Menseregte in Indonesië - Geskiedenis

Menseregte in Indonesië - Geskiedenis



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Die wet bied strafmaatreëls vir amptelike korrupsie, en die regering het oor die algemeen probeer om die wet na te kom. Elemente binne die regering, polisie en regbank het egter probeer om pogings om korrupte amptenare te vervolg, te ondermyn. Ten spyte van die arrestasie en skuldigbevinding van baie hooggeplaaste en hooggeplaaste amptenare, was daar 'n wydverspreide binnelandse en internasionale opvatting dat korrupsie endemies bly. Die KPK, POLRI, die eenheid vir spesiale misdaad van TNI en die kantoor van die prokureur -generaal, onder die adjunk -prokureur -generaal vir spesiale misdade, het jurisdiksie oor die ondersoek en vervolging van korrupsiesake. Die KPK het nie die bevoegdheid om lede van die weermag te ondersoek nie, en is ook nie bevoeg in gevalle waar staatsverliese onder 'n miljard IDR ($ 75,000) gewaardeer word nie.

KPK -ondersoekers is soms geteister, geïntimideer of aangeval weens hul korrupsiewerk. In April het ongeïdentifiseerde aanvallers 'n suuraanval op 'n senior KPK -ondersoeker, Novel Baswedan, gepleeg, wat 'n aansienlike verlies aan sig tot gevolg gehad het; die polisie het nie geïdentifiseer wie die aanval gepleeg het nie, en die saak word steeds ondersoek. Baswedan het ondersoek ingestel na bewerings wat verband hou met die elektroniese identiteitskaartskandaal (E-KTP).

Korrupsie: Die KPK het ondersoek ingestel en vervolg amptenare wat verdink word van korrupsie op alle regeringsvlakke. Verskeie hoë profiel korrupsiesake het grootskaalse verkrygings- of bouprogramme behels en het wetgewers, goewerneurs, regente, regters, polisie en staatsamptenare betrek. Teen die einde van 2016 het die KPK ondersoeke en vervolgings gedoen en ongeveer 497,6 miljard IDR ($ 37,3 miljoen) se staatsbates verhaal. Die KPK handhaaf 'n 100 % skuldigbevindingsyfer, ondersteun deur die vervolging van 3,640 ent -sake uit 'n totaal van 3,669 sake van 2002 tot 2016. Volgens sy 2016 -jaarverslag het die KPK 96 ondersoeke gedoen; het 99 vervolgings begin; en 77 sake voltooi wat skuldigbevindings opgelê het.

Op 9 Maart het die KPK begin met die vervolging van twee voormalige amptenare van die ministerie van Binnelandse Sake vir transplantasie wat verband hou met die inskrywings in die Indonesiese elektroniese identiteitskaart (E-KTP) se verkrygingsprojek. Op 20 Julie het die korrupsiehof die twee voormalige amptenare, Irman en Sugiharto, onderskeidelik tot sewe en vyf jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis. Die E-KTP-saak, wat die grootste korrupsiesaak is wat ooit deur die KPK ondersoek is, het uitgebrei tot die vervolging van die voormalige speaker van die Huis van Verteenwoordigers, die Golkar-politikus Setya Novanto, wie se verhoor op 13 Desember begin het. Op 21 Desember het die Jakarta Die korrupsiehof het die sakeman Andi Agustinus tot agt jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis weens sameswering met Novanto en ander om 52,7 biljoen IDR ($ 7,5 miljoen) te verduister. Die voormalige minister van binnelandse sake, Gamawan Fauzi, en meer as 37 DPR -lede was betrokke by die KPK se aanklag. Die KPK het ook die strafregtelike vervolging van die voormalige DPR -wetgewer Miryam Haryani vervolg, wat die hof tot agt jaar vir meineed gevonnis het nadat sy haar vroeëre getuienis in die saak teruggetrek het na beweerde intimidasie van DPR -lede, sowel as Markus Nari, 'n wetgewer van die Golkar Party , vir meineed wat verband hou met die saak.

Korrupsiehowe het gedurende die jaar skuldigbevindings in baie hoëprofiel-korrupsiesake opgelê. Drie voormalige nasionale wetgewers-Damayanti Wisnu Putranti, Budi Supriyanto en Andi Taufan Tiro-is einde 2016 en begin 2017 tot tussen vier en nege jaar tronkstraf gevonnis omdat hulle na bewering omkoopgeld van 'n bouverkoper aanvaar het om die tender van 'n pad te verseker bouprojek in die Maluku -provinsie. Die Trans-Maluku-saak was belangrik om byna die helfte van alle wetgewers van die kommissie wat toesig hou oor die projek, sowel as hooggeplaaste amptenare van die ministerie van behuising en openbare werke, en plaaslike regeringsamptenare in die Maluku-provinsie te betrek. Die projek demonstreer die deurdringende en sistemiese korrupsie wat strek oor die uitvoerende en wetgewende tak.

In Oktober 2016 het president Joko Widodo 'n presidensiële regulasie uitgevaardig wat 'n taakspan stig om onwettige boetes en klein graft uit te wis. Volgens 'n verslag wat die Koördinerende Ministerie vir Politiek, Regte en Veiligheidsake op 2 Augustus uitgereik het, het die taakmag beslag gelê op 17,6 miljard (1,3 miljoen dollar) se onwettige fooie en meer as 900 klopjagte uitgevoer. Owerhede het 1 834 individue van die regering, die polisie en die kantoor van die Prokureur -generaal as verdagtes aangewys. Van die meer as 31 000 klagtes het 36 persent betrekking op die lewering van openbare dienste, 26 persent handel oor wetstoepassing, 18 persent fokus op opvoedkundige instellings en 12 persent wat verband hou met die uitreiking van lisensies en permitte.

Volgens nie -regeringsorganisasies en mediaberigte het die polisie gereeld omkoopgeld onttrek, wat wissel van geringe uitbetalings in verkeersake tot groot omkoopgeld in strafregtelike ondersoeke. Korrupte amptenare het soms migrante wat uit die buiteland terugkeer, wat hoofsaaklik vroue was, onderwerp aan arbitrêre soektogte, diefstal en afpersing.

Die KPK het gedurende die jaar verskeie geregtelike owerhede gearresteer, waaronder 'n regter van die konstitusionele hof, en korrupsiewaghondgroepe het gesê dat korrupsie oral in die regstelsel hoogty vier. Omkoopgeld en afpersing het vervolging, skuldigbevinding en vonnisoplegging in burgerlike en strafsake beïnvloed. Sleutelpersone in die regstelsel word daarvan beskuldig dat hulle omkoopgeld aanvaar en vermoedelike korrupsie goedgekeur het. Regshulporganisasies het aangemeld dat sake dikwels baie stadig beweeg, tensy omkoopgeld betaal is en dat aanklaers in sommige gevalle betaling van verweerders eis om 'n minder ywerige vervolging of betaling te verseker om 'n saak te laat verdwyn.

Tussen April 2016 en Mei 2017 het die Nasionale Ombudsman -kommissie 392 klagtes in verband met litigasie gunste en wanadministrasie in hofbesluite ontvang. In dieselfde tydperk het die Regterlike Kommissie 712 openbare klagtes ontvang wat verband hou met wangedrag van die geregtelike owerheid en aanbeveel dat 33 regters aan verdere ondersoeke onderwerp word. Vanaf 27 Julie het die Kommissie sanksies aanbeveel vir drie regters wat daarvan beskuldig word dat hulle verhore gemanipuleer het.

Finansiële openbaarmaking: Die wet vereis dat senior regeringsamptenare, sowel as ander amptenare wat in sekere agentskappe werk, finansiële openbaarmakingsverslae moet indien. Die wet vereis dat die verslae alle bates van die amptenare, hul eggenote en hul afhanklike kinders bevat. Die wet vereis dat verslae ingedien moet word wanneer die amptenaar sy amp beklee, elke twee jaar daarna, binne twee maande nadat hy sy amp verlaat het, en onmiddellik op versoek van die KPK. Die KPK is verantwoordelik vir die verifiëring van openbaarmakings en die bekendmaking daarvan in die Staatskoerant en op die internet. Daar is strafregtelike sanksies vir nienakoming in gevalle waar korrupsie betrokke is. Nie alle bates is geverifieer nie weens beperkinge op menslike hulpbronne binne die KPK. Op 11 Desember het die KPK 'n nuwe aanlyn stelsel bekendgestel om die verpligte welvaartverslae in te dien.

