulle sou na verwagting ontmoet om te oefen, hul eie wapens te voorsien en te dien as hulle opgeroep word. Romeinse burgers en bondgenote het dus nie by die weermag aangesluit nie; hulle is gebore as burgers van Rome of hul gebore geallieerde stad of stam en het deeltydse soldate geword sodra hulle oud genoeg was.

Dus, tensy ek verkeerd is, het byna geen Romeine of Italianers by die weermag aangesluit voor die hervorming van Marius nie, hulle was almal burgerlike soldate wat wettiglik moes dien toe hulle opgeroep is. Hulle is almal gebore as toekomstige deeltydse soldate.

Daar was dus geen 'aansporings' nie, net soos vir Amerikaners wat tussen 1940 en 1973 opgestel is.


Die Romeinse leër en die Mariane hervormings

Dwarsdeur die klassieke wêreld het die aarde geskud onder die voete van een van die grootste, magtigste juggernauts in die geskiedenis: die Romeinse leër. Hulle sterkte lê nie in getalle nie; trouens, die Romeine was dikwels drasties in die minderheid op die slagveld. Op die oppervlak het hulle ook 'n verbasend beperkte reeks militêre vaardighede gehad, aangesien die vroeë Romeinse leër byna geheel en al bestaan ​​het uit infanterie, sonder kavallerie of vloot. Hoe het so 'n indrukwekkende krag een van die magtigste en blywendste ryke in die geskiedenis beheer? Die antwoord lê in hul vermoë om te innoveer. Die Romeinse militêre masjien kon nie 'n groter leër bou nie, maar was daarop gefokus om doeltreffender en beter opgelei te word, of deur talent te werf van hul oorwonne vyande om hul eie sterkpunte aan te vul. Verreweg een van die invloedrykste en innoverendste generaals van Rome was Gaius Marius (157 en 86 v.C.), wat eiehandig 'n aantal hervormings ingestel het wat die weermag van 'n vrywillige milisie tot die magtigste professionele vegmag in die Westerse wêreld. Sy innovasies staan ​​gesamentlik bekend as die Marian Reformes.

Gedurende die vroeë militêre loopbaan van Gaius Marius ’ was die aanstelling in die Romeinse leër beperk tot grondeienaars. Ryk aristokrate het as offisiere gedien, wat gewoonlik deel was van die Romeinse burgerlike diens. Infanteriste is in wese opgestel uit die bevolking van klein landelike boere. Dit was nie net 'n ou gewoonte nie, maar word destyds as gesonde verstand beskou. Grondeienaars word beskou as meer toegewyd aan die welsyn van Rome en sou derhalwe harder veg om die grense van Rome te beskerm of uit te brei. In ekonomiese terme was dit ook baie prakties dat grondeienaars hul eie wapens, wapens, pakdiere en ander noodsaaklike toerusting kon voorsien, en sodoende die tesourie van Rome kon bevry van die las om sy eie soldate toe te rus (Parker, 47).

Gedurende die tydperk van 264 vC tot 109 vC het Rome egter 'n aantal opeenvolgende oorloë in Europa en Afrika gevoer en swaar ongevalle opgedoen. Die gevolglike verlies aan hele geslagte voedselproduserende boere het die Romeine op die rand van katastrofiese hongersnood gebring en Rome ook heeltemal onvoorbereid gelaat op die massiewe Duitse inval van 109 – 105 vC. Om 'n leër op te rig wat groot genoeg was om hierdie bedreiging die hoof te bied, het Marius, wat destyds konsul (hoofadministrateur) van Rome was, die wet sowel as die konvensie omvergewerp deur legio's uit stedelike armes in Rome te werf. Hierdie segment van die bevolking het in die tienduisende getel en is lank reeds beskou as 'n afname in die Romeinse hulpbronne. Baie Romeine was ook bekommerd oor sosiale omwenteling. Die stedelike armes verteenwoordig 'n potensiaal vir massa -oproer as daar 'n onderbreking in hul brood en sirkusse is. Marius gebruik dus 'n militêre innovasie om 'n sosiale probleem sowel as 'n militêre probleem op te los.

Om die probleem van militêre toerusting aan te spreek, het Marius eers begin met die gebruik van wapens en wapens uit die dood op slagvelde. Toe dit selfs onvoldoende was, het Marius sy aansienlike handelsvernuf tot die probleem gewend en baie belê in wapenvervaardigers in Italië (Starr, 520). Daarna gebruik hy sy nog groter politieke invloed om die Senaat van Rome te oortuig dat dit in hul beste belang is om wapens en wapens aan te skaf en op te slaan om nuwe rekrute toe te rus (waardeur hy dus 'n groot fortuin verdien).

Marius ’ -planne het egter in die Senaat sterk weerstand gekry. Hulle was tereg bang dat 'n leër wat deur 'n enkele generaal gewerf is, daardie leër meer lojaal aan die generaal sou maak as aan die Senaat en die mense van Rome. Dit sou inderdaad die geval wees, en toekomstige generaals sou hul persoonlike leërs gebruik om die Romeinse senaat te boelie om aan hulle buitengewone magte en voorregte te gee. Die vermoede van die senaat oor Marius se bedoelings is bevestig toe hy op nog meer omstrede kwessies aangedring het. Eerstens het Marius voorgestel dat sy nuwe soldate 'n gewone loon uit die tesourie moet betaal. Voorheen is soldate slegs uit die buit van die oorlog betaal, of met ander woorde, alles wat hulle tussen die gevegte kon plunder, steel of plunder. Toe die “-stryd om betaling ”-voorstel aanvaar is, het Rome spog met 'n voltydse, professionele weermag wat die hele jaar kon veg. Dit alleen was 'n beduidende verbetering teenoor die vorige model; 'n weermag wat uit boere bestaan, moes in die herfs terugkeer huis toe om hul oeste te oes, terwyl die nuwe soldaatras vir jare op veldtogte na verre plekke gestuur kon word (Anglim, 55).

Die tweede voorstel van Marius was nog meer omstrede: hy het gevra dat sy soldate na 'n sekere diensperiode grond as pensioen kry. Dit sou verskeie dinge bereik: eerstens sou dit sy ontslaan veterane weerhou om na die stad Rome terug te keer. Hulle bied 'n nog groter moontlike bedreiging met hul militêre opleiding, en Marius wou nie hê dat sulke manne ledig en ontevrede moet bly nie. Tweedens, die plase en kleinhoewes wat tydens die vorige oorloë ontvol was, kon gevul word met sterk manne en sou hulle 'n groter aansporing gee om te vestig, gesinne op te rig en voedsel vir Rome te produseer. Derdens, sodra al die Italiaanse plase vol was, kan veterane gebruik word om pas verowerde gebiede te koloniseer en te vestig. Hulle sou nie net die Romeinse kultuur en waardes na die verste uithoeke van Rome versprei nie, maar kon ook dien as reserwe -garnisoene in geval van probleme in die nuwe gebiede van Rome. Ten spyte van die talle voordele van hierdie plan, het dit egter baie jare geneem voordat die Senaat daartoe instem, en toekomstige generaals wat hierdie program wou voortsit, het jaar na jaar dieselfde opdraande stryd om land ondervind (Erdkamp, ​​164).

