Panzer I en II bloudruk vir Blitzkrieg 1933-1941, Robert Jackson

Panzer I en II bloudruk vir Blitzkrieg 1933-1941, Robert Jackson



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Panzer I & II Blueprint for Blitzkrieg 1933-1941, Robert Jackson

Panzer I & II Blueprint for Blitzkrieg 1933-1941, Robert Jackson

Die beeld van die Duitse weermag van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog is van 'n hoogs gemeganiseerde leër, toegerus met tenks wat alles wat hul teenstanders kan uitoefen, uitklas. Ironies genoeg kom die prentjie die naaste daaraan toe dat dit laat in die oorlog, toe die Duitsers verslaan is, die waarheid is. Vroeër was die ligte Panzer I, vervaardig as 'n oefenbak, en die effens swaarder Panzer II, eintlik die meeste tipes tydens die seëvierende Blitzkrieg -jare. In Pole in 1939 was die Panzer I die meeste, gevolg deur die Panzer II. Tussen hulle was hulle meer as 2 600 uit die totaal van net minder as 3 500 gepantserde voertuie in diens. In Mei 1940 het die Panzer I begin verdwyn, hoewel daar nog meer as 500 in diens was, maar die Panzer II, met 955 teenwoordig, was die meeste. Selfs so lank as die inval in die Sowjetunie, was die Panzer II nog steeds in groot getalle teenwoordig, hoewel dit na die tweede plek gekom het.

Gevolglik was hierdie ligte tenks 'n belangrike deel van die Duitse oorlogsmasjien gedurende die suksesvolste tydperk. Hierdie boek dek hul volledige geskiedenis, vanaf hul oorspronklike ontwikkeling, deur die latere weergawes en die verskillende voertuie wat op dieselfde onderstel gebaseer is (namate die tenkweergawes uitgedien geraak het, het verskeie selfaangedrewe gewere en tenkvernietigers met dieselfde onderstel in groot getalle vervaardig), en verder na hul gevegsrekord.

Die modelafdeling kom voor die gevegsrekord, miskien omdat dit logies voortvloei uit die kamoefleer- en merkafdeling, hoewel dit hier 'n bietjie verkeerd voel. Die modelafdeling is ongewoon neutraal van toon - dit kan dikwels redelik veroordelend wees (veral om oorlogsboeke om een ​​of ander rede), maar nie hier nie. Daar is 'n goeie model -uitstallingsgedeelte met die werk wat met die kits vervaardig kan word.

In die algemeen is dit 'n goeie opsomming van die ontwikkelings- en gevegsrekord van hierdie twee belangrike Duitse tenks, ondersteun deur 'n goeie seleksie van foto's en illustrasies, hoewel ek iets sou wou hê wat die interlay -uitleg van die voertuie toon.

Hoofstukke
1 - Panzer I & II Ontwerp en ontwikkeling
2 - Panzer I -variante
3 - Panzer II
4 - Panzer II -omskakelings en ontwikkelings
5 - Panzer I & II in detail
6 - Kamoeflering en merke
7 - Modelvertoonkas
8 - Modelprodukte
9 - Panzer I & II in Combat

Skrywer: Robert Jackson
Uitgawe: Sagteband
Bladsye: 64
Uitgewer: Pen & Sword Military
Jaar: 2018



Panzer I en II: bloudruk vir Blitzkrieg 1933-1941 deur Robert Jackson (Engels)

Verkäufer: die_nyl ✉ ️ (1.124.018) 99,1%, Artikelstandort: Londen, Versand nach: Wêreldwyd, Artikelnummer: 132539279408 Panzer I en II: bloudruk vir Blitzkrieg 1933-1941 deur Robert Jackson (Engels). GRATIS VERZENDING AUSTRALIË WYD Panzer I en II deur Robert Jackson Spesiaal in opdrag gemaakte kleurprofiele wat groot variante van die Panzer I en II FORMAT Sagteband TAAL Engelse TOESTAND Splinternuwe uitgewer beskrywing Die Panzer I en II het 'n belangrike rol gespeel in die blitskriegveldtogte wat Duitsland so 'n groot rol gespeel het. buitengewone sukses in die beginjare van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, en hierdie hoogs geïllustreerde bundel in die TankCraft -reeks is die ideale inleiding tot hulle. Die Verdrag van Versailles verbied Duitsland om tenks te vervaardig, sodat die Panzer I in streng geheimhouding ontwikkel moes word, maar teen die inval van Pole het die Wehrmacht meer as 1400 van hierdie ligte tenks gehad. Die Panzer II was 'n tussentydse ontwerp wat die gaping tussen die Panzer I en die daaropvolgende, veel lewensvatbaarder gepantserde vegvoertuie soos die Panzer III en IV oorbrug. Benewens die geskiedenis van die Panzer I en II, is die boek van Robert Jacksons 'n uitstekende verwysingsbron vir die modelleerder, met besonderhede van beskikbare kits, tesame met kunswerke wat die kleurskemas toon wat op hierdie tenks toegepas word. Elke afdeling van die boek word ondersteun deur 'n magdom foto's uit die oorlog, sowel as diagramme wat die tegniese veranderinge toon wat tydens hierdie loopbane aan hierdie tenks aangebring is. SKRYWER: Robert Jackson is die skrywer van meer as tagtig boeke oor militêre, lugvaart, vloot en wetenskaplike onderwerpe. Hy was korrespondent vir verdediging en wetenskap vir 'n groot Britse koerantuitgewersgroep, en het 'n spesiale studie gemaak van die tenks van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. 150-200 illustrasies Skrywer Biografie Robert Jackson is die skrywer van meer as tagtig boeke oor militêre, lugvaart, vloot en wetenskaplike onderwerpe. Hy was korrespondent vir verdediging en wetenskap vir 'n groot Britse koerantuitgewersgroep, en het 'n spesiale studie gemaak van die tenks van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Resensie "Dit is 'n goed uitgevoerde boek vir 'n goeie prys. Daar is net die regte hoeveelheid detail in 'n boek met beperkte bladsye, en die kleurprofiele is baie goed gedoen. Genoeg om selfs die volgende pantseropbou te inspireer! I sal die boek beslis aanbeveel vir almal wat geïnteresseerd is in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog se Duitse wapenrusting - veral as u belangstel in voertuie voor die vroeë oorlog. Vir die prys kan ek dit ook aanbeveel vir die modelbouer met selfs 'n verbygaande belangstelling in die onderwerp. "--IPMS/USA Review Quote" Dit is 'n goed uitgevoerde boek vir 'n goeie prys. Daar is net die regte hoeveelheid detail in 'n boek met beperkte bladsye, en die kleurprofiele is baie goed gedoen. Genoeg om selfs Ek sal die boek beslis aanbeveel vir almal wat in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog belangstel, veral as u belangstel in voertuie voor die vroeë oorlog. Vir die prys kan ek dit ook aanbeveel vir die modelbouer met selfs 'n deurlopende belangstelling in die onderwerp. " Besonderhede ISBN1526711249 Skrywer Robert Jackson Bladsye 64 Uitgewer Pen & Sword Books Ltd Jaar 2018 ISBN-10 1526711249 ISBN-13 9781526711243 Formaat Sagteband Afdruk Pen & swaard Militêre plek van publikasie South Yorkshire Land van publikasie Verenigde Koninkryk Media Book Subtitle Blueprint for Blitzkrieg 1933-1941 DEWEY 623.747520943 Publikasiedatum 2018-01-24 Illustrasies 200 illustrasies Reeks TankCraft Taal Engels Publiek Algemeen/Handel VK Release Date 2018-01-24 AU Release Date 2018-01-24 NZ Release Date 2018-01-24 We have this At The Nile, as u daarna soek, het ons dit. Met vinnige aflewering, lae pryse, vriendelike diens en meer as 'n miljoen items - u sal beslis vind wat u wil hê, teen 'n prys wat u baie sal geniet! 30 DAG TERUGBELEID Geen vrae nie, 30 dae opgawe! GRATIS AFLEWERING Maak nie saak waar u in Australië is nie, aflewering is gratis. VEILIGE BETALING Gemoedsrus deur te betaal via PayPal en eBay -kopersbeskerming TheNileItemID: 123807244 Toestand: Splinternuut , Herlaai -fooi: Geen , Retourversending word betaal deur: Koper, Opbrengs aanvaar: Opbrengs aanvaar, Item moet binne: 30 dae , Terugbetaling sal gegee word as: Geld terug , Formaat: Sagteband , Taal: Engels , ISBN-13: 9781526711243 Siehe Mehr


