Adlai Stevenson - Geskiedenis

Adlai Stevenson - Geskiedenis



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Henry Lewis Stimson

1867- 1950

Amerikaanse staatsman

1962


Henry Stimson is gebore in New York op 21 September 1867. Hy het na Phillips Academy in Andover gegaan en daarna na Yale College. Na die kollege studeer hy na die Harvard Law School. Hy het hom in 1891 by die regsfirma Root and Clark in New York aangesluit

Henry Stimson het as oorlogsekretaris gedien onder president Taft en later as minister van buitelandse sake onder president Hoover. Hy het saam met Roosevelt begin werk tydens die oorgang van die Hoover -administrasie na die eerste Roosevelt -een. Gedurende die laaste deel van die dertigerjare ondersteun hy Roosevelt se standpunt ten opsigte van die wêreldsituasie sterk. Stimson ondersteun ook Roosevelt se kwarantyn -toespraak.

In Junie 1940, terwyl Frankryk op pad was na 'n nederlaag, het Roosevelt Stimson gevra om oorlogsekretaris te word. Stimson was 'n aktiewe sekretaris en het al sy kragte gewy aan die leiding van die Amerikaanse weermag tot oorwinning. Hy was ook betrokke by die ontwikkeling van die atoombom.

Boeke

Kolonel, The: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867-1950

Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man (biografieë in Amerikaanse buitelandse beleid)


26 Oktober 1962: die rol van Adlai Stevenson in die Kubaanse missielkrisis (deel sewe)

Dr Stern is die skrywer van talle artikels en “Avertering 'the Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings" (2003), "The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis" ( 2005) en "The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths vs. Reality" (2012), alles in die Stanford University Press Nuclear Age Series. Hy was historikus by die Kennedy -biblioteek van 1977 tot 2000. Dit is die sewende in 'n reeks. Klik HIER vir vorige paaiemente.

26 Oktober: Adlai Stevenson neem die ExComm toe

Op die oggend van Vrydag, 26 Oktober, het die VN -ambassadeur, Adlai Stevenson, na Washington gevlieg om die ExComm -vergadering by te woon en die pogings van die sekretaris -generaal om 'n onderhandelde oplossing vir die krisis in Kuba te vind, verduidelik. Stevenson het 'n uitbarsting van nasionale gewildheid geniet nadat hy die Sowjet -VN -ambassadeur tydens 'n televisiesessie van die VN se Veiligheidsraad uitgeoefen het. Die president het Stevenson gou gevra om 'ons gedagtes te gee'.

Die VN -ambassadeur het sekerlik gevoel dat die ExComm teen hom gestapel was: McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, John McCloy en John McCone was Republikeine RFK het in Stevenson se presidensiële veldtog in 1956 gewerk, maar nadat hy oortuig was dat die goewerneur van Illinois swak en besluiteloos was, het hy gestem vir Eisenhower JFK self, het Stevenson se kwiksotiese poging om 'n derde presidensiële benoeming by die Demokratiese byeenkoms van 1960 te behaal, nooit vergewe nie. Die ambassadeur self het nie vergeet dat hy mislei is om vervalste CIA -foto's by die VN te wys in 'n mislukte poging van die Kennedy -administrasie om die Amerikaanse rol in die Bay of Pigs -inval in April 1961 te verberg nie.

Nietemin het die ambassadeur onverskrokke begin met 'n verduideliking en verdediging van die VN se moratoriumplan - wat 'n stilstand by die bou van missielbasis in Kuba insluit en 'n opskorting van die Amerikaanse vlootblokkade terwyl onderhandelinge plaasvind. Dean Rusk het gevra om te weet of die stilstand 'die ondoeltreffendheid van die missiele' sou insluit. 'Wel, dit kon nie help nie,' het Stevenson saggies bygevoeg. 'Ek dink dit sou redelik wees om te probeer om dit onbruikbaar te hou eerder as om te sê dat dit onbruikbaar moet wees. 'Wel, wanneer het hulle onbruikbaar geword?' McNamara sê: "Hulle kan nou werk." "Verseker dat hulle onbruikbaar is!" Eis Bundy streng. Selfs McCloy, wat by die VN aangewys is om Stevenson te help in die onderhandelinge (as gevolg van die privaat twyfel van die Kennedys dat die ambassadeur die Russe regtig kan hanteer), het 'n baie strenger houding geëis omdat die missiele direk "op ons harte gerig was" . ”

Die beleërde VN -ambassadeur, ondanks 'n koor van vyandige opmerkings rondom die tafel, het toe bygevoeg dat die Sowjets die basisse sal ontmantel en hierdie wapens uit die halfrond sal onttrek, maar 'wat hulle in ruil daarvoor wil hê, is 'n nuwe waarborg van die territoriale integriteit van Kuba. Inderdaad, 'het hy vermetel aangevoer,' dit is waarvoor hulle gesê het hierdie wapens is bedoel-om die territoriale integriteit van Kuba te verdedig 'teen 'n ander inval wat deur Amerika geborg is-'n argument wat opvallend was as dit nie duidelik ontbreek het in die ExComm-besprekings nie. Stevenson laat sak toe die ander skoen: 'Dit is ook moontlik dat die prys wat ons in die langtermynonderhandeling kan vra, die ontbinding van ons basisse, soos Italië en Turkye, kan insluit.'

Stevenson het eers 'n moontlike missielhandel voorgestel toe hy op 17 Oktober, die tweede dag van die krisis, met die president beraadslaag het. Maar gedurende die hele 13 dae van besprekings was die VN -ambassadeur die enigste deelnemer van die ExComm wat Chroesjtsjof se sentrale argument vir die ontplooiing van Sowjet -missiele in Kuba geopper het: dat dit bedoel was as 'n verdedigende poging om Castro en sy regering te beskerm teen die Kennedy -administrasie geheime oorlog en 'n tweede poging om Kuba binne te val. Stevenson het die vergadering binnekort verlaat om 'n oproep van 'n medewerker by die VN te neem. ' baie geïnteresseerd in ”Stevenson se voorstel.

Robert Kennedy, in Dertien dae, het later beweer dat JFK Stevenson se aanbeveling vir 'n missie-ruil tussen Kuba en Turkye verwerp het. Ironies genoeg is dit presies wat die president die volgende dag gedoen het oor die besware van feitlik die hele ExComm. Net 'n paar weke later het 'n tydskrifartikel, byna seker die gevolg van 'n lek van een of albei die Kennedys, beweer dat Stevenson ''n München' 'op die ExComm -vergadering van 26 Oktober voorgestaan ​​het. Die verslag was perfek in ooreenstemming met die ontluikende voorblad van die administrasie dat die president 'n missielhandel tussen Kuba en Turkye verwerp het en die Sowjets genoop het.


Adlai E. Stevenson II (FDR se presidensie vir twee termyn)

Adlai E. Stevenson II was 'n Amerikaanse politikus wat as die 32ste president van die Verenigde State gedien het (1949 - 1953). Stevenson het die goewerneur van New York, Thomas E Dewey, in die presidentsverkiesing van 1948 verslaan, en Stevenson word beskou as 'n bekwame en doeltreffende administrateur, terwyl hy die regering van die staat Illinois vaartbelyn maak, belasting en inflasie in lyn hou, 'n groot openbare behuisingsprogram begin vir die haweloosheid in Illinois en bevorder burgerregte.  

Voor-presidentskap:

Wallace se administrasie is bederf deur gebeurtenisse wat hom bevoordeel het en baie Amerikaners wou en smeek hom om vir 'n tweede termyn te staan, aangesien hy die idees van FDR verteenwoordig en aan al sy beloftes kon voldoen aan die einde van 1946. Wallace hou egter nie van die stres van die presidensie en oorweeg om nie vir 'n tweede termyn as president aan te bied nie, en sou op 13 Maart 1948 op National Television, aan alle Amerikaanse gesinne, met 'n ondertekende brief van Wallace tussen 1946-1947, aankondig dat hy nie vir 'n sekonde sou hardloop nie termyn as president. Wallace se besluit om nie weer te hardloop nie, het 'n voormalige diplomaat met die naam Adlai Ewing Stevenson gelukgewens. Partyleiers hou nie van Sen nie, Estes Kefauver, wat die meeste van die voorverkiesings gewen het (wat destyds weinig invloed gehad het.) . Die kleinseun van 'n voormalige vise -president met dieselfde naam,

Stevenson het verskeie diplomatieke en administratiewe posisies beklee in die Roosevelt- en Wallace -administrasies. As gasheer -goewerneur is Stevenson gekies om die Keynote -toespraak te hou tydens die Demokratiese Konvensie van 1948 in Chicago. Sy welsprekende opmerkings het die konvensie wat hy op die derde stembrief benoem het, getref. Met 'n werklike kans om te wen, het die Demokrate baie versigtig gekies om 'n vise -presidentskandidaat te kies, en uiteindelik op die jeugdige sen, John Sparkman van Alabama, getik.   Sparkman, 'n gematigde Suidlander, het 'n geografiese en filosofiese balans gebied vir Stevenson, 'n noordelike liberaal.