Terwyl sy nuwe leër hom voorberei op die geveg, het Marius 'n ernstige opknapping van militêre organisasie en toerusting onderneem. Namate Rome sy grense uitbrei, het dit in botsing gekom met ander groot nasies, eerder as met die kleiner stamvyande wat Rome meer gewoond was. Tydens hul kleiner oorloë is die Romeinse soldate tot 160 manskappe gevorm. Om op hul magtiger vyande te reageer, verander Marius die standaard -eenheid in 'n groep van 480 soldate, wat dan in legioene van 4800 man gevorm is (Campbell, 9). Hierdie nuwe formasie het die weermag in staat gestel om doeltreffender op groot slagvelde te beweeg, en selfs die standaard infanterie -eenheid toegelaat om kavaleriekoste te hanteer, iets wat met die kleiner manipulasies moeilik sou gewees het. Alhoewel die manipelsisteem bewys het dat dit effektief was teen die olifante van Hannibal by die Slag van Zama in 206 vC, het die nut daarvan afgeneem namate oorlogvoering ontwikkel het.

Marius het ook begin om elke element van die weermag te standaardiseer. Opleidingsmetodes was altyd lukraak, aangesien dit die verantwoordelikheid van die individuele soldate was. Die verwagting was dat landboere reeds sou weet hoe om te perd te ry en 'n swaard en spies te hanteer voordat hulle by die weermag aangesluit het, maar die nuwe soldate wat uit Rome se krotbuurte geslaan is, het min of geen ervaring met gevegte nie. Marius het afrigters van die gladiatorskole van Italië gewerf en 'n formele opleidingsprogram vir sy rou rekrute opgestel.

Een van Marius se beste herinneringe is die vereenvoudiging van die bagasie-trein van die weermag. In plaas daarvan om elke soldaat toe te laat om sy eie pakdiere te bring (wat nie een van sy nuwe soldate in elk geval kon bekostig nie), het Marius beveel dat alle kampeertoerusting, soos tentpale, kookgereedskap, pikke en grawe, en ander miscellanea gelykop verdeel moet word. onder elke soldaat. Benewens hierdie toerusting, word van elke infanteris verwag om in volle wapenrusting te marsjeer met sy swaard, skild, twee spiese, ekstra klere en twee weke se rantsoene. Tot vandag toe word hierdie nuwe soldate onthou as “Marius ’ Mules ” (Parker, 51)

Die Romeinse spies, genoem die pilum, is gemaak van 'n houtkapper wat aan 'n staalspieskop gekoppel is. Die verbindingspen was van yster. Marius het dit as 'n swakheid in die ontwerp geïdentifiseer omdat die ysterpen ironies genoeg te sterk was. Vyandelike soldate het gereeld net buite bereik gewag dat die Romeine hul spiese gooi. Toe tel hulle dit eenvoudig van die grond af op en gebruik dit teen die Romeine. Marius laat die ysterspelde vervang met hout, wat uitmekaar breek nadat die spies sy teiken getref het. Die spies wat gegooi is, was toe funksioneel nutteloos vir die vyand (Anglim, 56). Onder Marius se leiding is die Romeinse skild ook herontwerp. Die tradisionele skild was in die vorm van 'n ovaal, ongeveer 4 voet hoog, met afgeronde tops en onderkant. Die nuwe ontwerp het die afgeronde rande verwyder en die hoogte tot 3 voet verminder, wat die skild ligter en makliker maak in die geveg. Flense is ook aan die kante aangebring, sodat elke skild aan weerskante met ander skilde kon inskakel om 'n verdedigende formasie te vorm wat bekend staan ​​as 'n testudo (skilpad). Hierdie soliede versperring verhoed dat die voorste linies onder 'n volgehoue ​​lading breek en bied ook 'n beter beskerming teen inkomende pyle en spiese (Nickerson, 59).

Onder Gaius Marius het die Romeinse leër 'n doeltreffende eenheid geword. Spanwerk en dissipline, wat reeds 'n kenmerk geword het van die Romeinse weermag, is tot nog groter vlakke geslyp. Die blywende simbool van die Romeinse leër, die Arend, is deur Marius bekendgestel om eenheid en samehang tussen die legioene te verbeter. Elke legioen in die herorganiseerde leër het 'n nommer gekry wat op 'n plakkaat verskyn bo-op 'n staf wat deur 'n groot goue arend gekroon is. Daardie arend het die standaard van die Romeinse leër geword en mitiese eienskappe aangeneem. Later jare sou Romeinse soldate sterf om die simbool te beskerm (Anglim, 56).

Namate die grense van Rome uitgebrei het, het die leër van Rome gereeld met nuwe gevegstyle in aanraking gekom. Omdat die Romeine nie gewoond was aan boogskiet, perdry of vlootoperasies nie, het hulle huurgeskutters, ruiters en matrose uit hul oorwonne vyande begin aanstel (Starr, 525). Altyd vinnig om enige voordeel te benut, het Rome sy verowerde vyande die kans gebied om by die leër aan te sluit en hul talente te bring. Alhoewel 'n staande kavallerie nog nooit nodig was nie (en eintlik 'n hindernis sou gewees het) in die moerasagtige, heuwelagtige streke rondom die stad Rome, moes die Romeinse leër gou leer hoe om kragtige kavaleries effektief in die wyd oop vlaktes te hanteer. van Oos -Europa en die Nabye Ooste. Net so het Rome verkies om Griekse, Siciliaanse en Fenisiese matrose aan te stel om hul kus te beskerm, en erken dat hierdie streke baie groter ervaring in sulke aangeleenthede het. In plaas daarvan om Romeinse infanteriste in ruiters en matrose te probeer verander, het Rome dus voortgegaan om te konsentreer op die instandhouding van hul kragtige infanterie en dit aan te vul met hulpbronne van buite.

Tradisioneel was die militêre krag van Rome heeltemal afhanklik van sy infanterie. Alhoewel daar baie bespiegel is, is daar nog geen werklike konsensus oor waarom Rome die dominante stam op die Italiaanse skiereiland geword het nie, en die meer kultureel ontwikkelde Etruskers en die meer oorlogsugtige Samniete ingehaal het. Nadat ek “Guns, Germs, and Steel ” gelees het, begin ek glo dat die Romeine 'n interessante voorbeeld van Jared Diamond se teorie van geografiese “geluk van die trekking gelees het. ” Die land rondom Rome was vrugbaar genoeg om laat die Romeine toe om landbou, gereedskap, spesialisberoepe en al die ander kenmerke wat hand aan hand gaan met agrariese samelewings te ontwikkel. Dieselfde kan egter gesê word oor die hele Italië. In werklikheid was Rome waarskynlik slegter daaraan toe as baie van haar bure omdat die stad gesentreer was in 'n moerasagtige laaglandriviervallei wat gereeld oorstroom het. Ek glo dat die Romeine welvarend genoeg was om tegnologie tot op 'n sekere punt te ontwikkel, maar dat hulle hul gelukkiger bure moes oorwin om aan te hou vorder.