Jackson, R: Panzer I and II: Blueprint for Blitzkrieg 1933-1941 Sagteband-13 maart 2018

Ek hou van die idee agter hierdie boek, wat 'n tegniese kombinasie kombineer
geskiedenis, operasionele geskiedenis, 'n afdeling vir kleure en merke, en 'n modelafdeling. In hierdie bundel kon die outeur (en miskien ook die redakteur) egter nie uitvoer nie.

Ongelukkig het die keuse van foto's en die onderskrifte daarvan te wense oorgelaat. As die onderwerp van die boek die Pzkpfw I/II is, moet die meeste van die meegeleverde illustrasies van die voertuie wees, of ten minste daarmee verband hou. Daar is egter verskeie foto's wat geen verband het met die onderwerp van die boek nie. Erger nog, verskeie onderskrifte is eenvoudig verkeerd. 'N Panzerjaeger Marder III word byvoorbeeld verkeerdelik geïdentifiseer as 'n Panzerjaeger I, wat 'n beduidende fout is. 'N Ander voorbeeld is die identifisering van 'n Munitionspanzer IV wat 'n Karl Gerat as Munitionspanzer I verskaf, nog 'n groot fout.

Gegewe die beperking van die aantal bladsye wat hierdie boekreeks stel, dink ek dat hierdie boek te veel probeer in te min bladsye. Kan ek die res van die illustrasies vertrou as die onderskrifte op 'n aantal illustrasies verkeerd is? Daarom het ek hierdie lesing as 2 sterre beoordeel.


Gebruik van Blitzkrieg in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog

Duitse magte gebruik 'n paar taktieke wat verband hou met blitzkrieg in die Spaanse burgeroorlog in 1936 en die inval in Pole in 1939, insluitend gekombineerde aanvalle op die grond en die gebruik van Panzer-tenkafdelings om die swak toegeruste Poolse troepe vinnig te verpletter. Toe, in April 1940, val Duitsland neutraal Noorweë binne, en beslaan die hoofstad, Oslo, en die belangrikste hawens van die land met 'n reeks verrassingsaanvalle.

In Mei 1940 kom Duitsland se inval in België, Nederland en Frankryk, waartydens die Wehrmacht (Duitse weermag) die gekombineerde mag van tenks, mobiele infanterie- en artillerietroepe gebruik het om deur die Ardennenbos te ry en vinnig deur die geallieerde verdediging binnegedring het.

Met noue lugsteun van die Luftwaffe (Duitse lugmag) en die voordeel van radiokommunikasie om die strategie te koördineer, vlieg die Duitsers deur Noord -Frankryk en na die Engelse kanaal en druk die Britse ekspedisiemag in 'n sak om Duinkerke. Einde Junie het die Franse leër in duie gestort en die land het om vrede met Duitsland gedagvaar.  

In 1941 gebruik Duitse magte weer blitzkrieg -taktiek tydens hul inval in die Sowjetunie, en verwag 'n kort veldtog soos dié wat hulle die vorige lente in Wes -Europa geniet het. Maar die strategie was minder suksesvol teen die hoogs georganiseerde en goed bewapende Sowjet-verdediging, en teen 1943 was Duitsland gedwing tot 'n verdedigende oorlog op alle fronte.


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Ek hou van die idee agter hierdie boek, wat 'n tegniese kombinasie kombineer
geskiedenis, operasionele geskiedenis, 'n afdeling vir kleure en merke, en 'n modelafdeling. In hierdie bundel kon die outeur (en miskien ook die redakteur) egter nie uitvoer nie.

Ongelukkig het die keuse van foto's en die onderskrifte daarvan te wense oorgelaat. As die onderwerp van die boek die Pzkpfw I/II is, moet die meeste van die meegeleverde illustrasies van die voertuie wees, of ten minste daarmee verband hou. Daar is egter verskeie foto's wat geen verband het met die onderwerp van die boek nie. Erger nog, verskeie onderskrifte is eenvoudig verkeerd. 'N Panzerjaeger Marder III word byvoorbeeld verkeerdelik geïdentifiseer as 'n Panzerjaeger I, wat 'n beduidende fout is. 'N Ander voorbeeld is die identifisering van 'n Munitionspanzer IV wat 'n Karl Gerat as Munitionspanzer I verskaf, nog 'n groot fout.

Gegewe die beperking van die aantal bladsye wat hierdie boekreeks stel, dink ek dat hierdie boek te veel in te min bladsye probeer doen. Kan ek die res van die illustrasies vertrou as die onderskrifte op 'n aantal illustrasies verkeerd is? Daarom het ek hierdie lesing as 2 sterre beoordeel.


Bloudruk vir Blitzkrieg

Vir kolonel Heinz Guderian en ander Duitse offisiere wie se loopbane die onstuimige tydperk tussen die twee wêreldoorloë strek, was die dood van veldmaarskalk Paul von Hindenburg op 2 Augustus 1934 die einde van 'n era. Hindenburg, 'n oorlogsheld wat die nederlaag deur die Geallieerdes in 1918 oorwin het om die verkiesing as president te wen, is deur Adolf Hitler tot 'n bofbeeld teruggebring, wat sy amp afgeskaf het toe hy gesterf het en sy rol as opperbevelhebber aangeneem het. Beamptes sou nou trou moet sweer aan 'n voormalige korporaal wat militêre leiers wantrou en vrees dat hulle sy pogings om die gewapende magte te hervorm, sou dwarsboom en Duitsland tot grootheid sou herstel.

Selfs innoveerders soos Guderian, wat Hitler vroeër in die jaar beïndruk het deur te demonstreer hoe tenks deur vyandelike lyne kan breek, het die moeite gehad om aan 'n opperbevelhebber sonder bevelondervinding voor te lê, wie se herbewapingsplanne die streng grense wat die Geallieerdes in Versailles opgelê het, oortree het. 'Môre sweer ons die eed aan Hitler. 'N Eed wat swaar is as gevolg! ” Guderian het sy vrou geskryf. 'Die weermag is gewoond om sy eed te hou. Mag die weermag hierdie keer in ere dit kan doen. ”

Guderian se belofte om die Nazi -leier te gehoorsaam, was noodlottig vir hom en vir die nasie wat hy gedien het. Hy en die 45-jarige Hitler was tydgenote, gebore met 10 maande uitmekaar, en was verenig teen die Versailles-verdrag, wat die magtige staat van Pruise-die tuisland van Guderian en die hart van die ou Duitse ryk-afgesweer het en 'n deel van afgestaan ​​het dit na Pole. Guderian was voorstander van Hitler se plan vir 'n herlewende Duitse ryk, bekend as die Derde Ryk, en deel sy entoesiasme vir nuwe wapens en taktiek. Slegs laat sou hy erken dat Hitler se diktatoriale maniere die Duitse militêre tradisies bedreig en rampspoed veroorsaak.