In Julie 2016 het die nuut aangestelde polisiehoof, Tito Karnavian, opdrag gegee dat alle senior polisiebeamptes hul finansiële state bekend maak. Na aanleiding van die opdrag van die polisiehoof, het die polisiehoof van Jakarta Metro, Moechgiyarto, verduidelik dat die polisie slegs verplig is om die bateverslag by die polisie se interne aangeleenthede in te dien en nie aan die KPK nie, om openbare wanpersepsies van die ondersoeke te vermy.


Menseregte in Indonesië

Tot 1945 was Indonesië 'n Nederlandse kolonie. Tussen 1967-1998 was Indonesië 'n outoritêre diktatuur onder president Suharto. Sedertdien het die land homself in die afgelope jare verander in 'n grootliks stabiele demokrasie.

Ekonomie

Die Indonesiese ekonomie het in 1997/1998 in 'n diep krisis gedompel, waarvan die gevolge eers sedert 2005 herstel het. Die hoë ekonomiese groei van meer as 5% per jaar vir ongeveer 10 jaar het gelei tot 'n groeiende middelklas. As gevolg van die Covid 19 -pandemie, het die bruto nasionale produk in 2020 vir die eerste keer sedert 1998 gedaal (ongeveer 1,5%meer)

Samelewing

Volgens ehistorylib is daar meer as 250 etniese groepe in Indonesië met hul eie taal en kulturele tradisies. Gemeet aan die aantal gelowiges, is Indonesië die grootste Islamitiese land ter wêreld, maar daar is groot dele van die land waarin Christene of (op Bali) Hindoes die meerderheid van die bevolking uitmaak.

Elke dag

Toeriste uit die meeste lande kan hul visum kry by die inskrywing. Buite die digbevolkte eilande kan reis in Indonesië moeilik wees as gevolg van 'n gebrek aan infrastruktuur. Daar was geïsoleerde bomaanvalle deur Islamitiese terroriste in Indonesië, maar die meeste van hulle was nie deur buitelanders geteiken nie.


Omdat Oos -Timoreërs soveel deurgemaak het om onafhanklikheid van Indonesië te verkry, is sommige van die ander streke in Indonesië geïgnoreer. In sommige gebiede het brutale onderdrukking al jare plaasgevind. Neem die volgende byvoorbeeld

  • In Aceh (ook Acheh of Atjeh):
    • Daar was baie skendings van menseregte (ondersteun deur die Indonesiese weermag) wat in verskillende dele van Aceh geïgnoreer word.
    • Sommige vergelykings in hierdie agtergrond van die Human Rights Watch dui daarop dat die probleme in Aceh groter kan wees as dié in Oos -Timor.
    • Amnesty International berig 'n ooreenkoms met Oos -Timor, waar "almal wat verslag doen oor die menseregte -situasie gerig en weggejaag word om te verseker dat daar geen getuies is van die oordrewe van die veiligheidsmagte nie", of, volgens 'n ander verslag van hulle, ander word as politieke gevangenes opgesluit. , deur sommige menseregtegroepe dat ExxonMobil vir sommige van die probleme daar verantwoordelik moet wees.
    • ExxonMobil staan ​​tereg op 'n regsgeding van die International Labour Rights Fund op aanklagte van medepligtigheid met Indonesiese veiligheidsmagte om ernstige menseregteskendings in Aceh te pleeg. Vir meer inligting oor Exxon-Mobil-verwante verslae, sien die volgende:
      • Hierdie nuwe artikel bespreek die skending van menseregte en die bogenoemde aanklagte, asook die vermelding van ander energiemaatskappye wat regsgedinge in die gesig gestaar het. , ondersoek 'n verslag deur Robert Jereski die konteks en die impak van ExxonMobil se veiligheidsreëlings met die Indonesiese weermag
        webwerf. webwerf
      • Die Spice Islands, soos hulle ook bekend staan, en die hoofstad Ambon, het sedert 1997 onluste beleef wat vandag nog plaasvind.
      • Honderde is dood as gevolg van spanning tussen Christene en Moslems.
      • Indonesië isoleer die eiland om 'te verhoed dat gerugte en persberigte sektariese geweld aanblaas'. Dit kan ook gesien word as 'n stap om te verhoed dat joernaliste verslag doen oor gruweldade wat na die isolasie kan plaasvind. Daar is ongeveer twee miljoen mense in die streek waar slegs 'n geringe meerderheid Moslem is en die ander hoofsaaklik Christene.

      Hierdie kwessies is grotendeels deur die westerse hoofstroommedia gerapporteer voordat die Oos -Timor -krisis uitgebreek het, hoewel groepe soos Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International en ander dit steeds genoem het. Aangesien politieke en ekonomiese probleme Indonesië (en dus die westerse sakebelange daar) raak, kom daar baie stadig meer beriggewing oor die streek, hoewel hierdie konflikte nog minder genoem word.

      Om mee te begin, sowel as die bogenoemde skakels, kan die volgende addisionele inligting verskaf:


      Die regte -stryd van Indonesië: besluit watter kandidaat die 'kleinste kwaad' is

      'N Debat het getoon dat geen van die kandidate in die presidensiële wedloop in Indonesië planne het om menseregteskendings aan te spreek nie.

      JAKARTA — Op 'n verhoog in die hotelkamer van die Hotel Bidakara in die middestad van Jakarta tydens 'n presidensiële debat, verdedig die huidige leier van Indonesië, Joko Widodo, sagmoedig wat op sy beste 'n geruite rekord oor menseregte was.

      Widodo, in die volksmond bekend as Jokowi, ontken dat hy toesig gehou het oor die regte -skendings wat hy belowe het, soos vier jaar gelede toe hy die eerste keer vir die presidentskap aangehad het, om die regstelsel te hervorm en hy het belowe, soos hy vier jaar gelede gedoen het, grondhervorming. En in die loop van die 73 minute heen en weer Donderdagaand-die eerste van vyf sulke debatte voor die verkiesing in April-het hy getoon hoe min hier werklik verander het tydens sy ampstermyn.

      Toe Jokowi in 2014 aan bewind kom, het hy nege prioriteite gedoen, 'n program wat hy die Nawa Cita genoem het. Onder hulle was 'n belofte om vorige menseregtelike ongeregtighede op te los. Sy belofte het die vooruitsig gestel om ten minste dekades van weermagmisbruik, outoritêre oorrekking en onderdrukking van minderheidsregte erkenning te gee, indien nie aan te spreek nie. In 'n deel van die wêreld wat dikwels gepla word deur 'n vorm van morele relativisme -Ons land is goed, ander is erger- dit blyk 'n belangrike stap vorentoe te wees.

      Min tasbare vordering het egter gerealiseer. Alhoewel Jokowi nie direk met menseregteskendings verbind is nie, word sy presidentskap gekenmerk deur 'n gebrek aan verbetering in die aangeleentheid (regte-groepe gaan verder en sê dat hy in werklikheid die verslegting van die voorwaardes gehad het). 'N Ondersoek na 'n aanval op 'n ondersoeker teen korrupsie het nêrens gegaan nie. Jokowi se administrasie het teruggehou met voorstelle dat hy formeel om verskoning sou vra vir 'n dekade oue regeringsmoord en dit het versoeke van internasionale liggame van die hand gewys om 'n rustige gebied te besoek wat onafhanklikheid wil hê. Alhoewel Jokowi nou sê dat hy die ongeregtighede van die verlede wil aanspreek, is voorstanders van menseregte mismoedig oor die vooruitsig wat hy sal volg. En hierdie verkiesing het min kans om verandering te bring: die posbekleër lê voor in die peilings, en sy enigste uitdager het nog 'n slegter rekord.