Gaius Marius het gedurende 'n onseker tyd in die geskiedenis van Rome geleef. Gedurende sy leeftyd is die Republikeinse regeringsvorm van Rome herhaaldelik deur interne en eksterne oorlogvoering geskud. Vir sy talle hervormings, sowel as sy vele oorwinnings op die slagveld, word Marius beskou as een van die “ stigters van Rome. #8217 se uiteindelike vernietiging. Later het Romeinse generaals, waaronder Gaius Julius Caesar, voordeel getrek uit die persoonlike lojaliteit van die weermag aan hul bevelvoerder en oorlog verklaar teen hul eie staat. Uiteindelik sou lang jare van burgeroorlog die einde van die Republiek en die begin van die Ryk tot gevolg hê. Alhoewel dit 'n bietjie moeite is om die blaam hiervoor by Marius ’ deur te lê, is dit duidelik dat sy innovasies ingrypende en langdurige gevolge gehad het wat die hele Westerse wêreld verander het.

Anglim, Simon. Vegtegnieke van die antieke wêreld (3000 v.C. tot 500 n.C.):

Toerusting, gevegsvaardighede en taktiek. New York: St. Martin ’s Press, 2002.

Campbell, J.B. Griekse en Romeinse militêre skrywers. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Erdkamp, ​​Paul. 'N Metgesel vir die Romeinse leër. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing

Nickerson, Hoffman. Oorlogvoering in die Romeinse Ryk en die Middeleeue. New York:

Parker, Geoffrey. Die Cambridge History of Warfare. New York: Cambridge

Starr, Chester. 'N Geskiedenis van die antieke wêreld. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.


Betaal van die Romeinse leër en wat beteken dit?

Julio-Cladiaanse infanterie: 1/3 van Legionaire
Julio-Cladiaanse kavallerie: 2/3 van Legionaire
post-Domitian infanterie: 20 persent minder as Legionaire.
na die Domitianse kavallerie: 20 persent meer as die Legionaire (hoekom sluit burgers nie net by Kavalerie aan vir meer betaling nie?)

pos Dioclecian betaal:
ongeveer 1/4 van Augustus betaal.
Komitee betaal dubbel as grensgroep.

Is hul neiging of verband met die afnemende Ryk?

Swart Adder IV

Augustus: 225 denarii
Vespasian: 186 denarii
Domitian: 252 denarii
Hadrianus: 243 denarii
Severus: 218 denarii
Carcalla: 265 denarii

Julio-Cladiaanse infanterie: 1/3 van Legionaire
Julio-Cladiaanse kavallerie: 2/3 van Legionaire
post-Domitian infanterie: 20 persent minder as Legionaire.
na die Domitaanse kavallerie: 20 persent meer as die Legionaire (hoekom sluit burgers nie net by Kavalerie aan vir meer betaling nie?)

pos Dioclecian betaal:
ongeveer 1/4 van Augustus betaal.
Komitee betaal dubbel as grensgroep.

Is hul neiging of verband met die afnemende Ryk?

Daar is waarskynlik 'n verhouding ('n algemene argument is dat die laat Ryk meer/dieselfde aantal troepe nodig gehad het, maar minder hulpbronne gehad het om dit mee te betaal). Alhoewel die syfers nie direk vergelykbaar is soos in die vroeë keiserlike tyd nie, is die koste van toerusting en voedsel van die soldaat se salaris afgetrek, terwyl dit teen Diocletian se tyd nie so was nie.

Dan is daar die argument (tans onmodies) dat die Limitanei deeltydse soldate was, wat ook boere was (en dus nie soveel betaal moes word as die komitee nie.


Was die Mariaanse hervormings verantwoordelik vir die val van die Romeinse republiek?

In al die geskiedenisklasse wat ek geneem het, is Marius se rol in die ondergang van die Republiek nog altyd verlig. Op die hoërskool glo ek glad nie dat dit genoem is nie, maar ek het weer my Western Civ -klas deur die gimnasiumonderwyser geleer (dankie daarvoor, privaatskool!).

In my eie persoonlike studies het ek die mening begin ontwikkel dat sy besluit dat militêre diens nie meer grondeienaarskap vereis nie, die weg gebaan het vir die oorgang van mag van die regering na generaals soos Caesar. Sy beleid dat die regering verantwoordelik is vir die koste van die weermag en die toekenning van grond aan die soldate, kan ook gesien word as 'n voorbeeld van hoe diepgaande Marius se mag was en hoe sy hervormings die soldate verder bevoordeel bo die adel en hoër klasse. wat tot dusver 'n wurggreep op Rome gehad het.

Natuurlik was daar ander faktore wat die weg gebaan het vir Marius, soos die hervormings van die Gracci -geslagte tevore, maar ek sien dat dit bloot die weg vir Marius is. Stem u saam of verskil u daarvan? Het Marius die doodsklok van die Republiek hervorm, of het hulle bloot 'n gelyke rol gespeel in die verhaal van die ondergang van die regering? Hoe belangrik was sy rol in hierdie geskiedenisperiode, en as 'n byvraag, as dit so belangrik was, waarom word daar nie aandag daaraan gegee in die studie van die Westerse beskawing en spesifiek die antieke Rome in (ten minste Amerikaans, volgens my ervaring) ) skole?

wysig - Terugskouend moes ek dit miskien in die Subreddit van Ancient Rome geplaas het, maar dit sal waarskynlik deur 'n groter gehoor gesien word, so miskien was dit nie 'n totale fout nie. Ek plaas dit in elk geval daar, en u kan dit afstem as u dink dat ek dit nie hier moes geplaas het nie.


Hoe was die verhouding tussen Caesar en sy leër na aanleiding van Marian -hervormings?

Die sukses van Caesar in die Galliese oorloë kan beslis toegeskryf word aan die Mariaanse hervormings wat baie meer Romeine by die weermag kon laat aansluit en die weermag in wese geprivatiseer het omdat baie soldate betaal is. In watter mate was die leër van Caesar werklik of was dit bloot 'n geval van mense wat die 'geldspoor' volg?

Ek bedoel, hy het 'n geruime tyd veldtog gevoer teen die Galliese stamme in vreemde gebied terwyl sy reputasie deur Rome aangeval is vir sy misdade in sy konsulskap, maar sy soldate het getrou gebly. Selfs tydens die burgeroorlog het hulle hom lojaal gebly, alhoewel hulle soms gedreig het met muitery en een van sy bevelvoerders verlate en by Pompeius en die optimiste aangesluit het.

Ek vra in wese hoe lojaal sy weermag was en hoe kan u sy verhouding met hulle beskryf.

Caesar het op 'n sekere tyd 'n paar byna opstande van sy eie manne vasgemaak, maar kon hulle altyd onderdruk.