Die Duitse weermag het onlangs 'n formidabele reputasie gekry vanweë sy skerp algemene personeel, wat konflikte in die verlede en beplande toekomstige veldtogte ondersoek het deur streng ontleding en debat, en vir 'n offisierkorps wat bekend was vir die dryfkrag en inisiatief wat dit in die stryd toon. In die komende jare sou dit gebruik maak van die sterk punte en die moderne era van gemeganiseerde oorlogvoering begin deur middel van 'n taktiek wat bekend geword het as 'n blitzkrieg - letterlik 'weerligoorlog' - wat vinnige, diep aanvalle op vyandelike gebiede insluit, onder leiding van wapenrusting met nabye lug ondersteuning. Maar eer sou vir Guderian en sy kollegas vlugtig wees, aangesien die dinamiese taktiek wat hulle in 1940 vinnig oor Frankryk gebring het, die strategiese doelwitte van die leier wat hulle gesweer het, opgeblaas het. Hulle het daarin geslaag om weerlig in te span, net om te sien hoe Hitler dit loslaat in plofbare stryd teen superieure magte wat Duitsland in puin gelaat het.

Guderian, gretig en ambisieus, het Hitler se opkoms as 'n geleentheid beskou en het sy steun gesoek vir die oprigting van 'n onafhanklike panzermag wat Duitsland in die volgende oorlog tot vinnige oorwinnings sou lei. By die bevordering en ontwikkeling van hierdie pantsermag is Guderian gelei deur sy bevelvoerder, generaal Oswald Lutz, en deur sy opleiding as seine -offisier, wat hom geleer het dat betroubare radiokommunikasie van deurslaggewende belang is vir die doeltreffendheid van wapenrusting.

Sonder radio kon tenks die pad na voetsoldate, soos tydens die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, die weg ruim vir vordering, maar tenkbevelvoerders kon nie hul mobiliteit uitbuit en diep in die vyandelike gebied ry nie, tensy hulle in radiokontak was met ander elemente van die pansermag Guderian en Lutz in die vooruitsig gestel, wat gemotoriseerde infanterie-, artillerie- en verkenningseenhede insluit. Die doel was om hierdie mobiele mag te bevry van vertroue in troepe wat te voet vorder en skielike, vinniger gepantserde stootwapens maak wat die opposisie sou lamlê. Omdat Guderian nie so 'n kapasiteit het nie, moet die weermag 'alle hoop op vinnige besluite in die toekoms laat vaar' en hom toemaak vir trae, wrede gevegte soos die loopgraafoorlog wat die Duitse hulpbronne in die laaste oorlog uitgeput het.

Alles wat 'n vinnige oorwinning beloof, was van groot belang vir Hitler, wie se militêre ambisies die land se produksievermoë oorskry het. Nadat Guderian hom vroeg in 1934 op die weermag se oefenveld met 'n panzertaktiek bewys het, het hy gevoel dat hy 'n kampioen in Hitler verwerf het. Die destydse kanselier was baie in die steek gelaat “deur die spoed en presisie van die beweging van ons eenhede”, herinner Guderian, “en herhaaldelik sê:‘ Dit is wat ek nodig het! ’” Hitler kon egter nie alles bekostig wat hy wou hê nie, maar die weermag en sy ontluikende panzerdivisies moes met die vloot en Luftwaffe vir finansiering en materiaal. Volgens sy eie skatting sou dit 10 jaar neem om Duitsland voor te berei op oorlog.

Hitler kon egter nie die uitbreidingsgeleenthede wat langs die grense van Duitsland aan die einde van die 1930's ontstaan ​​het, weerstaan ​​nie. Namate konflik opdoem, moes bevelvoerders klaarkom met die wapens tot hul beskikking. Guderian was nog nie ten volle toegerus om as Hitler se gepantserde vuis te dien nie. Die prototipiese Duitse tenk, die Panzerkampfwagen Mk. Ek het 'n wapenrusting van amper 'n half duim gehad en net twee masjiengewere in sy rewolwer, wat dit nie pas by swaarder modelle wat deur mededingers soos Frankryk en die Sowjetunie vervaardig is nie. Groter gevegswaens was in produksie, soos die Pzkw Mk. IV, wat gewapen was met 'n 75 mm -kanon, maar selfs die stewigste tenks sou sit as eende as hulle breek of brandstof ontbreek, soos baie gedoen het toe Hitler Oostenryk in 1938 beset het. Guderian reageer deur 'n noukeurige stelsel van voorsiening en onderhoud in te stel. dit het sy pansers in staat gestel om vinniger en verder te vorder as wat skeptici vermoed het.

Toe die oorlog nader kom, het skeptisisme oor wat 'n pantsermag in die geveg kon bereik, op hoë vlakke in Duitsland voortgeduur en het die oorhand gekry in Frankryk en Groot -Brittanje, waar beamptes deeglik bewus was van wat Guderian in gedagte het. Hy het baie geleer uit die geskrifte van J.F.C. Fuller, 'n Britse tenkbevelvoerder wat in die Eerste Wêreldoorlog 'n baanbreker was in aanvalle deur massale wapenrusting, en wat onlangs sy eie taktiese denke onthul het in 'n 1937 -opleidingshandleiding met die titel Achtung! Panzer! Die leerstelling van Guderianus het uitgesproke voorstanders in die buiteland gehad, soos Fuller en die Franse kolonel Charles de Gaulle. Maar slegs in Duitsland het dit genoegsame ondersteuning gekry om wapens 'n leidende rol in gevegsplanne te gee. Brittanje en Frankryk het defensief gedink en vertrou meer op natuurlike hindernisse soos die Engelse Kanaal of mensgemaakte soos die Maginot Line, die netwerk van verdedigende versterkings langs die grens van Frankryk met Duitsland, as in die offensiewe potensiaal van tenks.

Duitsland het sy eie versterkte lyn - die Westelike Muur wat na Frankryk kyk - maar sy militêre leiers wou in die konfrontasie met potensiële vyande op beide kante 'n langdurige stryd op twee fronte vermy deur planne van aanval te ontwikkel wat spoed en verrassing bo alles beklemtoon. 'In ag genome ons geopolitieke posisie', het 'n Duitse strateeg verklaar, 'moet ons altyd streef na 'n kort oorlog en weerligagtige besluite.'

Hierdie neiging het tot voordeel van Guderian gewerk, net soos die Versailles-verdrag, wat Duitsland beperk het tot 'n leër van 100,000 man en baie ouer offisiere gedwing het om af te tree voordat Hitler die verdrag getart het en sy magte uitgebrei het. Aan die vooraand van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog was die Duitse offisierkorps jonger en meer ontvanklik vir nuwe idees en tegnologie as sy eweknie in Frankryk.

In teenstelling met die stereotipe van die Duitse soldaat as 'n man wat net opdragte gevolg het, het Duitse offisiere hul opinies vryelik uitgespreek teenoor die meerderes, het hulle 'n groot breedtegraad om hul opdragte te vervul en is hulle aangemoedig om van voor te lei - wat almal pas by die opvatting van Guderian gepantserde oorlogvoering as vinnig bewegende en vrye wiel. 'As gepantserde formasies eers los is,' moet hy groen lig gee tot aan die einde van die pad, 'het hy volgehou. Ondersteuning van Hitler het Guderian gehelp en diegene wat sy standpunte gedeel het, het amptelike skeptisisme oorkom en hul leerstelling verfyn deur massiewe gepantserde stootkragte met lugaanvalle te kombineer om die konvulsiewe effek te produseer wat vandag bekend staan ​​as 'skok en ontsag'.