      "Jokowi sal dit nie waag om menseregtekwessies op te los nie," sê Rivanlee Anandar, 'n navorser in Jakarta by die Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Geweld, 'n regte-groep wat hier bekend staan ​​onder die akroniem in Indonesies, Kontras. 'Sy administrasie het 'n agteruitgang in menseregte getoon.

      Indonesië het 'n lang geskiedenis van vertrap op individuele regte. Sy eerste leier, Sukarno, was aanvanklik 'n kragtige voorstander van vryheid, terwyl hy die beweging gelei het wat uiteindelik die onafhanklikheid van die land gewen het, maar met sy bewindstyd het hy meer en meer outoritêre bewegings gemaak (op 'n stadium het hy lewenslank president van Indonesië geword) ). Sukarno is uiteindelik verdryf in 'n militêre staatsgreep onder leiding van Suharto, 'n generaal en iemand wat, net soos sy voorganger en baie ander Indonesiërs, slegs een naam het. Suharto se dekades lange outoritêre heerskappy het begin en geëindig in geweld: In 'n onstuimige tydperk tussen 1965 en Suharto wat uiteindelik die mag in 1967 verower het, het groot getalle-ramings wissel van honderde duisende tot 1 miljoen-kommuniste en vermeende kommuniste gedood, en sy bedanking in 1998 te midde van massademonstrasies en onluste wat honderde dood gelaat het.

      Sedert Suharto se vertrek is daar vordering gemaak: Nuwe wette is uitgevaardig, verdragte is onderteken en ad-hoc-menseregteverhore is gehou, “al is dit onbevredigend”, sê Andreas Harsono, die Indonesiese navorser van Human Rights Watch, die internasionale monitering. groep. Een van Jokowi se voorgangers, Abdurrahman Wahid, het aangedring op 'n groter amptelike aanvaarding van Indonesiërs wat etnies Chinees was, 'n minderheidsgroep wat aanhoudende diskriminasie tydens Suharto se heerskappy ondervind het, en het om verskoning gevra vir die slagting wat Suharto aan bewind gebring het (hy bly die enigste Indonesiese president om te doen) so). Wahid is egter later aangekla weens 'n verskeidenheid ander skandale en na 'n magstryd met sy opvolger. Sedertdien het die vordering op die regtefront verswak.

      Jokowi het belowe om dit alles te verander. Terwyl hy hom in 2014 vir president beywer het, het hy byvoorbeeld belowe om die beperkings op internasionale ondersoekers na menseregte op te hef en op die buitelandse pers wat die Indonesiese streek Papua besoek, waar 'n onafhanklikheidsbeweging al dekades lank oproerig is.

      In die kantoor was dit 'n ander storie. Sy regering het geweier om die hoof van die menseregte van die Verenigde Nasies toe te laat om Papua te besoek, waar regte-groepe die weermag daarvan beskuldig dat hulle die onafhanklikheidsbeweging gewelddadig onderdruk het, en het toegang vir buitelandse media daar beperk.

      En Jokowi het jare lank die vergadering vermy met betogers wat deelgeneem het aan die "Kamisan" -byeenkoms, 'n weeklikse vreedsame protes wat voor die presidensiële paleis van Jakarta gehou is en 'n beroep op die owerhede gedoen het om die skending van menseregte in die verlede aan te spreek, voordat hy uiteindelik die afgelope Mei laat vaar het (dat hy slegs in die laaste jaar van sy termyn bygewoon is, is geïnterpreteer as 'n politieke stap en het kritiek gelewer).

      Kontras, in 'n verslag wat in Oktober bekend gemaak is oor die beoordeling van Jokowi se ampstyd, het gesê dat Indonesië agteruit geval het oor 'n verskeidenheid regteverwante kwessies, van die gebruik van die doodstraf en buite-geregtelike moorde tot die gestremdheidsregte en die vervolging van inheemse volke en minderhede. Lasterwysgedinge - wat dikwels gebruik word om kritiese beriggewing of kritiek op maghebbers te onderdruk - het die afgelope vier jaar gestyg, terwyl ligsinnige vervolgings, soos die tronkstraf van 'n etnies Chinese Indonesiese vrou weens godslastering nadat sy gekla het oor die volume klank van 'n nabygeleë moskee, het toegeneem.

      Een van die kommerwekkendste gevalle was die van Roman Baswedan. Die senior ondersoeker teen korrupsie was te midde van 'n uitgebreide ondersoek in 2017 toe iemand soutsuur na sy gesig gegooi het. Baswedan moes na Singapore gehaas word vir behandeling, en nadat hy vier operasies ondergaan het, bly hy steeds byna heeltemal blind in sy linkeroog. Tog is niemand in hegtenis geneem of vervolg vir die aanranding nie.

      Daar is ook kommer oor die onderneming wat die Indonesiese leier hou. Onder sy ministers is 'n afgetrede generaal wat in 2004 deur die Verenigde State op 'n visumlyslys geplaas is en wat deur die VN aangekla is weens sy beweerde betrokkenheid by 'n reeks mishandelinge, insluitend moorde, rondom Indonesië se onttrekking in 1999 uit Oos -Timor , 'n provinsie wat dit beheer het. Jokowi se huidige hardloopmaat, Ma'ruf Amin, is 'n leier van die hoogste geestelike liggaam in Indonesië, 'n organisasie wat onder sy leiding godsdienstige verklarings uitgereik het ter ondersteuning van vroulike genitale verminking en godsdienstige minderhede veroordeel het.

      Jokowi se "rekord oor die behoud van menseregte, sy agting vir kerndemokratiese beginsels, sy verbintenis tot deursigtige en verantwoordbare regering en sy steun vir 'n betekenisvolle anti-korrupsie-agenda is almal baie twyfelagtig," Tom Power, 'n navorser wat spesialiseer in die Indonesiese politiek aan die Australian National University in Canberra, skryf in 'n onlangse ontleding.

      Daar is, indien enigiets, 'n gevoel onder sommige Indonesiërs dat 'n leier wat belowe het om dit te bevorder, hierdie kwessies in die wiele ry. 'Menseregte-tragedies', het Maria Catarina Sumarsih, wie se seun in die onluste in 1998 gesterf het en sedertdien 'n prominente aktivis geword het, vir my gesê, 'is net 'n politieke handelsmerk, wat gebruik is om meer stemme te kry.'

      Jokowi het egter ten minste een ding: hy is nie sy teenstander nie.

      Teenoor die Indonesiese president is dieselfde persoon wat hom in 2014 uitgedaag het, die voormalige militêre bevelvoerder Prabowo Subianto. Subianto, wat eens met een van Suharto se dogters getroud was, is tydens die vorige veldtog bekommerd oor aantygings van menseregteskendings. 'N Onlangs afgeklassifiseerde Amerikaanse diplomatieke kabel beweer dat die eenmalige hoof van die spesiale magte van Indonesië beveel het dat ontvoerders in 1998 ontvoer sal word. . ” (Subianto het egter voormalige lede van Indonesië se nasionale kommissie vir menseregte aangestel om deel te wees van sy nuwe veldtogspan.)

      Volgens Debbie Stothard, die sekretaris-generaal van die Internasionale Federasie vir Menseregte, het gewone kiesers begin besef dat dit in hierdie verkiesing 'die vraag is wie die mindere kwaad is'.


      Implementering

      Indonesië hou by die ideologie Demokrasie van Pancasila. Sodat die implementering van menseregte in Indonesië goed moet werk in ooreenstemming met die basiese eienskappe van die verstaan ​​van Pancasila as demokrasie.

      Volgens hierdie ideologie word die regte van elke volk in Indonesië basies vryelik toegepas, maar word dit beperk deur die regte van ander. Hierdie ideologie bied dus die vryheid wat verantwoordelik is vir die implementering van menseregte. Dit moet egter dieper bestudeer word, want die ideologie wat deur hierdie land Indonesië aangeneem word, hoef nie noodwendig deur mense met absolute regte toegepas te word nie.