Wat hulle in Gallië gemotiveer het, selfs met die gevaar, waarskynlik dat die keiser hulle baie van die buit van die verowering gegee het, hulle sou net 'n klomp ton daaruit gemaak het; sy offisiere het 'n groot hoeveelheid slawe gekry, maar waarskynlik die meeste mans die langste met hom geveg het, is stukke grond in Gallië en Italië belowe, sodat dit hulle sou gemotiveer het, dit beteken basies dat hulle ryk kan word.

Oor die rede waarom hulle hom goed respekteer, het hy basies een van hulle geword; hy het die werk gedoen, hulle het geëet wat hulle gedoen het, en in die meeste van sy gevegte was hy daar in die moeilikheid in 'n tyd toe die meeste bevelvoerders agterin was en meer luuks was .

Caesar se troepe was lojaal omdat hulle nie 'n keuse gehad het nie (muitery = straf), as gevolg van 'n persoonlikheidskultus, en omdat hy hulle letterlik omgekoop het om lojaal te bly, met kontant en donasies, met geskenke in die vorm van spogwapens en pantser, met belofte van grondtoelaes na diens.

Romeinse soldate het sedert 405 vC betaal geword, en die toelaag vir 'n myl gregarius in die keiserdag was nog so laag dat Caesar dit na sy optog na Rome en die burgeroorlog gewen het. Dit was laag, want dit was nie veronderstel om 'n loopbaan te wees nie, dit was net genoeg geld wat die mans se gesinne kon verhinder om van die honger dood te gaan terwyl hulle hul 16 jaar in die infanterie of 10 jaar in die kavalerie was. As hulle niks betaal het nie, sou hul gesinne letterlik honger ly terwyl hulle weg was, anders moes hulle die weermag jaarliks ​​ontslaan.

Die werwing van armes het die werwingspoel oopgemaak, maar werwingskwessies het nooit direk verband gehou met die werklike lae aantal rekrute nie, maar met 'ontwyking', met individue wat diens vermy het (veral by diegene wat gevaarlik was met 'n lae verwagting vir plundering). Tydens nasionale noodgevalle (moontlike Cimbri -inval, Varian -ramp) is reis buite Italië verbied: dit is gedoen om te verhoed dat moontlike rekrute op 'n skip klim en vakansie hou in Griekeland of elders, om dilectus te vermy.

Wat die werwing werklik groot gemaak het, was die uitbreiding van die Socii, met alle vrye manne van Italië suid van die Po wat burgers geword het na die Sosiale Oorlog. Dit was so dat Cinna gedurende die eerste burgeroorlog vinnig 30 legioene self kon werf, aangesien byna al die kohorte uit voormalige Socii -gebiede was (Cinna het hulle sterker stemreg belowe). Die bevolking van die Socii het Rome self DWARFED, dus toe hulle burgers word, het die potensiaal van Rome vir rekrute aansienlik uitgebrei.

Intussen het Caesar die verowering van Gallië begin met 'n leër van vier legioene, wat eintlik eeue lank die normale konsulêre weermag was, maar dit was klein, aangesien Polybius in die middel van die 2de eeu v.C. sê dat die Socii -kontingent van infanterie óf ooreenstem met die Die bydrae van die Romeinse burger of het dit verdubbel, dus was 'n konsulêre leër tradisioneel vier tot ses legioene groot.

Caesar beland met baie meer legioene, maar hulle het nie voordeel getrek uit nuwe werwingsvoordele nie, maar omdat hy dit óf verkry het deur goewerneur van 'n ander provinsie te word (om sodoende die bevel te kry oor die leër van die provinsie), het hulle dit by Pompeius geleen, of hulle uit sy eie sak onder nie-burgers in Gallië self grootgemaak het.

Die Romeinse stelsel het 'n persentasie van alle plundering aan die soldate gegee, selfs die laagste soldaat het 'n stuk daarvan gekry. Na tien jaar in Gallië het hulle 'n fortuin bymekaargemaak. Om toe te laat dat Caesar deur sy politieke vyande aangekla en in ballingskap gebring word, sal die uitroei van buit in gevaar stel, moontlik word dit ontken. Meer nog, dit het gewaarborg dat hulle geen grond sou kry nie, en dat daar geen agragiese wet sou wees sonder dat dit geborg word deur 'n uiters kragtige konsul wat namens hulle veg teen die pogings van die senatorium en die tribunaal om dit te stop nie. Om hul volle loon te kry, moes Caesar se soldate hom volg.


Inhoud

Begin: Marius se hervormings Redigeer

Toe Gaius Marius in 108 vC konsul word, was Rome in oorlog met die Numidiaanse koning Jugurtha. Omdat Marius 'n behoefte aan meer mannekrag nodig gehad het, het hy die eiendomsvereistes wat die Romeine in die weermag gekwalifiseer het, uitgeskakel, sodat enige Romeinse burger 'n legioen kon word. [4] Na die oorlog wou Marius die Romeinse legioene professionaliseer en standaardiseer. Hy het die opleiding van die soldate aansienlik verbeter en hom uniform gewapen, wat Rome 'n gewapende mag gegee het wat nie met elke nuwe veldtog opgehef moes word nie. [5] Hy het verder sy soldate aftreevoordele gegee, soos grond of geldelike betaling. Omdat die legioenen egter na hul generaals gekyk het na hul belonings en voordele, het hulle gou trou aan generaals geword eerder as aan die Romeinse senaat. Dit sou uiteindelik tot die einde van die Romeinse republiek bydra. [6]

Tydens die Principate Edit

Namate Augustus die mag in 27 vC konsolideer en die prinsipaal stig, het hy die Romeinse legioene verder professionaliseer en probeer om die afhanklikheid van die legioene van sy generaal te verbreek. Onder hom is die diensperiode van 'n legioene tot 25 jaar verhoog (voorheen was die gemiddelde diensperiode van 'n legioene slegs 10 jaar) en die loon is gestandaardiseer in die hele legioene. Die Romeinse legioenen is ook aan die einde van sy diens 'n grondtoelaag of kontantbetaling gewaarborg, wat die Romeinse legioene minder afhanklik maak van generaals vir belonings na veldtogte. Augustus het ook die sakramentum sodat soldate getrou gesweer het slegs aan die keiser, en nie aan die generaal nie. So het Augustus daarin geslaag om die burgeroorloë wat die laat Romeinse Republiek gedefinieer het, te beëindig en 'n leër geskep wat in die algemeen net aan die keiser lojaal was. [3]

Legionaries sou die grense van Rome uitbrei met laer Britannia, Dacia, Noord -Afrika en meer deur militêre veldtogte onder Augustus en toekomstige keisers. [7]