Op die verkiesingsdag 1948 sou die Stevenson-Johnson-kaartjie die Warren-Dewey-kaartjie verslaan met 'n kiestelling van 259-239 met die kandidaat van die Dixiecrat, Strom Thurmond, wat 39 verkiesingsstemme verseker. Nie een van die kandidate sou die vereiste 266 stemme maak om president te word nie, en daarom het die Huis gestem oor wie die president sou word. Selfs as Thurmond sy 39 stemme aan Warren gegee het, sou Stevenson steeds die verkiesing wen nadat die kiesers uit New York, Ohio en Pennsylvania vir Stevenson gestem het om die totaal van die verkiesing in die huis 360-169 te maak, wat Stevenson en Sparkman die president maak- Uitverkore en Ondervoorsitter Uitverkore. Dit was een van die kasverkiesings in die Amerikaanse geskiedenis - 'n verskuiwing van 24 000 stemme in Texas en Wisconsin sou Warren verkies het.

Presidensie:

Stevenson sou op 20 Januarie 1949 as die 35ste president van die Verenigde State ingehuldig word, terwyl hoofregter Fred M. Vinson om 12:55 EST die ampseed afgelê het en die hooggeregshofregter Stanley Forman Reed wat die visepresidensiële eed afgelê het van Office to Sparkman om 12:30 PST, wat Sparkman dus twintig minute lank die president maak.

President Stevenson sou onmiddellik met Duitsland en Japan aanbiedinge probeer maak om hulle bondgenote van die Verenigde State te maak, maar hulle sou weier om met hom of ondervoorsitter Stevenson te onderhandel. Dit sal sy goedkeuringgradering van 84% tot 59% laat daal. Een van Stevenson se hoofdoelwitte as president was om dakloosheid te verminder en die nasionale ekonomie reg te stel nadat dit deur die administrasies van Roosevelt en Wallace geïgnoreer is. Sy eerste poging was om $ 2000 te gee vir elke persoon wat gehelp het om regeringsgeboue en dorpe te herstel wat na die oorlog nog in puin was. Dit sal na die huis gestuur word en in 169-314 stemme neergeskiet word.

Die Koreaanse Oorlog sou op 27 Januarie 1950 begin, maar Stevenson sou wag om die land van die oorlog te vertel tot twee maande in Maart 1950. Hy sou nie moeite doen om die kommunisme in Oos -Asië te hanteer nie, aangesien die media agtergekom het dat hy gegewe generaal Dwight D. Eisenhower die bevoegdheid om alle besluite rakende die oorlog te neem, aangesien "hy te besig was om 'n oorlog te hanteer wat tot 1955 kan strek en die VSA sou verloor". Dit sou Eisenhower aanmoedig om dieselfde hoeveelheid krag te gebruik as wat hy 'n half dekade vroeër in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gebruik het

President Stevenson het aangekondig dat hy vir 'n tweede termyn as president in 1952 sou verkies en die Demokratiese benoeming vir president weer sou verseker, maar een van die grootste uitdagings was hoe ongewild hy was, met 'n goedkeuring van 58% aan die begin van die generaal verkiesing, saam met die ander uitdaging van wie teen hom wou wees. Generaal Dwight D. Eisenhower sou teen president Stevenson wees, 'n groot verrassing vir hom en die res van die land. Eisenhower sou die Republikeinse Primaries van 1952 op 15 April 1952 wen, en sou van 16 April 1952 tot en met die verkiesingsdag teen die Stevenson -verkiesing meeding.

Op die verkiesingsdag 1952 het die Stevenson-Johnson-kaartjie in 1952 geskiedenis geskep deur die eerste groot kaartjie in die Amerikaanse geskiedenis te word wat geen staat gewen het nie. Dit was een van die kasverkiesings in die Amerikaanse geskiedenis-'n verskuiwing van 24 000 stemme in Texas en Wisconsin sou Stevenson herkies het. Stevenson sou so ongewild by die Amerikaanse volk blyk te wees dat hy op sy laaste volle dag as president op Op 19 Januarie 1953 het hy 'n 0% goedkeuring.

Eisenhower sou op 20 Januarie 1953 as die 36ste president van die Verenigde State ingehuldig word, terwyl hoofregter Fred M. Vinson om 12:55 EST die eed afgelê het aan Stevenson en hooggeregshofregter Stanley Forman Reed wat die visepresidensiële eed afgelê het van Office to Sparkman om 12:30 PST, wat Sparkman dus twintig minute lank die president maak.

Na-presidentskap:

Na die presidentskap van Stevenson, sou hy terugkeer na sy woonplek in Libertyville, Illinois, waar hy baie aktiwiteite sou onderneem, soos skilder, teken, beantwoord briewe en waaierpos (hy het dit eers in 1957 gedoen omdat hy ongewild was tot omstreeks 1956)

Hy sou weer in 1956 teen Eisenhower hardloop, en Stevenson kon in 1956 makliker state wen.   Teen die huidige Republikeinse kaartjie van president Dwight D. Eisenhower en vise-president Sen, Richard Nixon, het die Stevenson-Johnson-kaartjie bygevoeg die deelstate Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri, Alabama, Georgia, Noord-Carolina en Suid-Carolina op sy kaart van 1952 vir 'n oorwinning van 457-73 van die verkiesingskollege en 'n oorwinning van 57,4 tot 42 persent in die gewilde stemming, maar verloor steeds vir Eisenhower.


Adlai Stevenson, die oorspronklike egghead

Die laaste Unitarian genomineer vir president van die Verenigde State.

Stevenson was mal oor taal en was 'n begaafde redenaar. As 'n skerp verstand, kan hy hooghartig en selfsugtig wees. In 'n verhaal wat gereeld aangehaal word, het 'n ondersteuner geskreeu: 'Goewerneur Stevenson, u het die stem van al die denkende mense', waarop hy geantwoord het: 'Dit is nie genoeg nie, mevrou. Ek het 'n meerderheid nodig. " Die rubriekskrywer van die New York Herald Tribune, Stewart Alsop, het die term "egghead" bedink om die stedelike, intellektuele en kaalkop Stevenson te beskryf.

Die talent onder sy spraakskrywers was asemrowend: Archibald MacLeish, John Kenneth Galbraith, John Hersey, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. voorberei. Sy adviseurs het volgens die biograaf Jean Baker geskerts dat hy eerder sou skryf as om president te wees.

Sy politieke teenstanders in 1952 was wreed: die genomineerde vise-president, Richard Nixon, senator Joseph McCarthy, en FBI-direkteur, J. Edgar Hoover, het die Stevenson-veldtog as 'n klomp "pienk en pansies" gesmeer.

In reaksie hierop het Stevenson gesê: 'Ek sou 'n voorstel aan my Republikeinse vriende maak. . . dat as hulle ophou om leuens oor die Demokrate te vertel, ons sal ophou om die waarheid oor hulle te vertel. ”

Stevenson geniet groot gewildheid internasionaal en onder die groeiende Amerikaanse middelklas wat op universiteit gestudeer het. Bekendes Humphrey Bogart, Lauren Bacall en Eleanor Roosevelt het hom beywer.

Ondersteuners het hom liefgehad, nie net vir sy styl nie, maar ook omdat hy beleidsdebat in die middel van sy veldtog geplaas het en om McCarthyisme te verdedig. Sy New America -veldtog voorsien programme wat Kennedy en Johnson kon implementeer, en sy oproepe om 'n einde aan kerntoetse te maak, het die toetsverbodverdrag van 1963 geword. 'n trae benadering tot burger- en vroueregte, wat jonger aktiviste woedend maak.

Tussen die verkiesingsiklusse het Stevenson wyd oorsee gereis. Hy het gehoop om minister van buitelandse sake te word in die volgende Demokratiese administrasie, maar John F. Kennedy het hom aangewys as ambassadeur van die Verenigde Nasies, 'n posisie wat pas by sy internasionale ervaring en redenaarsvaardighede.