      Politieke kant

      Vanuit politieke kant het die mense van Indonesië 'n breë politieke vryheid geniet. Vier basiese vryhede, naamlik die reg op vryheid van uitdrukking en kommunikasie, die reg op vryheid van vergadering, die reg op vryheid van assosiasie en die reg om deel te neem aan die regering, wat noodsaaklik is vir die werking van die politieke stelsel en die demokratiese regering wat is deur die meerderheid van die Indonesiese mense geniet.

      Indonesiërs geniet die vryheid van assosiasie. Mense is nie net vry om politieke partye te stig as 'n manier om te veg vir hul politieke aspirasies nie. Tans is mense ook vry om burgerlike organisasies te stig, soos boere -vakbonde, vakbonde, verenigings van inheemse mense, ensovoorts. Boonop versterk die groei van gewilde organisasies die burgerlike samelewing wat nodig is vir die kontinuïteit van die politieke stelsel en demokratiese bestuur.

      Gevalle van skending van menseregte

      1. Die gebeure van Trisakti en Semanggi (1998)

      Trisakti -tragedie het op 12 Mei 1998 plaasgevind. Hierdie gebeure hou verband met die beweging in die hervormingsera wat in 1998 plaasgevind het. massiewe demonstrasie in verskillende gebiede wat dan lei tot die botsings tussen studente en die polisie. Hierdie tragedie het tot gevolg gehad dat 4 studente dood is en nog tientalle beseer is.

      2. Case Marsinah (1993)

      Marsinah-saak het plaasgevind op 3-4 Mei 1993. 'n Werker en 'n vroulike aktivis by PT Catur Putera Surya Porong, Oos-Java. Hierdie gebeurtenis het ontstaan ​​uit die stakingsbeweging deur werkers Marsinah en PT CPS ’ arbeiders. Hulle eis die antwoord van die maatskappye wat hulle sonder rede afgedank het.

      Na die demonstrasie is Marsinah in plaas daarvan dood gevind vyf dae later. Sy is in wrede omstandighede in die bosgebied Wilangan, Nganjuk, vermoor en word beweer dat sy die skending van menseregte soos ontvoering, marteling en moord is. Die ondersoek duur nog steeds voort.

      3. Aksie Bali -bombardement (2002)

      Hierdie gebeurtenis het plaasgevind in 2002. 'n Bom het in die omgewing van Legian Kuta, Bali, deur 'n groep terroriste -netwerke ontplof. Die paniek het oor die argipel gekom as gevolg van hierdie gebeure. Die bomaanvalle op Bali het ook in die toekoms baie terreur veroorsaak. Die bomaanval op Bali het een van die grootste terreurdade in Indonesië geword. As gevolg van hierdie gebeure het soveel as honderde mense gesterf, wat wissel van buitelandse toeriste tot plaaslike inwoners in die omgewing.

      4. Gebeurtenisse Tanjung Priok (1984)

      Tanjung Priok -saak het in 1984 plaasgevind tussen amptenare met die plaaslike mense wat afkomstig was van rasse -probleem en 'n politieke element. Hierdie gebeure veroorsaak deur die plaaslike mense wat aan die regering gedemonstreer het en plaaslike amptenare wat die oordrag van die heilige graf van Mbah Priok wil uitvoer. Die woedende inwoners wat verset het en daarna 'n protesoptrede voer, veroorsaak 'n botsing tussen die inwoners en lede van die polisie en weermag. In hierdie voorval het beweerde menseregteskendings plaasgevind waar honderde mense dood is as gevolg van geweld en skietery.

      Hantering van oortredingsake

      'N Bietjie voorkoming is die moeite werd om te genees. Hierdie stelling moes baie keer gebruik gewees het. Dit is veral relevant vir die handhawing van menseregte. Die beste aksie om menseregte te handhaaf, is om alle oorsake van menseregteskendings te voorkom. As die oorsaak nie verskyn nie, kan die skending van menseregte tot die minimum beperk word of selfs uitgeskakel word. Hier is voorsorgmaatreëls wat ons kan tref om menseregteskendings aan te spreek:

      • Die oppergesag van die reg en demokrasie moet gehandhaaf word. Die regsbenadering moet aangespreek word om die deelname van mense aan die nasionale lewe te betrek. Wetstoepassers moet voldoen aan die verpligting om goeie diens aan die gemeenskap te lewer, beskerming aan enige persoon teen enige onwettige daad te gee en om geweld teen die wet te vermy om die wet toe te pas.
      • Die verbetering van die kwaliteit van openbare dienste ten einde die voorkoms van verskillende vorme van menseregteskendings deur die regering te voorkom.
      • Toenemende ondersoek van die openbare en politieke instellings na enige pogings tot handhawing van menseregte wat die regering onderneem.
      • Verhoog die verspreiding van menseregtebeginsels aan die publiek deur formele onderwysinstellings skool of kollege en informeel deur godsdienstige aktiwiteite en seminare.
      • Verhoog die professionaliteit van staatsveiligheids- en verdedigingsinstellings.
      • Versterk die harmonieuse samewerking tussen groepe in die gemeenskap om die oortuigings en opinies van mekaar te verstaan ​​en te respekteer.

      Menseregte is 'n gesamentlike poging van alle mense om gelykheid vir almal te bewerkstellig. Sowel as om humanisme te omhels wat op sy beurt alle mense in elke nasie saam bevoordeel.


      ɽreigemente en intimidasie van die plaaslike bevolking '

      Maar einde Maart het die VN -kenners die megaprojek aan die kaak gestel as 'n quotrampling op menseregte & quot.

      Daar word gesê dat die plaaslike bevolking onderworpe was aan dreigemente en intimidasie en dat hulle met geweld uit hul land gesit is sonder vergoeding, volgens 'n gesamentlike verklaring deur 'n hele paneel VN -spesialiste.

      Die harde kritiek het ook direk gemik op die AIIB en die Franse groep VINCI, wat die grootste belegger is, onder leiding van die renbaan, verskeie hotelle en 'n hospitaal.

      Maar die plaaslike owerhede en die polisie het beskuldigings van grondroof en gedwonge uitsettings ontken, terwyl Indonesië se missie by die VN selfs die kenners daarvan beskuldig het dat hulle met 'n "vals verhaal" vorendag gekom het.

      Die AIIB het ook beklemtoon dat hy die omgewings- en maatskaplike riglyne nakom en "vinnig" reageer op klagtes wat ontstaan.

      Die finale verslag het geen bewyse gevind van beweerde dwang, gebruik van direkte geweld en intimidasie wat verband hou met die verkryging van grond en hervestiging nie, 'lui 'n verklaring van die AIIB.

      Toe verslaggewers van die BBC se Indonesiese diens na Mandalika gaan om self te gaan kyk, het die ervarings van die plaaslike bevolking baie gewissel.

      Tientalle gesinne met hul vee hou nog steeds vas in die dorpie Kuta, terwyl die groot toerusting vir die bou van die motorfietsbaan agter die klapperbome gesien kan word.

      Die situasie word bemoeilik deur die feit dat nie alle dorpenaars dokumentasie gehad het dat hulle die grond besit waarop hulle woon nie. Uit 'n paar honderd huishoudings het ongeveer 180 geen bewys van eienaarskap nie en kan hulle hul uitsetting in die hof betwis.

      Een van die inwoners wat nog uithou, sê dat sy nie verhuis het nie, omdat sy meen haar gesin het die grond nooit werklik aan die regering verkoop nie. Intussen is ander inwoners in dieselfde gebied meegedeel dat hul grond reeds aan die staat behoort.

      Baie van die mense sonder bewys van grondeienaarskap is reeds verplaas na 'n gebied ongeveer twee kilometer van die dorp Kuta af.

      Maar Olivier De Schutter, spesiale rapporteur van die VN oor uiterste armoede en menseregte, het aan die BBC Indonesiese diens gesê dat diegene wat nie verplaas is nie, nou gedwing is om langs 'n bouperseel te woon.