Weier wysig

Vanaf die bewind van Septimus Severus verloor die Romeinse legioene geleidelik sy voorrang. Alhoewel daar verskeie oorsake vir hierdie afname was, dui almal op die geleidelike agteruitgang van lojaliteit en/of dissipline. Septimus Severus, miskien onbewustelik, het hierdie afname begin toe hy sy legioens met donasies en salarisverhogings uitspoel, en erken dat dit sy sleutel was om keiser te word en te bly. Dit was egter 'n nadelige uitwerking op die dissipline van die legioene, omdat hulle al hoe meer belonings van hul keisers begin verwag het. [8] Onder Caracalla, Septimus Severus se opvolger, het alle vrymanne in die Romeinse Ryk Romeinse burgers geword, wat die onderskeid tussen hulpverleners en legioene effektief uitgewis het. Dit, wat saamval met die voortgesette uitbreiding van die Romeinse leër, beteken dat rekrute van meer twyfelagtige standaarde by die legioene aangesluit het, wat die kwaliteit van die Romeinse legioene verder verminder. [9]

Tydens die 3de eeuse krisis het 'n meer beweeglike leër nodig geword, aangesien dreigemente oor die lang grense van die Romeinse Ryk ontstaan ​​het. As sodanig het berede kavallerie noodsaaklik geword om te reageer op die uiteenlopende uitdagings van die ryk. As gevolg hiervan het die Romeinse swaar infanterie verder vervaag van oorheersing. Teen die 4de eeu het die Romeinse infanterie nie veel van die liggaamspantser van die klassieke legioene ontbreek nie en eerder pyle as die pila van hul voorgangers. [7]

Alhoewel die legioenêr in die eerste plek 'n soldaat was, het hy 'n verskeidenheid ander belangrike funksies vervul. As daar nie 'n professionele polisiemag was nie, sou goewerneurs legioene gebruik om die vrede te bewaar en kritieke fasiliteite te beskerm. [10] Aangesien die Romeinse ryk nie 'n groot burgerlike administrasie gehad het nie, sou die leër dikwels baie administratiewe poste kry. Hooggeplaaste soldate het dikwels as regters opgetree in geskille tussen die plaaslike bevolkings en die weermag was 'n belangrike komponent van belastinginvordering. [11] Legionaries het ook die Romeinse kultuur versprei oor die provinsies waar hulle gestasioneer was. Namate legioenen hulle in die provinsies gevestig het, het dorpe rondom hulle ontstaan, wat dikwels groot stede geword het. Op hierdie manier, toe legioenen met die plaaslike bevolking saamgesmelt en met mekaar getrou het, het hulle gehelp om die provinsies wat hulle beskerm, te romaniseer.

Romeinse legioenen het ook gedien as 'n bron van arbeid en kundigheid. As sodanig is baie van die infrastruktuur wat die ryk verbind het, deur legioene gebou. Paaie, kanale en brûe is deur legioene gebou, sowel as meer verdedigende strukture soos vestings en mure. [7] Hadrianus se muur, 'n monumentale voorbeeld van Romeinse ingenieurswese, is gebou deur die drie legioene wat in die omgewing gestasioneer was. [12] Legionaries was nie net beperk tot die bou van grootskaalse ingenieursprojekte nie. Landmeters, dokters, ambagsmanne en ingenieurs in die weermag sal saam met hul normale militêre rol vir verskillende siviele dienste gebruik word. [11]

Gereelde opgeleide legioene was bekend as miliete en was die ekwivalent in rang van die moderne privaat. Ingesluit in die geledere, afgesien van die milites, were the immunes, specialist soldiers with secondary roles such as engineer, artilleryman, drill and weapons instructor, carpenter and medic. These men were still fully trained legionaries, however, and would fight in the ranks if called upon. They were excused from some of the more arduous tasks such as drill and fatigues and received better pay than their comrades in arms. [13]

Though Roman legionaries were predominantly made up of volunteer citizens, conscription of recruits continued through Republic era and into the Principate, especially in times of crisis. This meant that levees remained a significant part of the Roman legions. [14] With the state providing the equipment to the recruits and no property requirements, even the poorest Roman citizens were able to join the legions. However, the army was viewed as an honorable and valued profession. With a steady pay, good retirement benefits, and even certain legal advantages, a legionary had many perks that common citizens found desirable. As such, though poor citizens could join the military, members from across the plebeian class were found in the Roman legions. Indeed, the army served as one of the few avenues of upward mobility in the Roman world. [15]

The army actively sought out recruits with useful skills such as smiths, carpenters, and butchers. Though not required, literacy was useful since promotion to higher ranks such as centurion required a knowledge of writing. [16] During the Later Republic, Roman legionaries predominantly came from the areas surrounding Rome. However, as Rome expanded, recruits began to come from other areas in Italy. Slowly, recruits came from the regions where the legions were stationed rather than from Italy itself. By the reign of Trajan, there were 4-5 legionaries originating from the provinces for every legionary originating from Italy. [14]

When on the march in hostile territory, the legionary would carry or wear full armour, supplies and equipment. This commonly consisted of lorica hamata, lorica squamata, or 1st–3rd century lorica segmentata, shield (scutum), helmet (galea), two javelins (one heavy pilum and one light verutum), a short sword (gladius), a dagger (pugio), a belt (balteus), a pair of heavy sandals (caligae), a pair of greaves, a pair of manicas, a marching pack (sarcina), about fourteen days' worth of food, a waterskin (bladder for posca), cooking equipment, two stakes (sudes murale) for the construction of palisades, and a shovel, and a wicker basket. [17]

After the military reforms of Emperor Claudius (circa 41 AD), each Legion would also be requisitioned a certain number of artillery pieces. Each cohort (roughly 480 men) would receive one Ballista and each century (roughly 80 men) would receive one Carroballista. [18] In a standard Legionary formation of ten cohorts and sixty centuries, a Legion would be equipped with ten Ballista and sixty Carroballista.

Maintaining morale Edit

The Roman legionary fought first and foremost with his contubernium, the basic eight man unit of the Roman army. [19] The men of the same contubernium fought, slept, ate, and trained together. This strong sense of camaraderie gave Roman legionaries a sense of pride and kept them fighting on the battlefield. The standard bearers, signiferi, were of great importance in keeping Roman soldiers in the battle. The loss of a standard was a disgrace to the eeu the standard belonged to. As such, standard bearers served as someone to rally around and as someone to exhort legionaries to battle. [ aanhaling nodig ]

Optiones, Roman officers at the rear of a formation, had many essential roles outside of battle. However, during battle, their task was to prevent legionaries from routing. Carrying a staff with a ball-end, an optio would force legionaries fleeing from battle back into formation. Leading at the front, centurions would fight alongside legionaries under their command, serving as a role model for his legionaries to remain in combat. [17]

Finally, there were the rewards and punishments, which served as both incentives and deterrents for legionaries in battle. For example, the highly coveted corona civica was given to legionaries who saved a comrade in battle. [20] However, death was the punishment for a variety of different offenses. Those who committed cowardice and dereliction of duty were stoned to death by their comrades. On very rare occasions when a whole unit displayed cowardice, the unit might be decimated, in which one out of every ten soldiers were executed. Less extreme punishments included demotions, changing the wheat rations to barley, and the removal of some identifying military gear. [7]