Op 'n hoogtepunt van sy loopbaan het Stevenson in 1962 beroemd geëis dat die Sowjet -verteenwoordiger by die Verenigde Nasies sê of sy land missiele in Kuba installeer: "Moenie wag vir die vertaling nie. Antwoord ja of nee! ” Toe die Sowjet -ambassadeur wankel, het Stevenson foto's gemaak wat hul bestaan ​​bewys.

Stevenson het Unitarian grootgeword. Sy ma was 'n Republikeinse Unitarist, sy vader 'n Demokratiese Presbiteriaan. 'Ek beland in sy party en haar kerk, wat 'n goeie oplossing vir die probleem was,' het hy gesê.

Toe die Unitarian Universalist Association in 1961 gestig is, skryf Stevenson aan eerwaarde Dana McLean Greeley, sy eerste president, 'Baie geluk met u verkiesing as president. Ek weet uit hoorsê hoe bevredigend dit kan wees. ”

Nadat sy seun in 1955 'n ernstige motorongeluk oorleef het, het Stevenson by die Presbyterian -kerk in Lake Forest, Illinois, naby sy huis, aangesluit. Toe sommige unitariërs hom daarvan beskuldig dat hy godsdiens vir politieke doeleindes gebruik het, het Stevenson verduidelik dat hy dikwels die kerk van sy vader bygewoon het toe hy in dorpe gewoon het sonder 'n Unitaristiese kerk, maar hy het altyd lojaal gevoel aan sy kerk in Bloomington, Illinois. . Predikante van albei denominasies het hom geskryf en verseker dat dubbele affiliasie geen probleem was nie.

Stevenson sterf in 1965 aan 'n hartaanval in Londen. President Lyndon Johnson, vise -president Hubert Humphrey en skrywer John Steinbeck het sy gedenkdiens by die Unitarian Church in Bloomington bygewoon. Greeley lewer die lofrede en noem Stevenson '' 'n universele burger ''.


Meer oor hierdie fasiliteit

Programme

Selfgeleide roetes

Interpretatiewe tekens langs selfgeleide roetes bied historiese inligting oor die webwerf. Die rustige omgewing laat besoekers toe om die historiese landskap te ervaar, soortgelyk aan hoe dit gelyk het toe Stevenson hier gewoon het.

Self-geleide roetes rondom die eiendom is daagliks om 06:30 oop en maak sonsondergang oop. Hou die honde te alle tye aan die leiband en haal dit op. Kom meer te wete oor ons hondeparke buite die leiband (permit benodig).

Uitstallings

Die diensgebou en sy uitstallings oor die lewe en loopbaan van Stevenson is daagliks oop van 09:00 tot 17:00.

Begeleide toere

Hoërskool- en gemeenskapsgroepe kan reël vir 'n begeleide toer onder leiding van een van ons personeel vir kulturele hulpbronne. Bel 847-968-3422 vir meer inligting.

Histort

In 1935 koop Adlai E. Stevenson II en sy vrou, Ellen Borden, 70 hektaar grond waarop hulle 'n huis vir hul gesin kan bou.

Die eerste huis wat hulle gebou het, van 'vuurvaste' konstruksie, het afgebrand kort nadat dit gebou is. Baie van die familie se besittings en oudhede is in die brand verlore. Die huis wat vandag staan, is die tweede huis wat in 1938 op die perseel gebou is. Soos die eerste huis, is dit oorspronklik geel geverf, wat die gunsteling kleur van Ellen was.

Die huis is modern en in Art Deco -styl vanweë die eenvoud van die ontwerp, en die gebruik van geometriese vorms, simmetrie en kenmerke wat óf getrap of geboë is. Art Deco was 'n gewilde internasionale ontwerpbeweging gedurende die 1920's en 1930's. Die groot vensters, stoepe en dekke in die huis bied 'n pragtige uitsig oor die uitgestrekte eiendom.

Die belangrikste kamer in die huis is die studeerkamer. Toe hy tuis was, het Stevenson die grootste deel van sy tyd by sy lessenaar in hierdie kamer deurgebring, toesprake en boeke geskryf en vergader met hooggeplaastes soos Eleanor Roosevelt, 'n goeie vriend en gereelde gas by die huis, en John F. Kennedy. Deur die huis en terrein te loop, bring u 'n stap nader om hierdie buitengewone man beter te verstaan.

Die tweede gebou op die eiendom is die diensgebou wat in 1937 deur die firma Anderson en Ticknor van Lake Forest, Illinois, gebou is. Hierdie gebou huisves die motorhuis, perdestalle en die woonstel van die opsigter, Frank Holland, en sy gesin. Holland was plaasbestuurder en opsigter vir die Stevensons van 1937 tot 1963, en weer van 1965 tot 1970.

Ligging

Die Adlai E. Stevenson Historic Home is deel van Captain Daniel Wright Woods Forest Preserve met aparte parkeerplek beskikbaar op Saint Mary's Road tussen Everett Road en Illinois Route 60.


Adlai Stevenson - Geskiedenis

Visepresident Adlai E. Stevenson I

Goewerneur Adlai E. Stevenson II

Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III

Adlai Ewing Stevenson I (23 Oktober 1835 - 14 Junie 1914) was 'n landaanklaer, lid van die Amerikaanse Huis van Verteenwoordigers se eerste assistent -posmeester -generaal in Grover Cleveland se eerste termyn as vise -president in 1892, onsuksesvolle kandidaat vir vise -president saam met William Jennings Bryan in 1900 en vir die goewerneur van Illinois in 1912. Sy seun, Lewis, was die minister van buitelandse sake van Illinois.

Adlai Ewing Stevenson II (5 Februarie 1900 - 14 Julie 1965) was 'n prokureur; hy het in baie take tydens die Roosevelt- en Truman -administrasies gedien, onder meer as assistent van die Sekretaris van die Vloot tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog en as argitek van die VN in die nasleep van die oorlog. Hy is verkies tot goewerneur van Illinois in 1948. As Demokratiese presidentskandidaat in 1952 en 1956 en die Party se "Titular" -leier, begin hy met die strategiese wapenbeheerproses en lê die programmatiese grondslag vir die New Frontier van John F. Kennedy en die Great Society van Lyndon Johnson. In 1961 word hy aangestel as ambassadeur en Amerikaanse verteenwoordiger by die Verenigde Nasies en dien hy tot in sy dood in daardie posisie.

Adlai Ewing Stevenson III (gebore 10 Oktober 1930) is 'n prokureur en veteraan van die Marine Corps van Korea. vir die goewerneur van Illinois in 1982 en 1986, hoewel die verkiesing in 1982 feitlik gelyk was. Ondanks bewyse van wydverspreide onreëlmatighede is hy met een stem in die hooggeregshof in Illinois geweier. Stevenson se lewe fokus al lank op openbare beleid en besigheidsverwante aktiwiteite in Oos -Asië. Hy is bekroon met die Japanse Orde van die Heilige Skat met goue en silwer sterre en is 'n ereprofessor aan die Renmin Universiteit, PR China.


Adlai Stevenson se tweede lopie

Adlai Stevenson het in 1956 vir 'n tweede keer teen Eisenhower deelgeneem, maar Eisenhower het die verkiesing selfs meer oortuigend gewen as in 1952.

Toe die 1,372 afgevaardigdes van die nasionale byeenkoms van die Demokratiese Party op 13 Augustus 1956 in Chicago vergader, was Adlai E. Stevenson 'n seker ding vir die benoeming as die kandidaat van die party teen die huidige president Eisenhower.

Dit was sy tweede kans, want hy het vier jaar tevore sonder sukses teen Eisenhower gehardloop. Stevenson, nou ses en vyftig, kom uit 'n Illinois-gesin met 'n uitstekende rekord in die demokratiese politiek: sy oupa was in die 1890's ondervoorsitter. Met 'n suksesvolle regspraktyk in Chicago en uiteenlopende ervaring in Washington, het hy na 1945 'n hand geneem in die organisasie van die Verenigde Nasies en is hy verkies tot goewerneur van Illinois in 1948. In 1952 word hy na 'n briljante toespraak tydens die partykonvensie verkies hardloop teen Eisenhower. Hy het die steun van die stadsbase van Chicago, wat hom baie verkies bo Senator Estes Kefauver van Tennessee, wie se ondersoeke na georganiseerde misdaad hulle ontstel het. Eisenhower het die verkiesing in 1952 maklik gewen, met 55 persent van die algemene stemme en 'n groot meerderheid in die kieskollege.