      "Wat regtig kommerwekkend is, is dat die werk aan die bou van hierdie hotelle en die Moto Grand Prix -baan begin het sonder dat die gesin werklik in 'n voldoende toestand verhuis en hervestig is," het hy gesê.

      De Schutter voeg by dat die regering nie genoeg gedoen het deur net dorpenaars op te tel en te verhuis nie - en voeg by dat baie van hulle op hul ou dorp afhanklik was vir hul lewensbestaan.

      "Dit is nie genoeg om 'n dak, water, elektrisiteit en kos te hê nie," het hy gesê.

      U moet die vermoë hê om 'n bestaan ​​te maak. Andersins sal hierdie gemeenskappe in 'n desperate situasie verkeer. & Quot

      Om net geldelike vergoeding te ontvang, was nie 'n plaasvervanger nie.

      Damar is een van die dorpenaars wat wel vergoeding van die regering gekry het - maar sê dit was nie genoeg nie.

      Hy was een van die voormalige inwoners van Kuta en het op minder as 500 meter van die konstruksieterrein grootgeword en 'n groot oppervlakte van ongeveer 3,3 hektaar besit - waarvoor hy bewys het van eienaarskap.

      "Ek onthou nog die eerste vergadering in 2019, hulle het dadelik gesê: in Augustus moet die grond ontruim word," het hy aan die BBC gesê. So ons was verward, daar was geen sosialisering, geen beraadslaging en geen ooreenkoms tussen die twee partye nie. & quot

      Volgens Damar is sy grond deur 'n onafhanklike beoordelingspan beoordeel en is hy daarvoor betaal. Maar hy sê die geld stem nie ooreen met die pyn om 'n nuwe lewe te begin nie en die hartseer om die gemeenskap wat hy al jare probeer bou het, te verlaat.

      & quot Ons het die vergoedingsgeld geneem omdat ons geen ander keuse gehad het nie. & quot


      Indonesië

      Hoof tale: Bahasa Indonesia (amptelik), Javaans, Sundanees, ens.

      Belangrikste godsdienste: Moslem 87,2 persent, Christen 7 persent, Rooms -Katoliek 2,9 persent Hindoe 1,7 persent, ander 0,9 persent (Boeddhisties en Confucian ingesluit), ongespesifiseerde 0,4 persent (2010 skatting).

      Belangrikste minderheidsgroepe: Soendanes 15,5 persent, Maleis 3,7 persent, Batak 3,6 persent, Madurese 3 persent, Betawi 2,9 persent, Minangkabau 2,7 persent, Buginese 2,7 persent, Bantenese 2 procent, Banjarese 1,7 persent, Balinees 1,7 procent, Acehnese 1,4 persent, Dayak 1,4 persent, Sasak 1,3 persent, Chinees 1,2 persent, ander 15 persent (Indonesië -sensus 2010).

      Meer as 85 persent van die Indonesiërs beskou hulleself as 'n Moslem, wat Indonesië nominaal die grootste Moslem -nasie ter wêreld maak. Indonesië is taalkundig uiters uiteenlopend. Wes van Java is die meerderheidstaalgroep die Maleis-Polinesiese familie van meer as 250 tale, wat gewoonlik in 16 groot groepe onderskei word. Vier van die 16 groepe van die Maleis-Polinesiese familie is Maleise. Een van die vier is Riau Maleis, die primêre literêre taal van Indonesië, wat in gemoderniseerde vorm Bahasa Indonesia is, die amptelike taal van Indonesië.

      Die groter eilande ondersteun verskeie etno-taalkundige groepe. Sentraal -Java is die tuisland van die oorheersende Javaanse etniese groep (wat ongeveer 40 persent van die Indonesiese bevolking uitmaak), wat mettertyd na baie van die ander bewoonde eilande in die argipel migreer. East Java also contains substantial numbers of Balinese and Madurese from the islands of Bali and Madura, the Balinese being distinctive for having maintained a Hindu-based religion while the other Malay peoples of the archipelago adopted Islam. On the island of Bali itself, about 83 per cent of the population is Hindu. West Java also has a large Sundanese population, who are similar to the Lampung peoples of South Sumatra. Java supports more than half of Indonesia’s total population.

      The economically important island of Sumatra contains a number of significant ethno-linguistic groups besides Javanese. These include the Muslim Acehnese of north Sumatra Minangkabau, a Muslim group noted for its matriarchal structure and tradition of commerce and trading and Batak, a half-dozen related tribes, many of which have become Christianized. Kalimantan is dominated by Dayak, Murut, coastal Malay peoples and ethnic Chinese.

      The Moluccas (or Maluku Islands) are inhabited by peoples who were exposed to Islam and Christianity at around the same time, in the sixteenth century, but managed a peaceful coexistence between the two faiths at community level until the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, when there was brutal communal fighting. Sulawesi is inhabited mainly by Muslim Buginese and Makasarese in the south, and Christianized Minahasans and Manadonese in the north. Papua is home to some 800,000 indigenous people divided into many hundreds of groupings. The names of smaller islands, or clusters of islands, are often coterminous with the ethno-linguistic communities.

      The Indonesian government recognizes the existence of peoples referred to as komunitas adat terpencil (geographically-isolated indigenous communities), yet there are many more who self-identify as indigenous. According to the national indigenous civil society organisation Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN), there are between 50 – 70 million indigenous people in Indonesia.

      Ahmadi Muslims number between 400,000 to 500,000. Ahmadiyya is an Islamic movement considered heretical by some hardline Muslims. Attacks and persecution of Ahmadiyya followers have been increasing in Indonesia, particularly after the country’s top Islamic body declared Ahmadiyya heretical in 2005, and a government decree in 2008 prevented them from proselytizing. The approximately 55,000 members of Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (Gafatar), another smaller Islamic following that combines aspects of Christianity and Islam, have also been increasingly under threat. In March 2016, the Indonesian government issued a decree banning Gafatar the move coincided with a wave of mob violence, evictions and detentions.

      While the presidency of Joko ‘ Jokowi ’ Widodo , beginning in 2014, was accompanied by promises of justice for past human rights abuses, greater equality and strengthened rights protections, many of his supporters have been disappointed by the persistence of discriminatory practices and targeted attacks against minorities and indigenous peoples. Widodo secured re-election in the 2019 elections, win ning more than 55 per cent of the national vote, but his choice of Ma ’ ruf Amin as running mate – a senior Muslim cleric who played a leading role in the prosecution and conviction of Jakart a ’ s Christian governor in 2018 on blasphemy charges – was regarded with dismay by many activists. Widodo himself has been accused of repressing dissent and wooing illiberal groups for political gain. In this content, the situation of the country ’ s minorities and indigenous peoples remains grave.

      In particular, the Ahmadi community, who have suffered increasingly frequent violence against them since a 2008 ministerial decree that declared the Islamic group heretical, continue to be targeted by authorities. In January 2016, for instance, the local government in Bangka, a district of the Bangka-Belitung Islands province off the east coast of Sumatra, issued a letter threate ning Ahmadis to convert to Sunni Islam or be evicted from the area. Bangka residents subsequently subjected the community to further intimidation and harassment. In early February, authorities reportedly visited the community, made up of approximately 14 families, and told them to leave, prompting a number to leave their homes for fear of reprisals. In Many 2018, extremists attacked Ahmadi houses on Lombok Islands, forcing more than 20 community members to seek protection at a police station. Ahmadis continue to face a range of discrimination in Indonesia, including difficulties accessing identification documents.

      Other religious communities have been similarly targeted, including Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (known as Gafatar ), an Islamic sect established in 2012 that incorporates teachings from Christianity and Judaism, thought to have about 55,000 members nationwide. In January 2016, Home Affairs Minister Tjahjo instructed local authorities to close down Gafatar offices. A mob subsequently looted and burned the houses of the community in West Kalimantan. Security forces were reportedly complicit in these actions and failed to protect the community, instead evicting over 7,000 community members from both East and West Kalimantan, holding them in unofficial detention centres, then deporting many – a large proportion of them women and children – back to their hometowns in Java. Thereafter, a joint ministerial decree (No. 93/2016) was issued by the Jokowi administration against Gafatar the following month, declaring the sect blasphemous and its followers heretics. In May 2016, three of its leaders, who had already declared that they had left the religious community, were arrested on accusations of treason and blasphemy and were sentenced in March 2017 to between three and five years in prison.