Voorspel tot stryd Edit

Large armies would generally not begin battle immediately upon meeting. Rather, days or even weeks of redeployment and negotiation would take place before battle. Several days of maneuvering occurred before the Battle of Pharsalus began. [21] Before battle, measures were taken to ensure legionaries were as effective as possible. These include giving legionaries their meals and resting them before the battle. [22] Their commanders and general would also give speeches during this time. These speeches would heavily emphasize the amount of plunder and riches that winning the battle would give the legionaries, as this was a primary incentive for the legionaries to do battle. Light skirmishing would then take place, with cavalry and auxiliaries probing enemy lines before a pitched battle commenced. [17]

Fighting style Edit

The Roman legionary's three principal weapons were the pilum (javelin), scutum (shield), and gladius (short sword). Ideally, the legionaries would throw their pila first as they approach the enemy army. These pila could often penetrate enemy shields and hit the soldiers behind them. [1] Even if the pila fail to pierce the shields, the neck of the javelin would bend, making the shield useless. This then makes the enemy vulnerable to missile fire and legionary attack. The disruption and damage wrought by pila would then be followed by the charge of Roman legionaries. [7]

Though Roman scutum have various different designs, they all share a large metal boss in the center of the shield. This allows the legionary to not only use the scutum as defensive equipment but also as an offensive weapon. Legionaries would have used this iron boss to punch and shove the enemy combatants. [23] Accompanying this is the gladius, a primarily stabbing weapon though it can also be used to cut. These fairly simple tools combined with impressive discipline made the Roman legionary an extremely effective soldier in the ancient world. [7]

Though there were many different formations that legionaries fought in, they tended toward close ordered formations with gaps between formations. These gaps would allow for reserve units to enter battle or serve as avenues for skirmishing forces to retreat back behind the legionaries. During lulls in the battle, wounded soldiers can further be taken back behind battle lines through these gaps. [17]

During the Pax Romana, a rank-and-file Roman legionary would be paid 225 denarii per year. This was increased to 300 denarii during the reign of Domitian. However, during the third century crisis, inflation and chaos disrupted a legionary's pay, with emperors often letting legionaries seize goods from civilians. Their income was supplemented by donatives from emperors either to secure a legion's loyalty or to award them after a successful campaign. [7] Plunder and loot also supplement a legionary's income and is used as a large incentive for soldiers to follow their emperor in campaigns. At the end of their years of service, Roman legionaries received a small allotment of land or a monetary equivalent. [24]

As the Roman empire solidified, permanent legionary fortresses were constructed and many grew into towns. These fortresses contained bathhouses, taverns, and even amphitheaters where festivals and animal displays were held. However, legionaries were not allowed to legally marry until the reign of Septimius Severus (though their spouses were often recognized), most likely because of the implicit necessity to care for the widow in the event of a legionary's death. [25]

Training and discipline Edit

When first enlisted, a fresh Roman recruit (tiro) was not given real weapons to train with. Instead, he was given wooden swords and shields designed to be twice the weight of their counterparts in battle. This allowed the recruit to develop strength as he trained with these wooden weapons. Alongside battle training, the recruit was also taught other necessary skills such as swimming and setting up camp. [1] Most of all, however, the recruit was taught discipline, and was drilled twice a day during his training period. After this period, which could last up to six months, the recruit would become a milite and sent to his respective legion. [7]

The Roman soldier underwent especially rigorous training throughout his military career discipline was the base of the army's success, and the soldiers were relentlessly and constantly trained with weapons and especially with drill—forced marches with full load and in tight formation were frequent. As discipline was important, infractions were heavily punished by the centurions. Punishments could range from being obliged to spend the night outside the protective security of a fortified camp, through being beaten with clubs (fustuarium—a common punishment for 'slowpokes' during long marches), to the stoning of individuals or unit executions involving decimation. However, honors, rewards, and promotions were frequently awarded to legionaries who distinguished themselves in battle or through exemplary service. [7]

One of the goals for strong disciplinary training was to expel fear from a Roman soldier. Fear, and the panic that often follows, is a devastating force to an army on the battlefield. The Romans aimed to remove fear through strict physical and mental training. [26] However, a different fear was used to motivate a soldier in spite of the fear of battle that was the fear of harsh punishment by their commanding officers. In the words of Josephus "they are moreover hardened for war by fear for their laws inflict capital punishments, not only for soldiers running away from the ranks, but for slothfulness and inactivity". [27]

Diet Edit

A Roman legionary had two meals per day: The prandium (breakfast) and the cena (dinner). For these meals, the soldiers were issued regular rations consisting mainly of wheat, which composed roughly 60–70% of a soldier's total rations. [22] This would be consumed in the form of either bread or porridge. However, while on campaign, the soldiers would cook their wheat rations into hardtack, a long-lasting biscuit. [7]

Supplementing the soldier's wheat rations was the cibaria, rations other than grain. This included a variety of foodstuffs but mainly wine, vinegar, vegetables (largely beans or lentils), salt, salt-pork, cheese, and olive oil. However, this did not include fruit. Through foraging, trade with merchants, requisitioning, or raiding during campaigns, the Roman legionary could obtain other foodstuffs not included in his rations. In combination, the average soldier's diet was generally nutritious and filling. [22]

Healthcare Edit

Permanent Roman forts would contain hospitals, where doctors (medici) operated on wounded, injured, or sick legionaries. [28] These medical personnel also isolated sick soldiers, thereby reducing the chance of a possibly infectious disease spreading through the army. Roman forts and camps were also planned in such a way as to minimize the spread of water-borne illnesses, which ravaged many ancient armies. Engineers took special care in piping fresh water to the camps and carrying sewage downstream of any watering places. [24] Those legionaries who were seriously and permanently wounded or injured would be granted missio causaria, or a medical discharge. This discharge would come with many benefits including exemption from some taxes and some civic duties.

Legionary is also a term used for members of various military forces which have been accorded the title of "legion", although bearing no resemblance to the heavy infantry of ancient Rome. In the 18th and early 19th century this designation was sometimes accorded to units which comprised both mounted and foot components. More recently the title has been used by the French Foreign Legion, the Spanish Foreign Legion and the Polish Legions. Members of these modern legions are often called légionnaires, the French term for legionary. [ aanhaling nodig ]

The term was also used by the Romanian far right paramilitary group known in English as the Iron Guard. [ aanhaling nodig ]


Vox Senatoris numquam iterum audietur
The voice of the Senator will never be heard again

í dauða er dýrð
There is glory in death

May the Visigoths prevail!

Marian reforms actually did very little to changing equipment and the main effect was actually who paid for the legionnaires equipment and wage. By effect it created more professional troops but it was more of an accidental side effect. It also meant army's could be raised in peace time.

The change and standardization of equipment actually slowly started before the second Punic wars. While you had the separation of Hasti, Principles and Triarii still by this point the actually pretty much all wore chainmail and where armed with the same equipment. All Marian did was recognize this fact and make they one organization instead of three (which incidently had already been done in all but name by other generals).