Sommige joernaliste en historici het die Duitse verowering van Pole wat die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in September 1939 van stapel gestuur het, as 'n blitsoorlog geprys, maar 'n groot deel van die veldtog is konvensioneel uitgevoer deur artillerie en infanterie te voet met perdevoertuie. Operasies wat gebruik gemaak het van meer gesofistikeerde militêre hardeware, het bygedra tot die uitkoms, insluitend 'n lugblits deur die Luftwaffe dit het die Poolse lugmag geneutraliseer en 'n indrukwekkende rit deur die XIX Korps van General Guderian, bestaande uit een panserdivisie en twee gemotoriseerde infanteriedivisies. Maar die Poolse veldtog was nie revolusionêr nie. Eers toe die stryd om Frankryk in 1940 ontvou het, het die Duitsers hul wapenrusting by die Schwerpunkt, of 'hoofpunt van inspanning', en 'n deurbraak van historiese afmetings bereik.

Die oorspronklike plan vir die veldtog, wat aan die einde van 1939 opgestel is, het 'n beroep op die weermag gedoen om 'n groot stoot uit die noordooste te maak, deur België tot by die kus Frankryk, net soos dit aan die begin van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog was. ' kom weg met so 'n operasie wat twee keer uitgevoer is, 'het Hitler aan sy hoofde gesê. Maar hulle het die voorspelbare plan deels voorgestel om tyd te koop en dit te behou Führer, bekend daarvoor dat hy impulsief is, om 'n offensief te gou te begin. Elke gedagte om met die plan voort te gaan, is in Januarie 1940 laat vaar, toe 'n vliegtuig met Duitse stafoffisiere in België neergestort het, 'n neutrale nasie wat na Frankryk en Brittanje leun, en dokumente wat hul bedoelings onthul, in Franse hande val.

Hitler eis 'n nuwe benadering, gebaseer op 'geheimhouding en verrassing'. Die resultaat was Operation Sickle Cut, 'n gewaagde alternatief wat deur generaal Erich von Manstein bedink is met insette van Guderian. Manstein se idee was om die Franse en Britse magte noordwaarts na België en Holland te lok deur oortuigende aanvalle daar uit te voer, terwyl die hoofkrag in die suide rondom Luxemburg ontvou het. Dit beteken dat ons deur die Ardennen moet vorder, 'n beboste gebied met min paaie, wat deur tenks onbegaanbaar beskou word. Guderian het die gebied egter goed geken en was seker dat panzers so lank as moontlik sou kon deurkom Luftwaffe het hulle teen geallieerde aanvalle beskerm. Anderkant lê die Franse grens en die Maasrivier, aan die ander kant geflankeer deur 'n verlenging van die Maginot -lyn wat in aanbou was. Sodra hulle deur die versperring gebreek het, sou panzers soos 'n steenwaai weswaarts deur Frankryk sweep totdat hulle die Kanaal bereik en die geallieerde magte na hul noorde afsny.

Die sukses van hierdie plan was afhanklik van konsentrasie en koördinasie. Die Franse het meer tenks as die Duitsers gehad, maar die meeste is langs die voorkant versprei ter ondersteuning van infanterie, en hulle het min betroubare radio's. Daarteenoor plaas die Duitsers sewe van hul 10 gepantserde afdelings aan die voorpunt van weermaggroep A, wat die groot druk oor die Maas sou maak terwyl weermaggroep B die geallieerdes in die noorde beset en weermaggroep C die Franse magte agter die Maginot Line na die suide. Guderian, wie se korps nou met drie panserdivisies spog, sou die Maas by Sedan oorsteek-die plek van 'n verpletterende Duitse oorwinning oor Frankryk in 1870-terwyl ander panzerleiers, insluitend die harddrywende generaal-generaal Erwin Rommel, daar naby sou oorsteek.

Guderian het gehoop dat hulle 'n groen lig sou kry sodra hulle die vyand se verdediging oortree het, maar dit moet nog gesien word. Generaal Franz Halder, die stafhoof van die weermag, het verwag dat panserkragte, nadat hulle brugkoppe oor die Maas verseker het, sou wag totdat die grootste deel van die weermag sou inhaal voordat 'n 'behoorlike aanval in massa' geloods sou word. Guderian het teen die versigtige benadering aangevoer en dring daarop aan dat pansers sonder deurbraak mag deurbreek en ''n wig so diep en wyd dryf dat ons ons nie hoef te bekommer oor ons flanke nie.' Hy wen gou vir Halder. Maar sou Hitler, 'n voormalige infanteris wat daarin geglo het om sy flanke te beveilig, as die opperbevelvoerder genoeg waag om hierdie hoë insette tot 'n triomfantelike gevolg te sien?

Op 10 Mei 1940 het Duitse troepe opvallende aanvalle in Holland en België geloods om Franse troepe en die Britse ekspedisiemag noordwaarts in die lokval te trek terwyl pansers deur die Ardennen gevorder het. Die vooruitgang was bedoel om te verhoed dat massiewe verkeersknope tot gevolg gehad het, met voertuie wat meer as 100 myl tussen die Duitse grens en die Maasrivier verstop het. Tankbevelvoerders kyk angstig omhoog na geallieerde oorlogsvliegtuie. Een beampte het geskryf dat sy uitgestrekte panserdivisie 'n ideale doelwit is, aangesien dit 'stadig op 'n enkele pad vorentoe beweeg. Maar ons kon geen enkele Franse verkenningsvliegtuig raaksien nie. ” Vinnige werk deur die Luftwaffe het baie geallieerde vliegtuie op die grond vernietig en diegene wat opgestyg het, weerhou daarvan om die opmars van Army Group A op te spoor voordat dit momentum kry. In afwagting van 'n lang oorlog, het die Franse honderde militêre vliegtuie na aanloopbane ver van Duitsland verwyder, waar hulle nie skade ontkom het nie, maar niks gedoen het om hierdie blitsgeveg te weerhou nie.

Guderian het belowe om die Maas binne vier dae te bereik. Hy het daar in drie gekom. Sy aanval op Sedan begin op 13 Mei 1940, met 'n donderende lugaanval deur die Luftwaffe dit het min skade aan die bunkers oorkant die Maas aangerig, maar die verdedigers ontsenu. 'N Franse luitenant daar onthou die verstommende geluid van Stuka -duikbomwerpers wat met sirenes huil. Die geraas "boor in jou oor en trane in jou senuwees", het hy geskryf. "Dit voel asof jy wil skree en brul."

Teen die aand het Guderian in opblaasvlotte infanterie en ingenieurs oor die rivier gestuur om verdedigers uit hul bunkers te blaas en pontonbrue vir die tenks en ander voertuie te bou. Baie van die Franse eenhede wat die onvoltooide verlenging van die Maginot -lyn in hierdie sektor gehad het, was weinig meer as konstruksiemanne en het nie gevegsopleiding gehad nie. Hulle teenstanders het daarteen noukeurig geboor vir hierdie operasie in Duitsland deur die Moselrivier onder lewende vuur oor te steek. Teen die aand het die verdedigers in massas teruggetrek, paaie verstop en paniek versprei. “Tanks volg ons!” skreeu hulle, hoewel geen tenks in werklikheid die Maas sou oorsteek voor dagbreek nie. Hul bevelvoerder, brig. Genl. Henri-Jean Lafontaine, het daardie nag kosbare ure gemors deur sy bevelpos agteruit te skuif en gedetailleerde bevele van meerderes te soek. Teen die tyd dat hy die volgende oggend teenaanval, het Guderian - wat gereeld van voor af gelei en vinnig besluite geneem het - genoeg wapens en artillerie oor die rivier gehad om die laat Franse uitdaging af te weer en sy brughoof te beveilig.