      Persecution on the basis of one’s religion has not been confined to smaller communities in outlying regions. Basuki Tjahaja Purnama , popularly known as ‘ Ahok ’ – an ethnic Chinese Christian and governor of Jakarta since late 2014 – had proceedings initiated against him in November 2016 by police under Indonesia’s blasphemy law for remarks he had made at a gathering in September. Ahok won the largest share of the vote in the first round of elections to keep his governor’s role, but lost the hotly contested run-off vote in April 2017 to his main contender Anies Baswedan , a former minister of education. The trial had been suspended for the duration of the elections, but the charges certainly had a negative impact on Ahok’s campaign and were widely seen as an attempt by his political opponents to mobilize ethno-religious hatred against him. Once the election was over, the case proceeded in May 2017, Ahok was found guilty of blasphemy and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. He was initially planning his appeal but withdrew it, citing fears that his sentence might be extended if he did. The prosecution’s appeal that Ahok be given a lesser sentence and probation remained in place. In January 2019 Ahok completed his sentence and was released from prison.

      Indonesia’s large and diverse indigenous population continues to face ongoing rights violations, particularly in relation to the control and management of their ancestral land. Despite 2013’s landmark Constitutional Court ruling that gave indigenous peoples rights to own and manage customary forests, estimated to affect 40 million indigenous people, there is not as yet a clear procedure for implementing its provisions, leaving communities vulnerable to continued violations. In March 2016, the National Commission on Human Rights ( Komnas HAM) released the findings of its national inquiry into indigenous peoples’ land rights. It found that the absence of formal recognition of indigenous communities and their customary lands was one of the root causes of human rights violations against indigenous communities. Inequality between indigenous men and women was also highlighted as a contributing factor as women can face discrimination from within their communities regarding decision-making power and are disproportionately affected by conflicts over natural resources as they must travel further distances to find access to food and traditional medicines.

      National level legislation, protecting and outlining the rights of Indonesia’s indigenous peoples, is urgently needed to regulate the process of legal recognition and land demarcation. Though legislation along these lines, the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (PPHMHA) Bill, has already been drafted, but the law remains stalled in parliament. As Indonesia has one of the highest d eforestation rates in the world, it is crucial that indigenous peoples achieve the right to manage their own forests to prevent the onslaught of land development projects that until now have proceeded largely without their consent.

      In the far eastern provinces of Papua and West Papua, collectively referred to as West Papua, human rights abuses remain widespread despite official commitments to bring an end to violations by security forces in these regions. While an official taskforce was announced in April 2016 to investigate a number of high profile cases of human rights abuses in the provinces, including incidents in Wasior in 2001 and Wamena in 2003 where military and police crackdowns left dozens of civilians dead. So far, however, there has been little detail on how the investigations would proceed , and local human rights groups have publicly expressed their lack of faith in a government-led investigation, particularly as its formation involved no consultation with the community.

      The Setara Institute, a human rights monitoring organisation in Jakarta, reported that human rights violations in Papua during 2016 had risen steeply to 68 cases, compared to 16 the previous year. Largely peaceful protests were met with a heavy-handed response from security forces: in May 2016, a peaceful pro-independence rally resulted in what many are calling the largest mass arrest ever in Papua with 1,449 people arrested in Jayapura and hundreds more across the province. Thereafter, independence rallies in June led to more than a thousand more arrests, followed by a further 500 in December. Many were released without charges, but there were reports of mistreatment and torture. Indonesia authorities continue to target Papuan activists, including an assault on a peaceful gathering by the West Papua National Committee that resulted in the detention and beating of nine activists in December 2018, three of whom were subsequently charged with treason. As of June 2019 , Indonesia had 38 Papuans in prison for their political activity, often on charges of treason.

      Omgewing

      The Republic of Indonesia is a sprawling archipelago of nearly 14,000 islands, which divides into two tiers. The main islands of the more heavily populated southern tier include Sumatra, Java, Bali and Timor. The northern tier includes Kalimantan (most of Borneo), Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Papua (the western half of New Guinea). Sumatra lies west and south of peninsular Malaysia and Singapore across the narrow Strait of Malacca. Kalimantan, the Indonesian section of Borneo, is bounded to the north by Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. North of the Indonesian island of Sulawesi is the Celebes Sea and beyond that the Philippines. Indonesia’s geographic position has made it a gateway for human migration throughout history.

      Geskiedenis

      Humans may have inhabited parts of today’s Indonesia from between 2 million to 500,000 years ago, but most Indonesians today are of Austronesian stock whose ancestors may have migrated into this part of the world in waves, starting perhaps from Taiwan some 4,000 years ago, displacing in the process an already existing population of Papuan people.

      The main islands of Sumatra and Java had flourishing pre-colonial empires and long-established commercial links with China and India, Asia Minor and Europe. In 1511, the Portuguese captured Malacca, which controlled the sea lanes between India and China. The Portuguese fought the Spanish and local sultanates to establish armed forts and trading factories in the archipelago. The Portuguese held on to East Timor until the Indonesian invasion of 1975 (see Timor Leste), but elsewhere, in the early seventeenth century, they were pushed aside by the Dutch, who set up a monopolistic trading company and empire based in Batavia (present-day Jakarta).

      The Dutch gained control of the coastal trading enclaves throughout the archipelago and developed mining and plantation agriculture. The Dutch largely ignored the interiors of the islands and ruled through alliances with local sultans. Only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did the Dutch seek to unify control, greatly extending plantation agriculture, based on forced labour, and repatriating huge profits to the Netherlands.

      Chinese immigration was encouraged to provide intermediaries between the colonial authorities and the indigenous peoples. The Dutch were ousted by the Japanese at the beginning of the Second World War. The Japanese installed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, leaders of the Indonesian nationalist pro-independence movement, in nominal power. In 1945, the Indonesians proclaimed independence. However, after the defeat of Japan, the Dutch sought to re-establish their rule, forcing the Java-based nationalists to fight a four-year war of independence. The Netherlands finally recognized Indonesian independence in 1949.

      Indonesia’s history since independence has been tumultuous, as its leaders have attempted to deal with its ethnic diversity, sheer size, lack of internal political cohesion and impoverished peasantry. Indonesia had military and political confrontations with Malaysia and the UK over the creation of the eastern Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak and the Sultanate of Brunei on the island of Borneo, sharing the island with the Indonesian province of Kalimantan.

      Indonesia confronted the Dutch over the forced incorporation of Irian Jaya (West Irian) into Indonesia and the Portuguese over East Timor (see East Timor). There have been rebellions on the provinces of West Java, Aceh Central and North Sumatra, Papua, East Timor, North Sulawesi and the Moluccas and recurrent outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence.

      To counterbalance the political strength of the army and the militant Islamic political parties in the 1950s, Sukarno, Indonesia’s first President, encouraged the re-emergence and political strength of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). In 1965, left-wing military officers and some elements of the PKI attempted a coup, which was quickly suppressed by elite army units under General Suharto. The army launched a massive witch-hunt for PKI members and sympathizers, which saw the slaughter of an estimated 500,000 people, including many ethnic Chinese. Suharto was installed as President, a position he held until 1998. During his administration, the military, better known by its acronym ABRI, exercised a great deal of political power, enjoying special civic privileges and responsibilities, including unelected seats in Parliament and local legislatures, in addition to its defence and security roles.

      The Asian economic crisis of 1997–8 brought Indonesia to its knees. Popular discontent with the Suharto administration led to mass protests and widespread rioting that forced Suharto to step down in May 1998. This was followed by a quick succession of changes and reforms towards a more open and democratic society, a process referred to as ‘Reformasi’. East Timor voted to regain its independence after 1999, and despite violence and serious obstacles in its path was allowed to do so. Islamic fundamentalism seemed to gain strength during this period of upheavals, including an upsurge in confessional attacks in different parts of the country, and terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta.