The main difference change in equipment was actually between the Camillan manipular organizaion and the Polybian Manipular organization when the gladius and chainmail where adopted between the first and second punic wars. For the rest of roman history they mostly followed the Polybian principle model with very slight improvements up until the late imperial reforms.

By the the time you get to the Marian reforms the only changes would be these

-Generals recruit troops instead of the senate - This means the senate will not pay for campaigns directly though they still helped finance it by more indirect means.

- There was no longer the need to be a land owner to join the army - This meant for the first time the poor could serve in the army instead of being in reserve roles armed little better than peasants, this also meant for the first time there was an incentive for the poor to join the army as a career, this meant the army could finally be professional due to long time soldiers who also would ha and incentive re-enlist after there term was over. (These re-enlisted troops where elite legionnaires who also no longer had to do menial tasks such as built forts& latrines etc and also higher pay due to the now elite status which further encourage people to re-enlist )

- Instead of having three identical main units you now have one - Even though they by now they had the same equipment, the only difference was their experience, Marian realized it was pointless having them separated still, although there are still "slight" reference too these three groups even into Caesars time. Again as stated earlier, he was not the first to do this, but the most famous and due to Marian's successes most followed his example.

- Increased standardization - This was actually completely by accident, and while the roman army had always been relatively standardized compared to all the other civilizations of the time, having generals buy equipment on bulk upon recruitment helped increase this further. However as troops needed replacement gear, replacement troops raised and the surprisingly big variation from blacksmith to blacksmith troop standardization was still massively off modern standards. It was still common enough to still see slightly different styles of armour, gladius's, scutums or even armour used within the same unit. This was again improved during the imperial era but two legionnaires especially from different legions was never "identical" whatever the films tell you.

- Increased chance of civil war - Now troops where more loyal to their generals than the state, generals started to be able to claim power. Before the most famous example, Caesar, there where many who did the same but gave up power later including Pompey and a rival to Marian.

There was actually very little in the change of equipment because of the marian reforms however.


Inhoud

In the late republic, the army became an instrument for successful international warfare, due to the reforms of one of Rome's greatest generals, Gaius Marius, a man admired and imitated by Julius Caesar. His changes were so critical to the success of Roman legions that the army is characterized in history as "pre-Marian" and "post-Marian" or just "Marian".

The draft [ edit | wysig bron]

The highest officers of the military were the two consuls for that year, who were also the leaders of the senate at Rome. Each of them ordinarily commanded an army group of two legions: they also had responsibility for raising these troops. In militaristic Rome, the highest civilian officers were also the military chiefs of staff and the commanding generals in battle. They answered only to the Roman Senate.

Raising the legions was an annual affair. The term of service was one year, although many candidates no doubt were picked year after year. The magistrates decided who in the tribes were eligible for selection.

The word we translate as "magistrate" was the title of a tribal official, a tribunus ("of the tribus"). Here a basic division of the military and civilian branches applied, as well as the subjection of the military to the civilian. The working organizations of the tribe were called comitia (committees). They elected tribuni plebis, "tribunes of the people", as well as 24 tribuni militares — 6 per legion — who were careerists with at least 5 or 6 years' service experience. A career would include both military and civilian offices. The 6 military tribunes were to be the senior staff of the legion.

On selection day, the presiding tribune sent the men of the tribe to appear before the military tribunes in groups of four. The four senior staffs of the future legions observed a priority of selection, which rotated. Each staff would take its pick, man by man, until each had selected 4200 men, the complements of four legions. The selection of 16,800 men must have taken several days.

If the circumstances of the state required it, the complement could be expanded to include more men, or the consuls could draft as many as four legions each. Additional forces could be drafted under ad hoc commanders called proconsules, who served "in place of consuls." In the later republic, the relatively small number of legions commanded by the consuls (2-4) resulted in their power being overshadowed by the proconsuls, the provincial governors. Provincial governors often would command more loyalty from their troops than their consular counterparts did, and governors were able to raise vast numbers of troops.

While provincial armies technically were supposed to stay within the provinces over which their governors had jurisdiction, by the middle of the 1st century BC this rule was ignored. By the end of the Republic, the various commanders participating in Rome's civil wars had raised the number of legions throughout the provinces to more than fifty, many under the command of a single man.

The necessity of raising legions quickly, to offset battle losses, resulted in an abbreviation of the recruitment process. The government appointed two boards, of three military tribunes each, empowered to enter any region in Roman jurisdiction for the purpose of enlisting men. These tribunes were not elected. The experience requirement was dropped in the case of aristocratic appointees. Some were as young as 18, although this age was considered acceptable for a young aristocrat on his way up the cursus honorum, or ladder of offices.

The appointed tribunes conducted an ad hoc draft, or dilectus, to recruit men. They tended to select the youngest and most capable-looking. It was similar to later naval press gangs, except that Roman citizens were entitled to some process, no matter how abbreviated. If they had to, the appointed tribunes drafted slaves, as they did after the Battle of Cannae.

Soldiers who had served out their time and had obtained their discharge (missio), but had voluntarily re-enlisted, were called evocati.

The Standard Legion [ edit | wysig bron]

A standard Republican legion before the reforms of Gaius Marius (“the early Republic”) contained about 4500 men divided into the velites, the principes, and the hastati — of 1200 men each — also the triarii, of 600 men, and the equites, of 300 men. The first three types stood forward in battle the triarii stood back. The velites and the equites were used mainly for various kinds of support.

The class system of Servius Tullius already had organized society to support the military. He practically had created a "store" in which officers could "shop" for the resources they needed. Officers were elected by the civilian centuries, usually from the classici, or from the patricii if the latter were not included in the classici (there is some question about how this worked).

There were available 80 centuries of wealthy classici, 40 of young men ages 17 to 45, and 40 of men 45 and older. These citizens could afford whatever arms and armor the officers thought they needed. The classici could go into any branch of the legion, but generally veterans were preferred for the triarii, and young men for the velites. The rest was filled out from the young 40 centuries. The older 40 were kept for emergencies, which occurred frequently. These older men were roughly equivalent to the United States Army Reserve.

If the arms requirement was less severe, or the expensive troops were in short supply, the recruiters selected from Classes 2 through 4, which again offered either older or younger men. Class 5 were centuries of specialists, such as carpenters. The Romans preferred not to use Class 6, but if the need was very great they were known to recruit even from slaves and the poor, who would have to be equipped by the state.

The full equipage of arms and armor were the helmet with colored crest and face protectors, breastplates or chain mail (if a soldier could afford it), greaves, the parma (a round shield), the scutum (an oblong wrap-around of hide on a wood frame, edged with metal, with the insignia of the legion painted on it), the pilum (the hasta velitaris, a light javelin of about 3 feet with a 9-inch metal head), and a short sword they borrowed from Spanish tribes, the gladius. The gladius was both pointed for thrusting, and edged for slashing.

These arms could be combined in various ways, except that one battle-line had to be armed in the same way. Most typical was a line of principes armed with pila and gladii, and defended by the scuti. The hastati could be armed the same way, or with the hasta and parma. The velites bore the hasta velitaris and depended on running to get them away after a throw, which is why only the young were chosen for that job.