Guderian oorkom toe besware van meerderes, wat hul magte by Sedan wou konsolideer en vorder met twee panserdivisies, en laat 'n derde agter om die brugkop te verdedig. Hy het 'n groot risiko geneem, want geallieerde oorlogsvliegtuie dreun oor die Maas, en die Franse het swaar wapenrusting by Stonne, suid van Sedan. Tussen 15 en 17 Mei het Stonne meer as 'n dosyn keer van hande verander terwyl pansers in die strate geworstel het met fransende Franse Char B swaar tenks, so dik gepantser dat skulpe soos 'n bokskoot van hulle afgestamp het. Die gasvreters kon egter nie lank werk sonder om te brandstof nie, en min het radio's wat funksioneer. Baie het uiteindelik ten prooi geval aan ligter, maar meer manoeuvreerbare panzers en aan Duitse artillerie, waaronder vreesaanjaende 88 mm lugafweergewere wat verdubbel het as tenkmoordenaars met hul vate laat sak. Die Franse is op Stonne verslaan, en 'n kranige poging deur brig. Genl Charles de Gaulle se vierde pantserdivisie om Guderian by Montcornet, wes van Sedan, te stop, misluk ook. '' N Paar van sy tenks het daarin geslaag om binne 'n kilometer van my gevorderde hoofkwartier binne te dring, 'het Guderian opgemerk, maar die eensame bod van De Gaulle het gebreek weens gebrek aan ondersteuning.

Operation Sickle Cut slaag bo verwagting. Vir Guderian was dit 'amper 'n wonderwerk', en ander aan die voorkant het ewe selfversekerd gevoel. Vir sommige by die hoofkwartier het die relatiewe gemak van oorwinning egter te goed gelyk om waar te wees. Die Geallieerdes sou beslis gesamentlike pogings uit die noorde en suide aanwend om die opkomende panserkolomme af te knyp voordat hulle die Kanaal bereik.

Wat die Duitse opperhoofde nie geweet het nie, was dat hul verstommende deurbraak wanhoop en nederlaag nie net onder verdedigers langs die Maas versprei het nie, maar ook in die hele opdrag. Toe generaal Alphonse-Joseph Georges, bevelvoerende oor die Franse magte aan die noordelike punt van die front, verneem dat die vyand by Sedan deurgedring het, het hy "homself in 'n stoel geslinger en in trane uitgebars", onthou een beampte. 'Hy was die eerste man wat ek tydens hierdie veldtog gesien het huil. Helaas, daar sou ander wees. ” Georges het weer kalm geword, maar hy en sy mede -hoofde het nooit weer die inisiatief gekry nie. Hulle opperbevelhebber, generaal Maurice Gamelin, het die grootste deel van sy reserwes verbind om te keer dat hy die belangrikste Duitse stoot na die noorde was, en het die hoop heeltemal verloor en verklaar dat die Franse leër "klaar is".

Dit is oorgelaat aan bevelvoerders op laer vlakke soos de Gaulle om geïsoleerde teenaanvalle te voer. Een so 'n aanval deur die Britse wapenrusting, wat op die regterflank van Rommel se 7de Panzerdivisie geloods is toe dit op 21 Mei naby die Franse kus gekom het, is teen 'n prys afgeweer en het Hitler gerusgestel, wat nie gerusgestel is toe Rommel die dreigement oorbeklemtoon het nie. "Honderde vyandelike tenks."

Op 24 Mei, uit vrees dat sy vinnig gevorderde wapenrusting deur 'n knyperbeweging afgesny kon word, het Hitler 'n bevel van generaal Gerd von Rundstedt, bevelvoerder van weermaggroep A, bekragtig en die pansers binne 10 myl van Duinkerken tot stilstand gebring, waar die geallieerde magte vergader het. vir ontruiming oor die kanaal. Von Rundstedt wou die agterste infanteriedivisies tyd gee om af te sluit met panserkolomme en hul flanke te beskerm. Maar sy meerderes, stafhoof Halder en kommandant -generaal Walther von Brauchitsch, was oortuig dat die Geallieerdes geslaan is en dring Hitler aan om die bevel op te hef. In 'n skerp teregwysing aan die leërhoofde, het Hitler die besluit oorgelaat aan hul ondergeskikte von Rundstedt, wat die pansers nie eers die kans gegee het tot 26 Mei nie. Teen daardie tyd het die Geallieerdes hul verdediging by Dunkirk versterk, waar hulle lank gehou het. genoeg vir byna 340 000 troepe om oor die see te ontruim, insluitend die grootste deel van die Britse ekspedisiemag.

Alhoewel die Britte die ramp in Duinkerken nouliks ontduik het, het Operation Sickle Cut Frankryk gedoem deur meer as 1 miljoen geallieerde troepe in België gestrand te kry en hulle uit die laaste fase van die veldtog uit te skakel, wat in Junie geëindig het met die besetting van Parys en Franse oorgawe.

Tog het hierdie verbysterende triomf vir die verloorders baie meer leersaam geblyk as die wenners. Die vyande van Duitsland het vinnig gemeganiseerde taktiek en verdedigingsmaatreëls getref, soos die gebruik van lugafweergewere teen tenks. Hitler, daarenteen, ignoreer die waarskuwingslesse van 'n wedstryd wat baie nader was as wat dit blyk.

As die Geallieerdes hul pogings beter gekoördineer het en meer vuurkrag by Sedan of Stonne of Montcarnet gekonsentreer het, sou hulle moontlik die Duitsers in hul spore gestuit het en hulle gedwing het tot 'n langdurige stryd waarop hulle swak voorbereid was. Hitler was bedwelm van sukses en het gedink aan blitzkrieg as 'n strategiese silwer koeël wat die verdediging van groot moondhede kan deurboor en binne maande op hul knieë kan bring. Hierdie grandioze blitzkrieg-strategie het eers na die Franse veldtog ontwikkel, sluit die Duitse militêre historikus Karl-Heinz Frieser in sy onthullende boek, Die Blitzkrieg -legende: "Dit was nie die oorsaak nie, maar eerder die gevolg van die oorwinning."

Nadat hy nie later in 1940 Brittanje verslaan het met 'n lugblitz wat Duitsland in ruil daarvoor blootgestel het aan strategiese bombardemente nie, het Hitler planne beraam om sy nie -aggressie -ooreenkoms met Josef Stalin te verbreek en die Sowjetunie binne te val. Hierdeur het hy die risiko geneem om oorlog op meer as een front uit te nooi, want die Britte neem as -magte in Noord -Afrika aan en hoop op 'n dag om die besette Frankryk binne te val.

Dit was 'n nagmerriescenario vir die Duitse weermag, maar tog het min offisiere op hoë vlakke openlik die wysheid bevraagteken om Rusland binne te val. Many shared the belief that no theater was too vast to be dominated by their fast-moving forces. Ultimately, they would lose both the war and their honor in Russia, where generals became enmeshed in Hitler’s murderous campaign against Jews and other targeted groups, carried out by special forces called Einsatzgruppen that operated in conjunction with the army. Guderian’s claim that he knew nothing of such atrocities as he led his Panzergruppe 2 toward Moscow in late 1941 conflicts with reports from those responsible for the killings that they had “no difficulties” securing cooperation from commanders in his sector.