In die volgende vier jaar was Stevenson die land se voorste demokraat. Hy was intelligent, beskaafd en gesofistikeerd en 'n geestige en stylvolle spreker en die liefling van Demokratiese intellektuele. Dit was heeltemal tipies van hom om te sê dat 'die moeilikste van 'n politieke veldtog is hoe om te wen sonder om te bewys dat jy nie werd is om te wen nie.' Toe 1956 kom, begin senator Kefauver veldtogte met 'n bloei en wen die Demokratiese voorverkiesings in New Hampshire en Minnesota, maar toe steier Stevenson homself op. Hy het die belangrike deelstaat Kalifornië mooi aangeneem en in Julie onttrek Kefauver hom aan die wedstryd en kondig sy steun aan Stevenson aan. By die byeenkoms is goewerneur Stevenson se kandidatuur deur senator John F. Kennedy van Massachusetts beweeg. Oud-president Harry S. Truman, wat gesê het dat Stevenson 'te nederig was om te wen', het goewerneur Averell Harriman van New York benoem, maar Stevenson het maklik gewen met die eerste stembrief met 905 en 'n half stemme, wat twee- derde van die totaal, ver voor Harriman met 210, senator Lyndon B. Johnson van Texas met 80 en verskillende 'gunsteling seuns' met minder nog. Stevenson het al die stemme gekry van die afvaardigings uit agtien state, insluitend Kalifornië, en die meerderheid van die stemme uit nog sewentien, Illinois en Massachusetts, asook die van die afgevaardigdes uit Alaska, Hawaii en Puerto Rico. Goewerneur Stevenson het nou aangekondig dat hy, in teenstelling met alle presedente, geen voorkeur vir 'n lopende maat sou aandui nie. Tot die afgryse en verstomming van die party-professionele persone het hy die keuse van die kandidaat vir vise-president aan die konvensie oorgelaat. Na twee stembriewe is Senator Kefauver (Truman hom altyd privaat 'koeikoors' genoem) verkies met 750 stemme teen 593 vir senator Kennedy. Onderaan die lys was senator Hubert H. Humphrey van Minnesota met vyf stemme. Die een wat die meeste sou wen, sou Kennedy wees, wat nasionale bekendheid verwerf het sonder om saam met 'n verloorder te hardloop. Kenners het die daaropvolgende veldtog nogal saai gevind, ondanks af en toe oomblikke soos 'n duidelik swanger vrou wat paradeer met 'n vaandel wat sê 'Stevenson Is The Man'. Eisenhower het in hoë algemeenhede gepraat. 'Laat die geskreeu aan die opposisie', was sy advies aan die Republikeine, en dit het gewerk. Stevenson het beloof om die Amerikaanse toetsing van kernwapens te beëindig en die konsep af te skaf. Eisenhower het hom gekant op grond van nasionale veiligheid, en die Suez -krisis en die Sowjet -onderdrukking van die opstand in Hongarye het vir baie Amerikaners gesuggereer dat Eisenhower reg was. Hy het die verkiesing selfs meer oortuigend gewen as in 1952, met 58 % van die algemene stemme en die kieskollege met 457 teen 73 gewen.


Adlai Stevenson

Die eerste keer dat ek Adlai Stevenson gesien het, was in Julie 1953. Na die wonderlike maar groot mislukking van sy veldtog in 1952, het hy vyf maande gereis, meestal in Asië. Hy het wêreldwye erkenning gekry teen sy nasionale nederlaag. Londen was die laaste fase van sy reis. Ek het hom kortliks hoor spreek tot 'n tee-vergadering van die hele party. Die voorsitter stel hom voor met 'n ietwat selfbewuste onpartydigheid: Amerika was inderdaad gelukkig om tussen twee kandidate te kon onderskei van generaal Eisenhower en goewerneur Stevenson.

Stevenson se antwoord was minder straf. Ek onthou dit as kort, grasieus, selfveragtend en effens ontroerend. Dit was nie 'n Olimpiese speler nie, maar dit was aangenaam en bevredigend. Dit het my bevestig, toe 'n jong agterbank met min Amerikaanse kontakte, in 'n eenvoudige siening dat dit 'n tragedie was dat hy nie verkies is nie.

Ek het by daardie geleentheid nie met hom gepraat nie. Ek het hom ook nie geken voordat nog sewe of agt jaar verby was nie, en hy het beide die verdere nederlaag van 1956 gely, nog meer oorweldigend as die vorige, en, met die nominasie en verkiesing van John F. Kennedy in 1960, die finale uitskakeling van sy presidensiële hoop. In die laaste vier jaar van sy lewe, toe hy 'n bekende maar nie heeltemal gelukkige ambassadeur by die Verenigde Nasies was nie, het ek hom gereeld besoek. Ek het 'n uur voor hy gesterf het, telefonies met hom gepraat. Ek het 'n boodskap gestuur om hom te vra om die volgende dag 'n paar mense by my huis te ontmoet. Hy bel terug om met die entoesiasme te aanvaar vir enige sosiale betrokkenheid, veral 'n klein, wat hy altyd kon toon. 'Goed,' het hy gesê toe ons afgesluit het, 'ek sien jou môre eers eenuur.' Hy het nie. Later die middag het hy ineengestort en gesterf op die sypaadjie van Brookstraat.

Hy was vyf en sestig, nadat hy gebore is, gerieflik om sy ouderdom in stadiums van sy loopbaan te bereken, aan die begin van 1900. Hy leef sy lewe in die Amerikaanse ekwivalent van die Britse Victoriaanse era. Anders as die oorspronklike, was dit nie 'n tydperk van vrede nie. Maar in die meeste ander opsigte het die eerste sestig jaar van hierdie eeu vir Amerika baie van die kenmerke van die lang jare van die regering van die ou koningin gedra. Daar was dieselfde gevoel van toenemende uitbreiding van mag, dieselfde oortuiging dat vinnig toenemende materiële rykdom die sleutel tot die meeste probleme van die nasie en die wêreld bevat, dieselfde oortuiging dat die binnelandse politieke stelsel, ongeag die gebreke daarvan, die beste was die geskiedenis ooit gesien het en dat die basiese beginsels daarvan, behoudens 'n bietjie spesiale verpakking, geskik was vir uitvoer sowel as vir tuisverbruik. Natuurlik was daar verskille. Die terugslag van die Amerikaanse insinkingsjare was ernstiger as enigiets wat in die Victoriaanse Engeland bekend was, maar in die konteks van die eeu was die ellendes wat in 1929 gevolg het, relatief van korte duur. En die uiteenlopende aard van die oorsprong van die Amerikaanse volk, tesame met die tradisie van geweld wat uit die burgeroorlog en die vestiging van die Weste ontstaan ​​het, het beteken dat daar altyd 'n sterker onderstroom van vrees en spanning was.

Gedurende Stevenson se leeftyd het dit egter niks meer gedoen as om die oppervlak van Amerikaanse nasionale selfvertroue te benadeel nie. Sy liberale stem het binne die raamwerk van versekering gepraat. Dit was 'n stem wat, selfs al het dit nooit 'n posisie van volle gesag bereik het nie, gehelp het om die oorvloed van Amerikaanse mag te beskaaf en meer verantwoordelik te maak. Dit het dit meer aanvaarbaar vir die wêreld gemaak. Hy het die selfvoldaanheid van Eisenhower en die selfregverdigheid van John Foster Dulles betwis en was 'n teenstryd teen die grofheid van Lyndon Johnson. Maar hy was nietemin 'n produk, hoewel 'n sensitiewe en onselfsugtige produk, van hierdie tydperk van Amerikaanse leierskap. Vir hom was daar nooit 'n konflik tussen liberalisme en toewyding in die buiteland nie. Om verantwoordelik te wees, was om betrokke te wees, van Berlyn tot Korea, van Suidoos -Asië tot Latyns -Amerika.

Hierdie agtergrond van mag het hom nogal nie 'n sterk selfvertroue gegee nie. Hy het af en toe bevraagteken of hy geskik is vir die amp waarvoor hy 'n dekade lank gestreef het en of 'n openbare loopbaan nie noodwendig 'n man se privaat persoonlikheid beskadig nie. Maar hy betwyfel nie die parameters waarbinne hy, indien hy sou slaag nie, sou probeer het om die opperste mag uit te oefen of waarbinne hy sonder volle sukses die baie aansienlike invloed wat sy roem hom meebring, sou uitoefen.