The basic unit of the army was the company-sized centuria of 60 men commanded by a centurion. He had under him two junior officers, the optiones, each of whom had a standard-bearer, or vexillarius. Presumably he used the two officers to form two squads. In addition, a squad of 20 velites was attached to the century, probably instructed ad hoc by the centurion.

Two centuries made up a manipulum of 120 men. Each line of battle contained 10 maniples, 1200 men, except that the triarii numbered only 600. The legion of 4200 infantry created in this way was supported by 300 equites, or cavalry, organized in 10 turmae (squadrons) of 30 horse each, under a master of horse (magister equitatum), who took orders from the legion commander. Cavalry was used for scouting, skirmishing and various sorts of clean-up — they also constituted another reserve that could be thrown into the battle. The Republic was ignorant of armies on horseback, which, coming off the steppes of Central Asia in blitzkrieg operations, were to trouble the later empire.

The Legion in battle [ edit | wysig bron]

Servius Tullius, who most likely originally was an Etruscan soldier of fortune, identified the disadvantages of an army recruited from landowners: such an army depended heavily on a large farmer-class of citizens to provide troops. So Tullius pressed for reforms that granted veterans land. Although he was assassinated he did establish the precedent of granting land to veterans.

The army at first was not overly-successful, partly because it faced superior generals, and partly because of its inexperience. Roman commanders gave up trying to defeat Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, by direct combat as he ravaged Italy. The most successful Roman general at that time, Fabius Cunctator (“the delayer”), camped at a distance and watched the doings of the Carthaginians, while his troops harassed the Carthaginian army on its fringes.

Later, though, the army came into the hands of a family of careerists and professional soldiers, the Cornelii, a gens of the most ancient stock, patrician in the best sense of the word. They were the first real successors to Servius. After much trial and error, suffering personal losses, they produced one of the best and most influential generals Rome ever had, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus. He built the Servian army into a victorious fighting machine.

Let the Carthaginians ravage Italy, Scipio declared — he took the war to Carthage, landing in North Africa with a republican army. The strategy succeeded: Hannibal was recalled at once — he came home immediately, with a disrupted army, and he was beaten by Scipio at the Battle of Zama, in 202 BC. Using the tactics developed by Scipio — now entitled Africanus — plus good generalship, the army at last lived up to the potential imparted to it by King Servius.

Roman army tactics worked as follows. The general first picked his ground. The Roman military now understood fairly well the importance of taking the initiative and picking its own ground, with some infamous exceptions. If the terrain was not right, the army remained within its fortified camp (which was virtually unassailable) until the enemy moved on, and then followed, waiting for an opportunity to engage.

The ideal terrain was a gently sloping hill with a stream at the bottom. The enemy would have to ford the stream and move up the slope. The film, Spartacus, recreates this scenario.

The legion was drawn up in three lines of battle, with the turmae and the velites placed as the situation required. The hastati in front and the principes behind were stationed in a line of maniples like chess pieces, 10 per line, separated from each other. The two centuries of a maniple fought side-by-side. The line of principes was offset so as to cover the gaps in the hastati, and the triarii, somewhat more thinly-spread, covered the principes.

Roman soldiers fought in long thin lines. Such open formations allowed the Romans, often outnumbered, to outflank an enemy using a deep formation. The last thing they wanted was to be crushed together and cut down without being able to use their weapons, as they had been so many times before, and as so many armies who never studied Roman warfare were to be later. For the Romans, every man by regulation was allowed one square yard in which to fight, and square yards were separated by gaps of three feet.

Now came the moment of battle. The turmae and the bands of velites (skirmishers) made forays opportunistically, trying to disrupt the ranks of the enemy or prevent them from crossing the stream, if there was one. While they were doing this, the rest of the legion advanced. At a signal, the skirmishers retired through or around Roman ranks — there probably were trumpet calls, but we know little about them.

Picking up speed, the first and second ranks launched spears, the second rank over the heads of the first using light lanceae with launchers, the first rank at the last moment with pila, or javelins. On impact the heavy iron points drove through shields and armor both, pinning men together and disrupting the line. The hastati then drew gladii and closed. So great was the impact, we hear from Caesar, that sometimes the men would jump up on the enemy shields to cut downward.

What happened next depended on the success of the hastati. If they were victorious, they were joined by the principes, who merged into their line to fill the gaps and make up losses. The triarii moved to the flanks to envelop the enemy. If the hastati were not victorious, they merged backward into the principes. The third line remained in reserve unless the other two failed, in which case the front two merged into the third.

As Roman Legions were composed primarily of heavy infantry, they displayed the advantages and drawbacks of classical heavy infantry. It is notable that three of the biggest defeats (Battle of Carrhae, Battle of Teutoburg Forest, Battle of Ctesiphon) all came at the hands of light infantry or light cavalry forces.


The coming of the Cimbri

In 115 BC a great migration shook central Europe. The Cimbri, a Germanic tribe hailing originally from what is now the Jutland Peninsula, had started migrating south. Harsh winter conditions or flooding of their homeland had forced them to take this drastic measure and search for a new homeland.

The horde headed southwards. Hundreds of thousands of people filled its ranks – men, women and children. And it was not long before the migration swelled further. As the Cimbri journeyed south, two other Germanic tribes had joined the migration: the Ambrones and Teutones.

By 113 BC, after a long and perilous journey, they had arrived at the Celtic kingdom of Noricum, situated on the northern reaches of the Alps.

At the time, Noricum was inhabited by the Taurisci, a Celtic tribe. Upon the arrival of this huge migration they sought aid from their ally to the south. That ally was Rome.

The Romans agreed to help. Gnaeus Carbo, the Roman consul for the year 113 BC, was sent to Noricum with an army to deal with this new threat.

Map highlighting The migration of the Cimbri and the Teutons (Credit: Pethrus / CC).


How did gaius marius improve recruitment for army?

The reforms of the army of 107 BC by Gaius Marius have been called the Marian reforms. These made joining the army voluntary, allowed the landless poor to join the army, and made the state pay for the soldiers' equipment. Previously soldiers were drafted by the state and they had to be peasant-proprietors above a certain property threshold. This was because soldiers had to pay for their military equipment. The reforms abolished the property threshold, making the landless poor eligible for service. By making the state pay for the soldiers' equipment, the reforms made it possible for the poor to join the army.

The Marian reforms also established a career of 16 years (later Augustus increased it to 20 years). Soldiers were also entitled a grant of a sizable sum of money (nummaria missio) or a plot of land to farm (agraria missio) on discharge. The poor flocked to the army because it gave them a career, a pay (the Roman state had started paying the soldiers in 405 BC) and a pension.

The Marian reforms paved the way for the creation of a standing army by Augustus. Prior to that the soldiers were recruited and paid by the military commanders for the campaigning season. Augustus made the soldiers stay in the army all year round. He also created a military treasury funded with inheritance taxes and taxes of the sale of goods. The soldier were now paid by the imperial state.