      There eventually followed in 2004 Indonesia’s first direct presidential election, and changes which were to reduce, though not extinguish the military’s political power. A series of calamitous natural disasters have struck Indonesia in recent years, but at least one of them, the 2004 tsunami, may have contributed to the 2005 settlement of the separatist conflict involving the Acehnese minority.

      In the wake of Suharto’s fall in 1998, militant groups multiplied within Indonesia and attacks on religious minorities became increasingly common, typically Christians and non-Sunni Muslim communities, including Ahmadis, Shi’a and Sufis. Many of the attacks can be traced back to the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), a militant Sunni group with ties to senior members of the police, military and political establishment.

      Governance

      Since the end of the Suharto presidency in 1998, Indonesia has been moving towards a more liberal democratic system, with increased human rights provisions and mechanisms and other major political and structural changes: presidential elections in 2004 were the first where the president and vice-president were directly elected.

      The Constitution contains a range of human rights guarantees. There are a number of human rights institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), and a human rights court set up in 2000. Despite some good work in the past by Komnas HAM, the government appears to be unable to address very serious human rights violations such as extra-judicial killings, torture and other abuses by the security forces, which often target minorities in restive provinces. Corruption – including within the judicial system – and inadequate training, resources and leadership, all combine to weaken the potential legal and constitutional protections. The human rights court’s effectiveness is limited because cases involving military personnel fall instead under the jurisdiction of the Indonesian Military Court.

      Recent attempts to address past breaches have encountered setbacks. The establishment of a special Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate human rights violations since the 1960s was struck down by the Constitutional Court in December 2006 as having no legal basis. The earlier conviction of a pilot for the murder of human rights defender Munir Said Thalib on board a flight to Amsterdam was overthrown by the Supreme Court in Jakarta in October 2006. The case remains unsolved.

      Indonesia is not an Islamic state. The state ideology, Pancasila, requires only that citizens believe in one supreme God, and that they accept membership of one of five officially sanctioned faiths, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Orthodox Muslim groups have argued since independence that Islam should play a greater role in government and society, with some pushing for an Islamic state based on Shari’a law. Secular nationalists have countered that this risks provoking secessionist moves in regions of Indonesia where Muslims are not a majority.

      The political divide between the state and orthodox believers caused riots and a wave of bombings and arson attacks in the mid-1980s. However, Suharto successfully suppressed the more militant Islamic organizations, and co-opted the others. Under his authoritarian rule open reporting and discussion of religious and ethnic friction was banned.

      At present, Indonesian law only recognizes six major faiths, while practitioners of smaller Islamic sects, such as Ahmadis and Shi’a, endure regular threats and intimidation. In particular, the Ahmadiyya sect was formally branded heretical by the Indonesian Ulema Council, the country’s top Islamic body, in 2005, and is prevented from proselytizing and constructing new houses of worship.

      In Indonesia’s current climate of intolerance, the space for religious and ethnic minorities to practise their culture and faith openly continues to narrow. Indonesia experienced a surge in religious intolerance under the 10-year rule of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, resulting in frequent violence against its Ahmadi, Christian and Shi’a minorities. Indeed, extremist groups enjoy considerable legal support in Indonesia, where authoritarian blasphemy laws can easily be used to facilitate religious persecution. Meanwhile Sunni extremists appear to be able to practise hate speech in mosques across the country with impunity.

      President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo was elected in October 2014, on a platform the included democratic reform and minority rights. Unlike his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Jokowi has publicly acknowledged the need for Indonesia to curb extremism and his government proposed a new law to protect religious minorities shortly after assuming power. While activists have argued that the proposed new law does not go far enough and includes vague provisions that allow the government to discriminate against minorities in the name of ‘national security’, little progress on the law has been made so far.


      Indonesia

      Indonesia&#39s military (TNI) and the United States government have been compromised by serious human rights abuses committed by Indonesian security forces. This troubled relationship came to a crisis point after raging violence by military and militias in September 1999. After the people of East Timor overwhelming voted for independence from Indonesia in a UN-supervised referendum. Indonesia&#39s retreating military and militias terrorized, killed, and drove people from their villages.

      Open brutality and systematic devastation of the country&#39s food, water, power and other infrastructure shocked the world and led Congress to cut off direct military/financial support of TNI.
      Lees meer

      Exploited for Profit

      This is a film by Amnesty International that highlights some of the abuses suffered by Indonesian migrant domestic workers who go to work in Hong Kong.

      Their problems start in Indonesian where they are deceived about the terms and conditions they will work under, including salary. They acquire huge debts from illegally charged recruitment fees which they have to pay back once in Hong Kong via sham loans.

      Many are paid as little as half the minimum wage, have their passports confiscated by placement agents and employers, and face physical and verbal abuse in the workplace. The interviews for this video were mainly shot in Java with returnee domestic workers who had worked in Hong Kong.

      Spring Solidarity Action for Filep Karma

      Filep Karma has recently been transferred back to the Abepura Prison after spending several months, without charges, in a local police jail.

      Activists are asked to send messages of support to Filep Karma during the month of April. These messages not only tell him that the world continues to be outraged by his case, but also remind prison officials that we care about Filep&#39s treatment.

      He would especially appreciate your words of solidarity on Easter (April 24) – Filep is Christian, such holiday greetings are appropriate and welcomed.

      Please send a message of hope to:
      Filep Karma
      Melalui Cyntia Warwe
      KONTRAS PAPUA
      Jl. Raya Sentani No. 67 B.
      Depan Ojek Padang Bulan
      Jayapura – Papua,
      Indonesia


      INDONESIA: Papuan Peace Declaration

      We wish to share with you the following declaration from a group of Papuan organisations, indigenous and political Papuan stakeholders issued at the conference for peace in Papua which was held between 5-7 July 2011 in the UNCEN auditorium, Abepura Papua, Indonesia. The conference was organised by the Network of Peace in Papua (JDP).

      Asian Human Rights Commission
      Hong Kong

      We, the signatories represent the more than 500 participants at the Papua Peace Conference, consisting of representatives of religious groups, customary groups, women, youth, academics, student organisations and resistance groups from Papua who took an active part in the Papua Peace Conference. The conference was held in the auditorium of the Cenderawasih University, on 5-7 July, 2011

      At the conference which had the theme: “Let us together make Papua a Land of Peace”, we shared experiences and strengthened each other. We were also enriched by material that was presented by the following speakers:

      1. Djoko Sujanto, Minister-Coordinator for Politics and Law of the Republic of Indonesia
      2. Barnabas Suebu, Governor of the Province of Papua
      3. Bekto Suprapto, Chief of Police of Papua
      4. Erfi Triasunu, Commander of the Military Command XVII/Cenderawasih
      5. Leo Laba Ladjar, Bishop of the Diocese of Jayapura
      6. Tony Wanggai, Chairman of the Papuan Provincial Branch of NU and representative of the Papua Muslim Council
      7. Sokrates Sofyan Yoman, Chairman of the Synod of the Alliance of Baptist Churches in Papua
      8. Forkorus Yaboisembut, Chairman of the Papuan Customary Council

      We reflected on the situation in Papua by deepening our understanding of its concepts and indicators. We also identified problems which have to be resolved in order to achieve our objective.