Daar is 'n siening dat Stevenson die belangrikste boonste klas in die Amerikaanse politiek was. Ek dink dat hierdie siening in werklikheid sowel as in afleiding verkeerd is. Stevenson kom nie uit 'n kenmerkende hoër klas agtergrond nie. Die Amerikaanse aristokrasie is 'n aristokrasie van rykdom, verkieslik ou rykdom en meestal oostelike kus. Sy familie was goed gevestig, maar hulle was nie Oosterlinge nie en het, hoewel hulle gemaklik was, geen groot rykdom nie. Hy leef sy lewe teen 'n veilige en gevestigde agtergrond, maar hy is baie minder geraak deur sy gesinsherkoms en voorregte as Franklin Roosevelt, of Nelson Rockefeller, of Averell Harriman. En as 'n politikus was sy huiwering, vasberadenheid en af ​​en toe onbevoegdhede veel meer die gevolg van 'n ingewikkelde persoonlikheid, eerder as van enige sosiale sindroom.

'Amerikaners het altyd onbewustelik aangeneem dat alle probleme opgelos kan word dat elke storie 'n gelukkige einde het dat die toepassing van genoeg energie en welwillendheid alles reg kan laat kom. Met die oog op ons geskiedenis, is hierdie aanname natuurlik genoeg. As mense het ons nog nooit 'n hindernis teëgekom wat ons nie kon oorkom nie. Die Pelgrims het 'n rowwe eerste winter gehad, maar daarna het die kolonie floreer. Valley Forge is natuurlik gevolg deur Yorktown. Daniel Boone het altyd sy pad deur die bos gevind. We crossed the Alleghenies and the Mississippi and the Rockies with an impetus that nothing could stop. The wagon trains got through the Pony Express delivered the mail… the Union was somehow preserved. We never came across a river we couldn’t bridge, a depression we couldn’t overcome, a war we couldn’t win. So far, we have never known the tragedy, frustration and sometimes defeat which are ingrained in the memories of all other peoples.” —1954

Stevenson was born in Los Angeles. His father, Lewis Stevenson, spent about ten years in various places on the West Coast, mainly because he thought it would be good for his always somewhat ailing health. In 1906 he came back to Illinois, to Bloomington, the hometown of himself and his wife and their many relations, and became a largescale farm manager, supervising twelve thousand acres on behalf of an aunt. Bloomington, a hundred twenty-five miles southwest of Chicago, then had about thirty thousand inhabitants and was an agreeable mixture of farm center and college town. The Stevenson forebears had been there since it became a settled community about 1850. They were all of old American stock and had come in from Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and the Carolinas.

Lewis Stevenson also engaged mildly in politics, becoming Illinois secretary of state in 1913. He knew the great national figures of the Democratic Party, to which he had a firm hereditary affiliation, and they treated him as a figure of considerable local importance.

Lewis Stevenson’s father, Adlai E. Stevenson i, was a more serious politician. He had been appointed Assistant Postmaster General in Grover Cleveland’s first administration and won the Vice-presidential nomination in 1892, when Cleveland became the only President ever to go back to the White House. Adlai i served his four years in Wash- ington and then returned to Bloomington. Hy is in 1914 oorlede.

This was Stevenson’s family background: political, prosperous, rooted, small-town oriented. It was an agreeable and on the whole relaxed upbringing, marred by one dreadful and little-known incident. When he was twelve, he accidentally shot dead in his own house a sixteen-yearold girl, who was his sister’s closest friend and a distant cousin of them both. He was hardly guilty even of carelessness. The gun with which he was playing had been sent for and checked as empty of bullets by the older children. But the effect of the tragedy was temporarily devastating and musi have left some more permanent scars. It may have accounted for the fact that although he went to school in the East, as his father had done before him, he did not go until he was sixteen. He then went to Choate in Connecticut for two years and next to Princeton. He had some difficulty in getting in. Throughout his life, indeed, and contrary to widespread belief, his intellectual qualities were never particularly strong. He read comparatively little and very slowly, often moving his lips as he did so. He preferred to inform himself through the ear rather than the eye. He was quick to have some idea of what was in the books he had not read.

He graduated in 1922, went on to Harvard Law School, and was admitted to the Illinois bar in June, 1926. By the end of the year he had established himself, by Princeton rather than nepotic influence, as a law clerk in a Chicago firm of highest repute and the best possible financial contacts. For the rest of his life Stevenson became to some considerable extent a Chicago man. Bloomington rather faded into the background. He maintained the connection when campaigning in mid-Illinois, of course, but not much on other occasions.

It was his early Chicago life, more than his family and Bloomington upbringing, that put upon Stevenson something of the stamp of a Scott Fitzgerald socialite of the restless twenties. In fact he was not very restless, nor particularly pleasure-loving, and he worked hard, with growing but not sensational success, at the law. He lived mostly in a small apartment on the North Shore Gold Coast but spent much of the summer in a shared house at Lake Forest. So he was never far from the center of the social scene. The culmination of this phase of his life was his marriage in December, 1928, to Ellen Borden. She was rich, pretty, and barely twenty, one of the most soughtafter butterflies of the Chicago scene. She lived in a mockRenaissance chateau on Lake Shore Drive. Her father, rich by inheritance, both made and lost a lot of money. But in 1928 he, like most American men of property, was on the upswing.

The marriage was a gradual failure. Various explanations have been offered for this, the most frequent being that Ellen Stevenson resented the shift in the balance of fame and found no compensation in her husband’s mounting political success. At the beginning she was the more sought-after and he witty, charming, and easy social coinage, but superficially little more. At the end, twenty-one years later, he was a national figure, and the Borden fortune had largely disappeared. Not having known Mrs. Stevenson, I express no opinion. What is certain is that the breakup was a source of deep and lasting distress to Stevenson.

Stevenson’s first foray away from La Salle Street and Lake Forest came at the beginning of Roosevelt’s first term. Partly through the agency of Harold Ickes, the new Secretary of the Interior, he went to Washington for eighteen months as an assistant counsel in the Agricultural Assistance Administration. Then he returned to Chicago and his law practice. He became a partner in 1Q35 and with the reorganization and renaming of the firm in 1937 graduated to a major role and a steadily enlarging income. By the outbreak of the war in Europe he was making thirty or forty thousand dollars a year.

“Diplomacy… is not the art of asserting ever more emphatically that attitudes should not be what they clearly are. It is not the repudiation of actuality, but the recognition of actuality, and the use of actuality to advance our national interests.” —1954

During this period he also became increasingly involved in community affairs, notably the Council on Foreign Relations but also a few charities, a cross-party cleangovernment league, and some regular party activity at the time of Roosevelt’s second-term election. He was then thirty-six, and it is doubtful if he had ever before made a straight political speech. Nor did he make more than a handful for another twelve years thereafter. But he nonetheless began to make a minority-audience public name for himself. His introduction of visiting speakers at the council became known as models of wit and felicity. They were delivered in a throwaway manner. They were not so composed. On one occasion when he was asked to insert a new point, he recoiled in horror. He could not possibly do it without at least an hour’s further preparation.

In 1939 he spent the early summer in England and returned oppressed by the shadow of the coming war. Soon after his return he began his first substantial political enterprise, his first attempt to mold opinion. He became chairman of the Chicago chapter of William Alien White’s Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. The length of the title was made necessary by an ambiguity of approach. The aim was to produce an Allied victory while keeping America at peace. Chicago was a key segment of the ideological battle line. Isolationist sentiment was strong there. Stevenson had to stand up to a lot of abuse, both public and private. He greatly disliked it, but his controversial nerves improved under the bombardment.

In July, 1941, he again took a job in Washington, as personal assistant to Frank Knox, whom Roosevelt had recently appointed Secretary of the Navy. Later that year he began to be attracted by elective office and contemplated the possibility of running for the United States Senate. But American entry into the war turned his thoughts away from that. He stayed with Knox until 1943, and was then sent to try to organize civil administration in Italy. At the end of the war and in early 1946 he was occupied with the organization of the United Nations.

A year after the end of war in Europe he was once more back in his Chicago law office. He was forty-six. He had refused an embassy. He had a good record of public service. He had developed a feel for diplomatic negotiation and some rather ill-directed sense of ambition. Not for the first or last time in his life he was uncertain what he wanted to do.

By the summer of 1947 he again began to be tentatively, mock-reluctantly, interested in elective office. A Presidential year was on the horizon. President Truman’s stock was low, and the likelihood of his defeat looked overwhelming. On the other hand the possibility of a Democrat of Stevenson’s stamp securing nomination in Illinois had improved. The old Kelly-Nash machine had been beaten in Chicago. Colonel Jacob Arvey had taken over as head of the Cook County Democratic organization. Maurice Kennelly, a successful Irish businessman with a reform reputation and a broad appeal, had triumphantly replaced Kelly as mayor.