If he somehow had escaped knowledge of the death squads, Guderian surely knew by this time that Hitler was not a leader he could follow in good faith. Spirited debate had long been part of the army’s decision-making process, but Hitler would not tolerate dissent or a free exchange of ideas. “Everybody is scared of the Führer and nobody dares say anything,” Guderian wrote his wife as the fateful Russian campaign unfolded. Rapid advances by panzers over the summer gave way to agonizing delays and fitful progress amid worsening weather and mounting resistance.

In December, facing intense cold and a blistering Soviet counterattack, Guderian defied a standfast order from Hitler and pulled his Panzergruppe 2 back from within 100 miles of Moscow to a more defensible position. After being relieved of command for insubordination, he was approached by German officers who were plotting against Hitler but declined to join them. He would not break his oath to the Führer and, in late 1944, became acting chief of staff as Hitler’s disastrous blitzkrieg strategy unraveled and defeat loomed.

“Such was Germany’s dictator,” Guderian wrote afterward, “a man going on in solitary haste from success to success and then pressing on from failure to failure, his head full of his stupendous plans, clinging ever more frantically to the last vanishing prospects of victory, identifying himself ever more with his country.” In the end, Hitler brought that country and its once-mighty armed forces down with him.

This article by Stephen Hyslop was originally published in the June 2007 issue of Tweede Wereldoorlog Tydskrif. For more great articles, subscribe to Tweede Wereldoorlog tydskrif vandag!


How Did the Nazis Really Lose World War II?

Of the countless history books, TV documentaries and feature films made about World War II, many accept a similar narrative of the war in the West: Though Nazi Germany possessed a superior army, better equipment and by far the best weapons at the outset, the British somehow managed to hold on until the U.S. entered the war early in 1942. After that, with Germany seriously weakened by its brutal clash with the Soviet Union in the East, U.S. economic strength propelled the Allies to victory.

A formation of Tiger II tanks – January 1945. (Credit: ullstein bild/ullstein bild via Getty Images)

But according to James Holland, author of the three-volume history “The War in the West,” when it came to the operational level of World War II—the nuts and bolts of producing weapons, supplying troops and other logistics–the famous Nazi war “machine” was anything but efficient. It wasn’t even really a machine.

𠇎veryone always talks about the ‘Nazi war machine’ as though it’s entirely mechanized,” Holland told HISTORY. “Well it isn’t. Of the 135 divisions used in May 1940 for Blitzkrieg in the West, only 16 of those are mechanized. The other 119 are all using their own two feet, or they’re using horse and cart.”

In Holland’s view, the long-accepted wisdom of Germany’s military prowess relies too heavily on the experiences of individual Allied soldiers on the front lines, without taking into account the reality of the Wehrmacht’s logistical capabilities. While understanding strategy (including leadership and overall war aims) and tactics (the actual fighting on the front lines) of any conflict is essential, he believes the operational level is what holds the strategic and tactical levels together.

Germany Panzer Tiger II tanks in 1944. (Credit: ullstein bild/ullstein bild via Getty Images)

“If you’re an American soldier and you’re in Normandy in a foxhole, and you come up against a Tiger tank, all you care about is that it’s a huge tank with a massive great gun and if it fires a shell at you, you’re going to be obliterated.” Similarly, a Sherman tank facing off alone against one of the famously powerful German Tiger tanks would have no chance. “Looking at it operationally,” Holland explains, 𠇊 very different picture emerges. The Germans only built 1,347 Tiger tanks, whereas the Americans built 49,000 [Sherman tanks].”

And what about that Tiger tank? An icon of the Wehrmacht, the heavily armored monster featured a complex six-speed gearbox designed by Ferdinand Porsche. It was also prone to mechanical malfunction, difficult to sustain in combat and needed a lot of fuel, one of the many resources Germany sorely lacked.

Because Germany was so short on oil, steel and (most critically) food, Holland argues, the Nazis would have had to crush their enemies completely in the first phase of the war in order to have any chance of winning. Unable to defeat Britain in the West, Hitler had �solutely no choice” but to invade the Soviet Union in the hopes of getting access to more resources. That invasion, of course, led to another enormously costly war for Germany on the Eastern Front, even as the United States joined Britain in the West.


How 1 Mistake Cost Hitler Victory During World War II

What if the German Army had actually been ready to fight?

Editor’s note: This is the second in a series of five articles providing critical analysis as to how Germany Might Have Won World War Two.

In our last article, we examined some of the actions that Germany might have taken to achieve its territorial objectives without having to fight the Western Powers of Britain, France and the United States of America in World War Two. Some of the most important ways for Germany to have won the war would have been to have waited until German industries had recovered from the limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty to maximize Germany’s military potential. It would have entailed a more prudent utilization of Germany’s limited military-industrial resources, better organization and increased mobility of her army. Here are some examples:

Don’t risk war with Allies until 1941 or 1943

Due to the fact that the German rearmament program was not projected to be completed until 1943, Hitler expected the outbreak of war would not occur until then or until 1941 at the earliest. Accordingly, Hitler was completely caught off guard when Britain and France declared war against him on September 3, 1939 over his invasion of Poland. Germany’s generals warned Hitler that the army was not ready for war in 1939. Not only were one-third of Germany’s army divisions still seriously underequipped, but there was a major shortage of officers due to the massive expansion of the German Army from seven to 103 divisions during a five year period. Due to the serious shortage of tanks armed with 37mm guns or above, the German Army was forced to employ 2,000 obsolete Panzer I and Panzer II training tanks which the Germans had never intended to use in war. While the punitive Treaty of Versailles did not end up accomplishing its purpose in keeping Germany economically destitute, militarily powerless, divided and downtrodden, let alone prevent a Second World War, its ban on Germany building tanks actually contribute toward Nazi Germany losing World War Two.

Without the Treaty of Versailles’ restrictions, German industries would not have had so many difficulties producing thousands of Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks (which began production way back in 1936) until 1942/1943, forcing the Germans to use inferior model tanks. By contrast, the T-34 was first produced in 1940 by 1941, over 3,000 production models were being built. Had the German Panzer III and IV tanks comprised the whole of the German tank fleet—instead of a small percentage of it—at the beginning of Germany’s invasion of Russia, it might very well have made the difference and helped German forces capture Moscow in 1941. This likely would have prompted Stalin to offer Germany even more generous peace terms than he did in actual history.

Furthermore, thanks in large part to the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had a dearth of militarily-convertible industries which prevented them from mass producing the hundreds of thousands of trucks needed to motorize their army. Whereas the U.S. and British armies in Europe were fully motorized and the Red Army was nearly so—thanks to the 450,000 trucks provided by the United States and United Kingdom via Lend-Lease shipments—the German army was forced to move by horse carriage, foot and rail right up until the end of the war because they lacked motorized transport.

It is one of history’s greatest ironies that the nation that pioneered and most excelled at mobile Blitzkrieg warfare had the least-mobile army of all the great powers during the war. It is certainly impressive that the Germans achieved so many victories with so many quantitative disadvantages in terms of heavy weapons, supplies and transports in comparison with their enemies. One can only wonder what the German army might have achieved had it possessed a similar number of tanks and trucks as the American or the Soviet armies. Certainly, the outcome of the war would likely have been much different had Hitler waited until 1943 (as he had originally planned) when the German rearmament program was completed and the country had acquired sufficient fuel oil resources.

Begin mass production of armaments in 1939 instead of 1943

Hitler delayed starting Germany’s mass production of armaments because he anticipated a series of rapid victories against both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union ending the war by December 1941. He also feared a resulting disruption of the German economy as German leaders had done in World War One, largely resulting in the subsequent postwar German economic collapse. After his anticipated victory, the historical record reveals that he planned to reduce German armaments production in order to focus on economic, industrial and architectural pursuits such as his planned redesign of Berlin into the “world capital” of Germania.