      In accordance with the cultural traditions of Papua regarding ways to resolve conflicts by peaceful means:

      1. We declare that dialogue is the best way to finding the solution to the conflict between the Papuan people and the Indonesian Government
      2. We determine to find the solution to political, security, legal, human rights, economic, environmental and social-cultural issues in Papua by means of dialogue between the Papuan people and the Indonesian Government, mediated by a neutral third party
      3. We welcome the initiative of the central government in support of the preparatory processes for a Jakarta-Papua dialogue

      Through the Papua Peace Conference we decided on the criteria for Papuan representatives who should take part in the dialogue with the Indonesian government:

      1. Fluency in English
      2. Have no links of any kind with the system of Indonesia
      3. Have the ability and experience to engage in diplomacy and negotiation (certified)
      4. Imbued with the innermost belief and ideology of Papua Merdeka
      5. Understand the history of the Papuan struggle
      6. Have good ethics and morals
      7. Not be temperamental
      8. Negotiators who have a mandate from the leadership
      9. One of the political resistance organisations of the people of West Papua and/or are recommended by one of the resistance organisations of the people of West Papua
      10. Are acceptable to the majority of the political resistance organisations and the people of West Papua
      11. Have the spirit of Papuan nationalism
      12. Physically and mentally fit
      13. Understand the Papuan problem and think creatively to seek a solution to the Papuan problem
      14. Have integrity and loyalty towards efforts for the reconciliation and consolidation of the West Papuan revolution, including the commitment to accept all the consequences
      15. Are capable of and willing to WORK TOGETHER as members of the West Papua Negotiation Team
      16. KNOWLEDGE or EXPERTISE in one or more of the following is necessary: politics, law, economy, security, human rights, social-cultural affairs and the history of the national struggle of West Papua
      17. The negotiation team shall be composed of a balanced proportion of men and women

      Referring to the above criteria we propose that the following persons shall be members of the West Papuan negotiation team:

      1. Rex Rumakiek
      2. John Otto Ondawame
      3. Benny Wenda
      4. Octovianus Mote
      5. Leoni Tanggahma

      Herewith we submit the Papuan Peace Declaration to all the People of Papua, the Indonesian Government and all people who are concerned with achieving peace in Papua

      Forkorus Yaboisembut, Chairman of the Papuan Customary Council
      Em. Herman Awom, Moderator Papuan Presidium Council
      Ev. Edison Waromi, Executive President of the West Papua National Authority
      Septinus Paiki, Executive Council Committee of Independence and Sovereignty of West Melanesia
      Eliazer Awom, Reconciliation Forum of Ex Prisoners / political prisoners of Papua
      Albert Kaliele, Reconciliation Forum of Ex Prisoners / political prisoners of West Papua
      Onesimus Banundi, Vice Chairman of Tabi’s Customary Council
      Mb. Yan Pieter Yarangga, Chairman of Saireri’s Customary Council
      Barnabas Mandacan, Chairman of Bomberay’s Customary Council
      Sir-Zet Gwasgwas, Chairman of Domberay’s Customary Council
      Stanislaus Gebze, Chairman of Anim Ha’s Customary Council
      Dominikus Surabut, Secretary of La Pago’s Customary Council
      Benny Ruben Edoway, Chairman of Me Pago’s Customary Council
      Abina Wasanggai, General Srcretary of the Solidarity of Papuan Wowen
      Benyamin Gurik, The Head of Student Executive Body of UNCEN
      Selpius Bobii, Chairman of the United Front of West Papuan People’s Struggle
      H. Sarmadan Sabuku, Chairman of the Papuan Muslim Council

      To support this case, please click here: SEND APPEAL LETTER


      Human Rights in Indonesia: The Foundation of Our Future

      Indonesia and America share a common belief in fighting for the basic human rights of our citizens - life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These fundamental rights must be vigorously protected by every government in every country. Indonesia is no exception.

      Ensuring every citizen's basic rights is not only a moral imperative and constitutional obligation but it also provides the foundation upon which functioning societies are built and on which families and children depend to prosper and grow. Indonesia has many challenges, from economic to environmental and from governmental to societal, none of which can be sufficiently met until the basic human rights of our citizens have been fully protected.

      Today, hundreds of thousands of women and children have had their right to liberty taken from them by international or domestic human trafficking rings. Millions of our citizens are malnourished and go to sleep hungry because food is scarce or too expensive in our rural areas. And too many of our children are dying from curable diseases because of insufficient medical care in our rural and poor communities. Not only can many of these challenges be met through broad-based economic development but, as proven in the United States, successfully securing these basic rights can unleash the enormous entrepreneurial and economic potential of a society. Admittedly, simply embracing democratic reforms alone is not a panacea for hunger and malnutrition - the world's two largest democracies, India and the U.S., still struggle with poverty alleviation and hunger - but broadening economic participation to the rural poor is the most effective approach to fighting hunger and disease. As we move closer to a historic election in Indonesia, this effort must be our top priority.

      My country is facing a human trafficking crisis and the government is doing little to stop this heinous crime against an individual's personal freedom and dignity. Over two million women and children have become victims of human trafficking in Indonesia with another 100,000 added each year. Additionally, as a source country many Indonesian victims, such as the case of Milfrida Soik in Malaysia in which my brother, Prabowo Subianto, actively engaged, become enslaved overseas and forced to work in horrid conditions under the constant threat of physical violence. Others are traded like a commodity and forced to sell their bodies to pay off fictitious and insurmountable debt. Many unwittingly fall prey to traffickers as they desperately search for work due to severe financial hardship. The Indonesian government has failed to crack down on this crime despite the heavy toll on our most vulnerable fellow citizens.

      To stem the tide of human trafficking in Indonesia, the government must provide greater support to indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGO) while better collaborating with foreign governments to identify and protect Indonesian victims. The long term solution is clear that to address the root cause of human trafficking we must strengthen and expand our economy to include these vulnerable populations and provide better income alternatives for rural and poor families. We must not leave our disadvantaged citizens behind as Indonesia development continues to advance.

      Expanding economic opportunities to all Indonesians, not just those living in Jakarta or other major cities, is the most effective way to stem the tide of human trafficking. An inclusive economy enabling rural participation will ensure our population is properly fed and our children do not go hungry. Almost half of the Indonesian population lives on less than $2 a day making it nearly impossible to secure proper nutrition, clothing, or shelter. Our stagnating economy and agricultural mismanagement threaten the gains we have made since our democratic transition 16 years ago.

      Prabowo and I continue to express concern that the country's food supply has not kept pace with our exploding population resulting in severe food shortages threatening instability and domestic insecurity. Every Indonesia citizen has the right to basic nutrition yet corruption, illegal deforestation, and gross income inequality resulting in severe poverty is threatening the lives of our children, thus threatening our future livelihood. Indonesia needs to open up two million acres of new land for food production, build new fertilizer plants for farmers, and rehabilitate water resource infrastructure currently in disrepair. We must increase the protein intake of our children. Our "white revolution" initiative will provide milk to schoolchildren through cow and goat farm support programs. We must also invest in energy production capacity to power our agricultural industries and open new lands for cultivating bioethanol raw materials.

      These investments in our future will ensure sufficient production levels and pricing stability that will benefit both producers and consumers. With a commitment to investing in food, energy, and water security, we can produce the food we need to properly feed our families, power our economy, and create the jobs needed for all to prosper.

      Finally, our Constitution guarantees the right of every citizen to quality health services. However, more than half of the health facilities outside of our major cities do not even have a medical doctor. There are approximately 2 health workers per 1000 citizens, mostly working in major urban areas leaving the rural population without any professional medical care. Over 90% of mothers do not receive proper care and as a result, infant mortality rates remain high in rural areas. Rural and poor Indonesians are simply not getting the medical care they need to generate a healthy society. We must invest in modern hospitals and health care centers outside of the urban areas, require new doctors to serve in disadvantaged communities, and support family welfare programs for our citizens throughout the country. A healthier society and will be a happier and more productive society and we must make a greater commitment to delivering this constitutionally protected right to all Indonesians.

      America's democracy was built on the foundation that everyone has an opportunity to succeed if the most basic elements of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are secured and protected. Indonesia has made great strides since we embraced the democratic system in 1998 and I believe, despite great challenges, we have a bright future ahead of us. To realize our nation's promise, however, we must first protect the fundamental rights of our people. To date, we have not shown the political will to live up to our human rights obligations - but this must change for us to realize the tremendous potential of an Indonesia emerging as a regional and global leader.


      Kyk die video: The Documentary Of Indonesia History