As in 1941, it was the Senate that attracted Stevenson. If nominated, he could run against an isolationist incumbent who was an old enemy. If elected, he could pursue his main foreign-policy interests. A trio of influential Chicago gentlemen with little direct political involvement began to canvass actively on his behalf. There were also recommendations from Mrs. Roosevelt and Secretary Byrnes. Arvey was half-impressed. Mayor Kennelly’s success, and his own predilections, made him open to the idea of candidates with an appeal to middle opinion. But he was not sure about either Stevenson or his associates. He thought they might be too detached from the realities even of reformed Illinois politics. He made inquiries and gratefully received an assurance from Stevenson that, contrary to rumor, he had not been at Oxford, and “not even Eton.” Eventually Arvey gave them half of what they wanted. He preferred Paul Douglas for the Senate nomination, but Stevenson could run for governor. A thirtyman committee would make the formal decisions, but Arvey had made up his mind.

Stevenson had more difficulty in making up his. He finally gave a rather miserable positive answer five minutes before the deadline that Arvey had calmly set him. There was a good objective reason for his doubt. It was federal, not state, politics that interested him. But there were probably subjective factors, too. He always liked to be pressed to do a job rather than to seek it. To accept a bone that he had been tossed was not easily compatible with this stance.

Nevertheless it was, of course, a sizable bone. Illinois was a great state, and the governorship, with its tradition of Altgeld, a great office. In the past, at least, it had counted for more than the Senate. It took him back to his family roots. And as the campaign wore on he became captivated by the power and personality of a state that was almost a country.

“There’s an important difference, it seems to me, between Communism as we view it and Communism as some of the Asian peoples view it. When we think of Communism we think of what we are going to lose. When many of the Asiatics think of Communism they think of what they are going to gain—especially if they believe that they have nothing to lose.” —1952

The nomination was far from equivalent to election. Stevenson’s opponent was Dwight Green, who had been governor since 1940. He had started as a reformer, but he and his administration had deteriorated into lethargy and corruption. Green was nevertheless a considerable figure who, right up to the Republican convention, was a real possibility for either position on his party’s national ticket. His defensive position looked reasonably strong.

Stevenson’s campaign ran well but not easily. The machine, having tossed him the nomination, left him on his own until the last few weeks. His amateurs were enthusiastic but not very efficient. And his rich friends proved less forthcoming with their money than they had earlier suggested. He was occasionally down almost to his own resources. His speaking was at first rather hesitant and overprepared. Later the overpreparation did not show through, but it continued to occupy a great deal of his time and meant that his set-piece speeches could not be as thickly surrounded by handshaking expeditions as his supporters wished.

But he seemed to be making an impact upon the voters. His favorite campaign phrase was “I am not a politician, I am a citizen.” By the eve of the election his prospects had clearly advanced well beyond the ten-to-one chance that was all he had been allowed in the summer. But his supporters were far less confident than he was himself.

In the event he won a landslide victory, with a record majority of more than a half million.

By his 1948 victory Stevenson established himself as a vote getter in a key state. It remained to be seen what he would make of the governorship of Illinois. The next four years gave him the only opportunity of his life for the exercise of major executive responsibility. They are therefore important in any evaluation of how good a President he would have made.

He worked extremely hard. In part this was a reaction to the breakup of his marriage after nine months at Springfield. This left him somewhat lonely in the Executive Mansion, oversized in its pre-Civil War gingerbread style. Yet he was not alone. His sister and her retired diplomat husband soon moved in. He had a lot of friends, whom he was frequently with there or elsewhere. And he was surrounded by a devoted staff, mostly of young Chicago lawyers, with whom he was on easy and intimate terms. It was not absolute loneliness but more a desire to prove himself by public success to compensate for private failure. “I have failed as a husband. I have failed as a father. I will succeed as a governor,” he rather overdramatically told his sister when, late one night, she tried to drag him away from his office.

Yet the keynote of his administration was certainly not demonic. It was far too urbane for that. He rarely lost his temper. He was confronted with a difficult legislature: a bare but fairly corrupt Democratic majority in the house, a Republican one in the state senate. He eschewed deals, sometimes quite respectable ones, but maintained relations with all who could help him and resorted to occasional polite and moderately effective public admonition. He got two-thirds of his legislative program through, but the last third contained many of the most important measures.

If the legislature frustrated some of his bills, so he frustrated some of theirs. He was one of the most elegant drafters of veto messages in the history of American executive office. This elegance reflected itself in his speaking style, which became firmly established during these years. It was self-deprecatory, evocative, and literary, and it raised the sights of most of his audiences without disappearing over their horizons. He did not hold them by flashing eye or stirring populism, but he caressed them with a persuasive high-mindedness without in most instances causing a deep unease. He did not shock his listeners, but he tried hard to explain to them the more difficult issues.

If there was a fault of form, it was a lack of a hard structure of logical argument. He shone shafts of light and wit into most subjects, but he did not relentlessly take the subjects apart and then put them together again in his own mold. His speeches were isolated works of art rather than stations on a line along which he wished to travel. He half acknowledged this when, at the end of his political career, he was introducing John Kennedy in California: “Do you remember,” he said, “that in classical times when Cicero had finished speaking, the people said, ‘How well he spoke,’ but when Demosthenes had finished speaking, they said, ‘Let us march’ ?”

Stevenson’s reputation increased steadily throughout his period as governor. He gave the state better government in a nonideological way. He took the highway police and some other agencies out of politics. He got better men to accept public appointments. He vastly improved the provision for mental health. As his term went on, his national publicity grew into a favorable flood. He was clearly of Presidential quality.

Yet he did not want to be a candidate in 1952. He wanted to go on as governor. This was partly out of shrewdness and partly out of modesty. Once he realized that Elsenhower was likely to be the Republican candidate, he did not believe that with twenty years of office round their necks the Democrats could win. He also had some doubt about his own fitness for the supreme office. And to this he added a special fastidiousness about taking the plunge into full and lasting fame. “I can’t bear the possibility of never really being alone again,” he told a friend, “of never, as long as I live, being unidentified, of never again being a private person.” Accordingly, when Truman summoned Stevenson to Washington in January, 1952, and offered him Presidential support for the nomination, Stevenson said No. But the Stevenson boom continued to grow.

The convention assembled in Chicago in mid-July. On the Sunday Stevenson met the Illinois delegation and reiterated his reluctance: “I ask … that you all abide by my wishes not to nominate me, nor to vote for me if I should be nominated.” On the Monday he went some way to neutralize this by a welcoming speech, which as governor of the home state it naturally fell to him to make and which was perfectly phrased to arouse the enthusiasm of the delegates. One act of self-discipline that he could not impose upon himself was deliberately to make a bad speech.

On the Thursday his name was placed in nomination by the governor of Indiana. On the Friday balloting began. On the third ballot he was quickly pushed over the required total.

It was the only draft in American history apart from that of Garfield in 1880, and that was on the thirty-sixth ballot. But even Stevenson’s took a little time. When it had happened, but only then, he accepted Truman’s sponsorship. He entered the convention hall with the President and was presented to the delegates by him. His acceptance speech contained some notable passages, both of phrase and of substance, although, oddly, the style in places now reads a little floridly. But the central message was clear: Let’s talk sense to the American people. Let’s tell them the truth, that there are no gains without pains. … The people are wise- wiser than the Republicans think. And the Democratic Party is the people’s party, not the labor party, not the farmers’ party—it is the party of everyone. That, I think, is our ancient mission. Where we have deserted it, we have failed. With your help there will be no desertion now. Better we lose the election than mislead the people better we lose than misgovern the people.

Stevenson had set his own style for the campaign, except that there were no jokes on this occasion. He would make a high-minded, nonpartisan appeal, stressing America’s world role and world duty. His reluctance right to the last moment was no doubt genuine. Had it been a calculated cloak for a relentless, unvarying ambition, it would have required not merely a degree of self-deceit that was alien to his character but also a monumental nerve and selfconfidence that were equally unlike him.

At the same time there was an element of a two-way bet about his behavior. Maybe he was not equipped for the Presidency. In any event, 1956 might be a better year. But if he was to be the candidate in 1952, he had to be on his own terms. He had to be free of at least some part of Truman’s legacy. He had to fight, not as an heir, but as someone who would introduce a new spirit into Washington. His reluctance lost him Truman’s friendship but gave him as much of this freedom as it was possible for any Democrat to achieve.