However, if Hitler had started mass production of heavy armaments four years earlier, then by 1941 his factories might have been producing one thousand Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks a month. Ideally, these tanks would have been armed with long barrel 50mm and 75mm cannons. If so, by May 1941 he would have had ten thousand high-velocity gun-armed light and medium tanks (and, if at all possible, ten thousand half-tracks), which might have enabled the Germans to field over three times more tanks than the German Army was able to deploy on the Eastern Front during the entire war. Then the German Army might have succeeded in capturing Moscow in 1941 and may never have lost their hard-won quantitative superiority in tanks on the Eastern Front (which they briefly achieved following in the first two to three months following their invasion of the Soviet Union).

In sy boek Inside the Third Reich, which he wrote after the war, German Armaments Minister Albert Speer criticized Hitler’s decision to build 45-ton MAN-designed Panther tanks instead of Build Daimler-Benz Panthers weighing 35 tons. Furthermore, the German 57-ton Tiger tanks were much more expensive and difficult to produce than their 25-ton Panzer IVh medium tanks which weighed less than half as much (or their 45-ton Panther tanks for that matter). The effort to produce them likely prevented the Germans from building several thousand more medium tanks, which like the well-designed T-34 family of tanks produced by the Soviets, could have been mass-produced much more quickly and efficiently. The Germans should have also employed mass production techniques such as welded turrets to produce tanks as fast as the Allies did since maximizing medium tank production was the key to defeating the USSR.

In addition, German construction of heavy, rather than medium, tanks made even less sense given the desperate shortages of gasoline necessary to fuel the German war machine later in the war. For this reason, the German war effort would likely have been far better served had they averted construction of heavy Panther and Tiger tanks altogether and focused all tank production on 25-ton Panzer IVh tanks and StuG III tank destroyers to maximize their number of operational tanks during the latter half of the war.

Don’t waste limited Germany’s military resources

During World War Two, Germany ended up wasting its finite military-industrial resources building under-armed Scharnhorst-class battlecruisers, giant under-armed Admiral Hipper-class heavy cruisers, over 1,156 U boats and thousands of V-1 and V-2 rockets of dubious conventional military utility. Not only did these weapons squander limited German steel and industrial resources, but they expended millions of tons of fuel oil which was desperately needed for the German Army and Air Force. Instead of building over a thousand U-boats as they did in actual history, Germany should have abandoned its unrestricted submarine warfare campaign. For just as Germany did in World War I, unrestricted submarine warfare ended up yielding far more negative than positive results, specifically in that it caused other nations to declare war against Germany after their merchant ships were sunk. Doing so would have freed up limited German military-industrial resources to enable them to focus on building more fighters to obtain air superiority over the British and Soviets, giving them a better chance of both winning the Battle of Britain and capturing Moscow in 1941 or 1942.

In addition, building a fleet of seven aircraft carriers instead of four battleships and three Admiral Hipper-class heavy cruisers, would have been a far better use of limited German arms production resources, which would have given the German Navy a chance to potentially defeat the Royal Navy in successive battles and perhaps even obtain naval superiority, ending the British starvation blockade against Germany and her allies. The Germans could have started building this aircraft carrier fleet after 1935 the Anglo-German armaments agreement was signed so that by 1941 they would have had all seven completed.

Increase the mobility of the German Army and particularly of their Panzer divisions

Immediately prior to the German invasion of Russia, Hitler decided to cut the number of tanks per division in half from 300 to 150 in order to double the number of Germany’s Panzer divisions on paper while diluting their actual strength, mobility and fighting power. This was a major mistake. Instead, Hitler should have refocused Germany’s military-industrial resources to attempt to make the German Army as motorized as possible. British and American forces operating in the European theater were fully-motorized, meaning they were all transported by wheeled vehicles. But the German Army, ironically given the fact that its early war victories from 1939–1941 were due to their successful use of Blitzkrieg tactics, remained mostly foot and horse-bound right up until Germany’s unconditional surrender to the Allies on May 7-8, 1945.


How Russia blunted the German blitzkrieg

Eight out of 10 German soldiers killed during World War II died fighting the Russians. That is, Russia eliminated more than 6 million German soldiers.

Now chew on this: between 1939 and 1941, the German blitzkrieg &ndash or lightning war &ndash defeated Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the 380,000 soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force stationed in France. Hitler then unleashed the same blitzkrieg against Russia. On June 22, 1941 more than 200 Axis divisions, comprising two million men plunged into a front 3200 km broad. Yet by winter of that year the Red Army was lashing furious counterattacks that would make the besiegers the besieged.

Russia won the most mechanised war in history because it was able to out-produce Germany in a war of economic attrition. Russian production outweighed that of Germany in virtually every war item &ndash tanks, self-propelled guns, field guns, machine guns, mortars, combat aircraft, rifles, carbines. Only in shipbuilding did Soviet industry fail to compete.

More remarkable is the fact that the Russian advantage was at its greatest in 1942, writes military historian Arvo L. Vecamer writes in A Germany-Soviet Military-Economic Comparison. &ldquoJust when its struggle against the Wehrmacht for the military advantage was at the most intense, the Red Army was receiving combat aircraft at twice the rate of delivery to the enemy, and 3 or 4 times the flow of most other types of ground forces&rsquo armament. After 1942 the pace of German war production accelerated, but Germany&rsquos context had already changed to one of commitments multiplying out of control and an inexorable unfolding of defeat.&rdquo

According to the University of Warwick volume "Soviet Defence Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev", &ldquoDespite the fact that this was a war which German leaders had planned, and which took (Russian) leaders by surprise, and despite the burdens imposed by Germany&rsquos deep penetration of (Russian) territory, (Russian) industry was mobilised more rapidly than German industry.&rdquo

Vecamer writes Russia was the single most important factor in the defeat of Germany. &ldquoGermany essentially lost the Second World War on the Eastern Front&rdquo and the key to that loss can be directly attributed to the fact that Russia was able to supply its army with the needed materials while the German economic system could not.

Russia had built up a much more effective and reliable economic infrastructure since the 1920&rsquos when compared to the German economy. Vecamer explains it was more optimally geared for mass production of simple, yet reliable (military) goods and products. Throughout World War II, Russian military forces never really suffered from serious supply problems. Russian production centres continued to pour out what was needed on the front lines. But the Germans often suffered from supply shortages.

&ldquoTo win in an armed conflict, a nation must be able to optimally supply one&rsquos own forces both in offensive and defensive situations,&rdquo Vecamer adds. &ldquoGermany was able to (reasonably) supply her forces with military supplies in the early years of the war, when she fought a series of small, quick action campaigns. But after 1942, Germany could no longer provide her armed forces with the needed military supplies. Quick campaigns gave way to a prolonged war. (Russia) however could supply her army with the needed materials.&rdquo

How to win a war

The Warwick volume says the Russian economy "produced weapons on a larger scale than Germany" and more of Russian war production came earlier in the war. This was despite the fact that Germans had a head start in the arms race. While Hitler has started secretly rearming his forces from 1933 onwards, the Russian entered the race only in 1937.

&ldquoFrom 1939 to approximately 1941-42, the German military economy retained a distinct advantage in both quality and quantity when compared to the same of her opponents,&rdquo adds Vicamer. &ldquoBy 1943, Russia had caught up and began to surpass the German production capabilities.&rdquo

The Russians also made a &ldquotop to bottom&rdquo review of their military supply system to seek the most efficient solutions. Western armies of the World War II era were still modeled on the old Napoleonic way of thinking &ndash provide each combat division with ample service and supply capabilities so they can draw upon rear area stocks as needed. The Russians reversed that order &ndash army depots and army transportation units would (more efficiently) deliver supplies to the troops more combat troops could then be placed at the front lines. Of note is that the Russian military transportation system was far more mechanised than the German one. The German military transportation system still relied on horses in May of 1945.