It did not give him victory. Eisenhower was ahead at the beginning and remained so throughout. Probably it could not have been otherwise. Eisenhower was as near to unbeatable as it was possible to be. His combination of folksiness and reassurance was immensely appealing to Middle America. It made him impervious to Stevenson’s higherminded, more articulate campaign.

“And to the Soviet Union I would say: There are laws of history more profound, more inescapable than the laws dreamed up by Marx and Lenin- laws which belong not to class relationships or stages of economic development, but to the nature and the destiny of man himself. Among these laws is the certainty that war follows when new empires thrust into collapsing ruins of the old. So stay your ambitions … do not sabotage the only institution [the United Nations] which offers an alternative to imperialism.” —1961

Eisenhower would “lead a crusade” (he had led one already, he stressed) to “clear up the mess in Washington.” He would be hard on corruption and communism. Still more important for vote winning was his “I shall go to Korea” statement at Detroit on October 24. The war there hung heavily over the nation throughout the campaign. Although more creditable and successful than its successor in Vietnam, it was nonetheless almost as unpopular, although less frenetically so. Eisenhower’s promise to go there came as a shaft of light. Most Americans did not ask what he would do when he arrived. The General would surely find a way out. Stevenson responded with a clearly argued but defensive antiappeasement statement. It was less appealing than the hopeful ambiguity of his opponent.

“7 don’t share the concern of some of my contemporaries about student demonstrations. I rather like their involvement in great issues. But if I could offer demonstrators one word of advice I would say that to state goals is easy to tell us how to get there is not so easy. ” —1965

It was an exchange that was typical of the campaign. Stevenson’s speeches were more responsible, better phrased, better delivered, enlivened by a wit that was wholly lacking in Eisenhower (“I offer my opponents a bargain: if they will stop telling falsehoods about us, I will stop telling the truth about them”), and better received by the immediate audiences. But they made less impact across the nation, partly because they were less well reported by an overwhelmingly Republican press and partly because their message was less simple. Stevenson also spread his effort across too wide and diffuse a range of subjects.

Eisenhower’s campaign had some seamy edges. He did not disavow McCarthyism and indeed appeared with the senator in Wisconsin, cutting out of his speech there a passage of praise for General George Marshall, whom McCarthy had viciously attacked, which had been in the original draft. This aroused Stevenson’s particular contempt. “Crusade indeed” was his comment. Marshall was “General Eisenhower’s greatest benefactor.” Yet the General had given his hand to those, not only McCarthy, but also Senator Jenner of Indiana, who had traduced him. This was a break from Stevenson’s habit of courteous, almost overcourteous, treatment of his opponent. He reserved most of his acerbic remarks for the then Senator Nixon, second man on the Republican ticket, who specialized in suggesting that the Democratic candidate was steeped in the Acheson-inspired conspiracy to hand over the United States to communism. Stevenson called him “the brash and patronizing young man who aspires to be Vice President” and forcibly defended his own position in terms of classical liberalism.

Stevenson wound up his campaign in Chicago, where it had started, and awaited the returns in Springfield. At 9 P.M. he was told what the result would be and accepted it calmly.

He carried only nine states, all in or on the edge of the South. A few hours later Stevenson went across to his local hotel headquarters and conceded graciously. He added, spontaneously it seemed, that someone had once asked a fellow townsman—Lincoln—how it felt to lose: “He said that it felt like a little boy who had stubbed his toe in the dark. He said that he was too old to cry, but it hurt too much to laugh.” He was as urbane in defeat as he had been four years before in victory.

Defeat in the Presidential campaign of 1952 left Adlai Stevenson with a lasting fame, both at home and abroad dedicated minority support, particularly among the educated young, balanced by a strong current of criticism from others about the way in which he had conducted the campaign and no very clear political role. His ardent supporters felt that he had widened their horizons and given them a purpose and commitment in politics that they had never before experienced. His detractors pointed out, with some justification, that he had been aloof, not very good on television, above the heads of much of his audience, sometimes elegantly flippant when he ought to have been stolidly earnest, and rather ill-organized. His lack of a clear future role was endemic in the American system. He automatically remained the titular head of his party. But he had no forum in which to exercise his leadership and 1956 was a long way off, with a second attempt for a defeated candidate nearer to the exception than the rule.

“While I am not in favor of maladjustment, I view this cultivation of neutrality, this breeding of mental neuters, this hostility to eccentricity and controversy with grave misgiving. One looks back with dismay at the possibility of… Wesley contentedly administering a country parish, George Washington going to London to receive a barony from George in, or Abraham Lincoln prospering in Springfield with never a concern for the preservation of the crumbling Union.” —1955

He did not return to the law until 1954. The substantial office that he set up in Chicago was for the practice of politics. He travelled a lot, he spoke a lot. He remained in the news. His speeches were at first directed mainly to foreign affairs and were a little bland. They achieved more effect when he turned to a hard domestic issue. His attack on McCarthyism at Miami Beach in March, 1954, made a significant contribution to the turning back of that malign tide. This was followed by a notably successful part in the midterm elections of the following autumn. In six weeks he spoke in thirty-four states, and his speeches had more bite than in 1952. The Democrats regained control of both houses of Congress. It was a considerable victory and improved both Democratic morale and Stevenson’s stock.

But it did not mean that Elsenhower was dangerously vulnerable for 1956. He was always able to ride above the misfortunes of his party as well as the mistakes of his administration. And the collapse of McCarthy closed a Republican flank. If Stevenson had reason to be hesitant about 1952, he had still more reason for hesitancy in 1956. There were obvious attractions in missing a turn and waiting to run against a new Republican in 1960. He was unlikely to be forgotten.

“When I was a boy I never had much sympathy for a holiday speaker. He was just a kind of interruption between the hot dogs, a fly in the lemonade.” — 1952

To these attractions he was impervious. He did not push himself hard or prematurely, but by 1955 he made it obvious that he wanted the nomination. And this time he had to work hard for it. At the convention, again in Chicago, he was comfortably nominated on the first ballot. But he paid a price for this. The primaries left him tired before the real campaign began. And they also left him a little shop-soiled. There was a new tendency to say, “He’s just another politician.” Altogether the 1956 campaign, although in some ways more professional, lacked something of both the sparkle and the inspiration of 1952. It was intended to be domestically oriented. There was also to be a determined attempt to show Stevenson as a vigorous yet experienced challenger to a President who had been at best half-time and was now manifestly not up to the job.

The strategy failed. Elsenhower was so brilliantly packaged and presented that whenever he got to a television studio, he looked much fitter than his rushed and tired opponent. Stevenson’s attack also got diverted, perhaps by a natural predilection, on to foreign- and defense-policy issues. He demanded an end to H-bomb tests and the replacement of the draft by a professional army. He was almost certainly right on both points, but he totally failed to convince ordinary American opinion that he could be more expert on either than the great General. Then, in the last days of the campaign, the Suez war obtruded sharply.

The strength of the Democrats was that people instinctively associated the Republicans with big business and neglect of the small man at home. The strength of the Republicans was that people instinctively feared that the Democrats were the war party. The diversion of strategy reduced the first strength and increased the second. It helped to produce a victory for Eisenhower still more decisive than that of 1952. Stevenson carried only seven states.

This second defeat was much worse for Stevenson than the first. On the former occasion he had greatly enhanced his reputation. He started the campaign as a successful governor. He ended it as a world figure. And he could husband this reputation and live to fight another day. In 1956 he had gained nothing, and on any likely prognosis he was at the end of the road. Only Clay and Bryan in American history had been allowed third attempts, and Bryan’s were not consecutive.

A month after the election Stevenson issued a formal statement of withdrawal. He would continue to work for the Democratic Party and to warn the American people “against complacency and a false sense of security,” but he would not again be a candidate.

Stevenson was able to keep his imprint on Democratic policy. His stamp remained that of anticomplacency at home and deep commitment abroad.

There is little doubt that as the 1960 election came nearer he became tempted by the prospect of a third try. He would hardly have been human had he felt otherwise. He had devoted some of his best years to fighting when it was not possible to win. For 1960 the prospect looked quite different. Nixon seemed to be emerging as the most likely successor. Stevenson viewed him with strong disapproval verging upon contempt. He was certain he could beat him. Moreover he was constantly told, everywhere he went in the world, that he was the man to whom humanity was looking for the reburnishment of America’s leadership.

He therefore determined on a compromise course. If he was offered the nomination, he would accept it, but he would do nothing to seek it. Right up to the end he appeared to be hovering on the brink of a more positive move. He got appeals, from Mrs. Roosevelt, from Senator Humphrey, from a host of others, to declare himself a candidate. He continued to be available but undeclared.

“I am not an old experienced hand at politics. But I am now seasoned enough to have learned that the hardest thing about any political campaign is how to win without proving that you are unworthy of winning.” —1956

This was still his status when he arrived at the Los Angeles convention. His supporters had been there before him, working hard. There was no doubt that they were running him as a candidate, whatever he was doing himself. The Kennedy bandwagon was rolling fast, but it was still short of a first-ballot victory, and it was at that stage arousing more professional admiration than popular enthusiasm. Many thought that if Stevenson would give a clear lead and set alight the latent flames of nostalgic affection and respect that were smoldering in the hearts of many delegates, the convention could still be turned.

There were a number of occasions when he might have done this. He refused them all. Yet he allowed his name to be placed in nomination. Indeed he actually suggested the proposer, Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota. It was an excellent choice—but for what purpose?—and pro- duced the greatest oratorical feat of the week. “Do not turn away from this man,” McCarthy said. “Do not reject this man who has made us all proud to be Democrats.”

Meanwhile Stevenson had already started work on a speech introducing John Kennedy to a postconvention rally. Altogether it was a most mystifying week’s performance. It was certainly not calculated to endear him to the Kennedy camp. He had taken too much of the gilt off their gingerbread for that. Nor did he make it easy for his friends. Yet they did not revolt or even complain. Their springs of loyalty and affection were too deep.

“Unreason and anti-intellectualism abominate thought. Thinking implies disagreement and disagreement implies nonconformity and nonconformity implies heresy and heresy implies disloyalty—so, obviously, thinking must be stopped. But shouting is not a substitute for thinking and reason is not the subversion but the salvation of freedom.” —1954

This was the last week of his political career. It had lasted twelve and a half years. Thereafter everything was, not bathos, but anticlimax. Stevenson accepted the ambassadorship to the United Nations, sweetened by the rather meaningless prestige symbol of Cabinet membership.

For Kennedy it was a brilliant appointment. Stevenson discharged his duties with flair and imagination. It was no longer his own standard, but that of an administration with which he was not wholly in sympathy, that he carried. But he did it with most of his old distinction. He continued to foster world respect for the United States. But he again paid a price. He was under instructions. He defended causes in which he did not believe. He was no longer his own man. He lived in luxury and esteem at the top of the Waldorf Towers. He used his eloquence. He was warmly welcoming to the delegates of the emergent nations. He saw his old friends and went to too many parties. He thought of resigning and trying to run for the Senate but did not do so. It was certainly not the happiest period of his life. And then it all ended on a July afternoon in a Mayfair street.

Stevenson, with the possible exception of Bryan, was the most famous unsuccessful candidate in American history. By definition, therefore, he was a failure in his central purpose. But he inspired a generation. And he influenced the world view of the United States more than any other politician who never handled the levers of full power.

“Oh, what I would really like is just to sit in the shade with a glass of wine in my hands and watch the dancers.” —1965


Adlai Stevenson II

In 1928, Stevenson married Ellen Borden, a well-to-do socialite. The younger couple quickly grew to become widespread and acquainted figures on the Chicago social scene they particularly loved attending and internet hosting costume events. [18] They had three sons: Adlai Stevenson III, who would develop into a U.S. Senator Borden Stevenson, and John Fell Stevenson. In 1935, Adlai and Ellen bought a 70-acre (28 ha) tract of land alongside the Des Plaines River close to Libertyville, Illinois, a rich suburb of Chicago. They constructed a house on the property and it served as Stevenson’s official residence for the remainder of his life. Although he spent comparatively little time there because of his profession, Stevenson did contemplate the property to be his dwelling, and within the Nineteen Fifties, he was usually known as “The Man from Libertyville” by the nationwide information media. Stevenson additionally bought a farm in northwestern Illinois, simply outdoors Galena, the place he ceaselessly rode horses and saved some cattle.

A 12 months after leaving Harvard, Stevenson took an interest within the regulation once more after speaking to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. When he returned dwelling to Bloomington, he determined to complete his diploma at Northwestern University School of Law, attending lessons through the week and returning to Bloomington on the weekends to put in writing for the Pantagraph. Stevenson obtained his J.D. diploma from Northwestern in 1926 and handed the Illinois state bar examination that 12 months. He obtained a place at Cutting, Moore & Sidley, one in all Chicago’s oldest and most prestigious regulation corporations. [17]

He attended Princeton University, changing into managing editor of The Daily Princetonian, a member of the American Whig-Cliosophic Society, [12] a member of the Quadrangle Club, and obtained a B.A. diploma in 1922 in literature and historical past. [13] Under prodding from his father he then went to Harvard Law School, however discovered the regulation to be “uninteresting”, and withdrew after failing a number of lessons. [14] He returned to Bloomington the place he wrote for the household newspaper, The Daily Pantagraph, which was based by his maternal great-grandfather Jesse Fell. Die Pantagraph, which had one of many largest circulations of any newspaper in Illinois outdoors of the Chicago space, was a major supply of the Stevenson household’s wealth. [15] Following his mom’s demise in 1935, Adlai inherited one-quarter of the Pantagraph’s inventory, offering him with a big, reliable supply of revenue for the remainder of his life. [16]

Stevenson left Bloomington High School after his junior 12 months and attended University High School in Normal, Illinois, Bloomington’s “twin metropolis”, simply to the north. He then went to boarding college in Connecticut at The Choate School (now Choate Rosemary Hall), the place he performed on the tennis staff, acted in performs, and was elected editor-in-chief of The Choate News, the college newspaper. [9] Upon his commencement from Choate in 1918, [10] he enlisted within the United States Naval Reserve and served on the rank of Seaman Apprentice, however his coaching was accomplished too late for him to take part in World War I. [11]

Stevenson was raised within the metropolis of Bloomington, Illinois his household was a member of Bloomington’s higher class and lived in one of many metropolis’s well-to-do neighborhoods. On December 30, 1912, on the age of twelve, Stevenson by accident killed Ruth Merwin, a 16-year-old pal, whereas demonstrating drill approach with a rifle, inadvertently left loaded, throughout a celebration on the Stevenson dwelling. [6] Stevenson was devastated by the accident and infrequently talked about or mentioned it as an grownup, even together with his spouse and kids. [7] However, in 1955 Stevenson heard a few girl whose son had skilled an analogous tragedy. He wrote to her that she ought to inform her son that “he should now stay for 2”, which Stevenson’s associates took to be a reference to the capturing incident. [8]

Adlai Ewing Stevenson II was born in Los Angeles, California, in a neighborhood now designated because the North University Park Historic District. His dwelling and birthplace at 2639 Monmouth Avenue has been designated as a Los Angeles Historic-Cultural Monument. [2] He was a member of a distinguished Illinois political household. His grandfather and namesake Adlai Stevenson I used to be Vice President of the United States beneath President Grover Cleveland from 1893 to 1897. His father, Lewis Stevenson, by no means held an elected workplace, however was appointed Illinois Secretary of State (1914–1917) and was thought of a robust contender for the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1928. A maternal great-grandfather, Jesse W. Fell, had been an in depth pal and marketing campaign supervisor for Abraham Lincoln in his 1858 US Senate race Stevenson usually referred to Fell as his favourite ancestor. [3] Stevenson’s eldest son, Adlai E. Stevenson III, grew to become a U.S. Senator from Illinois (1970–1981). His mom was Helen Davis Stevenson, and he had an older sister, Elizabeth Stevenson Ives, an creator who was known as “Buffie”. Actor McLean Stevenson was a second cousin as soon as eliminated. [4] He was the nephew by marriage of novelist Mary Borden, and she or he assisted within the writing of a few of his political speeches. [5]

In each the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, Stevenson was defeated in a landslide by Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower. He unsuccessfully sought the Democratic presidential nomination for a 3rd time on the 1960 Democratic National Convention. After President John F. Kennedy was elected, he appointed Stevenson because the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Stevenson served from 1961 till his demise in 1965 from a coronary heart assault in London, following a United Nations convention in Switzerland.

Raised in Bloomington, Illinois, Stevenson was a member of the Democratic Party. [1] He served in quite a few positions within the federal authorities through the Thirties and Forties, together with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Federal Alcohol Administration, Department of the Navy, and the State Department. In 1945, he served on the committee that created the United Nations, and he was a member of the preliminary U.S. delegations to the UN. He was the thirty first governor of Illinois from 1949 to 1953, and he received the Democratic Party’s nomination for president within the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections.

Adlai Ewing Stevenson II ( / ˈ æ d l eɪ / February 5, 1900 – July 14, 1965) was an American lawyer, politician, and diplomat.


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