Moving a nation

The May 1945 issue of the American magazine Army Talks explains how the Russians developed a supply and logistics system that was geared for winning wars.

&ldquoThe Russian ability to supply their armies is partly due to the hard work of scientists,&rdquo it says. &ldquoSome food was supplied from the Arctic Circle, because Russian scientists developed seeds which could grow that far north. New methods of hardening metals were discovered when the Germans took over the raw materials used in older processes.

&ldquoOne of the most important "supplies' in time of war and one where Russian scientists have made an outstanding contribution is in the field of medicine. US Surgeon General Parran said, &lsquoamong the recent contributions of Russian medicine can be mentioned pioneer work on transfusion of blood and blood banks transplantation of cornea, nerves, and other tissues. Russian medicine has also had large experience in extensive public health projects in the prevention and eradication of malaria, typhus, tularemia and venereal diseases."

Over 20 million people in Russia were evacuated eastward as the tide of German invasion swept forward. Says Army Talks: &ldquoWhat the people could not take with them, they destroyed. It was not easy, but homes as well as barns and unmovable equipment went up in flames. Orchards were chopped down. Livestock was killed or driven on ahead.

&ldquoThe mighty Dnieper Dam, symbolising industrial progress, was blown up to prevent the Germans from using the electricity which it produced. Hitler found the rich Soviet bread-basket empty and the earth scorched.

&ldquoGerman efforts to convert mines, oil wells or factories to their needs were discouraging. The population which remained not only would not cooperate but they sabotaged the Germans in every way possible &ndash workers by days were guerrilla fighters by night.

&ldquoPractically no machinery had been left for Hitler to convert to his needs. The big factories of the Kharkov, Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov areas were moved eastward out of danger. V.N. Obraztsov, Director General of Traffic, said, "We had to cope with the biggest population movement in history &mdash of evacuees and whole industries to beyond the Volga, to the Urals, to Central Asia and of troops with their vast equipment to the front."

All this was happening in the backdrop of German territorial expansion, which added the industrial assets of much of continental Europe to its kitty. The occupation of industrialised Europe proved to be a major gain &ndash a sort of invasion jackpot &ndash for Germany and outweighed the costs of aggression. At the same time, German occupation significantly impacted Russian production capacities.

According to I.K. Malanin, a Russian military history writer, the following six factors determine a nation&rsquos ability to win or lose a war:

  1. The economic base
  2. The technological competence of the nation
  3. The established military doctrines and existing military traditions
  4. The geographic environment
  5. The ability and the experience of her personnel
  6. The comparative power of the enemy.

Malanin has ranked economic and technological factors right at the top. Clearly, the Russian political and military leadership knew what they had to do to ensure victory.


Primêre bronne

(1) Tom Wintringham fought against the German Army during the Spanish Civil War. He wrote about German military tactics in his book New Ways of War (1940)

Blitzkrieg tactics and strategy are almost entirely developed with the idea of escaping from the trench deadlock that held

the armies between August, 1914, and March, 1918, and held them again from September, 1939, to April, 1940. We can only grasp the essence of the Blitzkrieg if we realise that it is an opposite to, a reaction against, the war of trenches that otherwise condemns armies to practical uselessness.

From October, 1914, to March, 1917, on the Western Front, position warfare became more and more rigid, immovable, and futile. To "attack" meant to lose twice or three times as many men as your opponent, with no considerable gain in ground, and no decisive effect on anything except, your own cannon-fodder. The armies were locked in solid and continuous lines of trenches, in which they were pounded and obliterated by an even heavier hail of shells.

From March, 1917, to March, 1918, position warfare was in full flower, but some of the factors that must lead to its partial decay, its change into a new shape, became apparent. One factor was the tank another, more important, was a new method of defence - which inevitably developed into its opposite, a new tactical method for infantry advance. The defensive method was known as "elastic defence" or "defence in depth" the second developed from it, and adopted because it was a success, was called the tactic of "infiltration in attack."

(2) General Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier (1928)

In this way a military mass is constituted which, though unsuited to take part in a war of movement and seek a decision in formal battle, is well able to fulfill the duty of home defence, and at the same time to provide from its best dements a continuous reinforcement of the regular, combatant army in the field.

In brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered distinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft, and in the simultaneous mobilization of the whole forces, either to feed the attack or for home defence.

(3) Major General Sukhov was a tank commander in the Red Army who fought against the German Army during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

In their war against the Soviet Union the Germans have applied the methods of mobile attack - a method which has taken root in Fascist tactics. Hitler relied on the crushing force of his tank divisions accompanied by large numbers of motorized infantry. One hundred and seventy divisions were concentrated in the east for this purpose, of which 60 divisions were composed of mobile troops. The latter included as many as 25 tank divisions.

The fact that the Nazi mobile troops were nearly three times the number put in the field against France show that the Nazis intended to rout the Red Army with a lightning blow and achieve a rapid victory. Taking advantage of their surprise attack they gained certain territorial successes, but their calculations on crushing force and the sweeping movement of armoured groups have not been justified.

In subsequent operations the movement of these groups was completely stopped in certain directions, and in others it was retarded. During the first days of the war the Red Army used skilful manoeuvre to destroy small and large groups of German tank and motorized troops which had become cut off from their infantry units. One such group of 300 tanks was destroyed by the co-ordinated efforts of Soviet infantry and artillery. It is significant that in this complex operation the destruction of the Fascist tanks was accomplished without the participation of Soviet aircraft or tanks.

Having made a study of the enemy's tactics and knowing his vulnerable spots, the Red Army is in each case using the weapons within its reach. The 39th German Tank Corps engaged in a decisive battle was routed by a powerful blow from Soviet air and tank forces. Tanks, supported by infantry and artillery, participated in the destruction of the 20th Tank Division.

Usually the enemy pushes forward large tank units in the directions of major operations. This move is preceded by the operations of general infantry troop formations or by tank troops jointly with motorized infantry, supported by artillery and aircraft to make a breakthrough in the defence lines. Tank divisions are followed by motorized formations. Mobile groups of troops push ahead as far inland as possible, and in their sweeping movement they neither look back nor pay attention to their flanks, irrespective of whether the rest of their troops are following along.

Lately the German tank forces have adopted the following method : When the tank units which have pushed on far ahead run short of fuel they dig themselves into the ground, leaving only the gun turrets above the surface. Thus while waiting for the arrival of fuel the tanks are transformed into a kind of fortified post, and the district occupied by the tank unit becomes something of a fortified district.

(4) Hasso Manteuffel was interviewed by Basil Liddell Hart about Heinz Guderian after the war for his book The Other Side of the Hill (1930)

Guderian favoured from the beginning the strategic use of panzer forces - a deep thrust into the enemy, without worrying about a possible threat to his own unprotected and far-extended flanks. That was why he planned to transport all supporting elements of the panzer forces (infantry, artillery and engineers) in a similar way - that is, on tracks - and why the supply services (petrol, ammunition, food) were organically incorporated with the fighting troops. This enabled them to accompany, and keep up with the tank core until fused with it - at the same tune assuring Guderian's own supplies for three to five days.

It was Guderian - and at first he alone - who introduced the tank to the Army and its use as an operative weapon. It was certainly not the General Staff. During my term in the War Ministry (in the Inspectorate of Panzer Forces) I was well acquainted with Guderian's struggle on behalf of the use of this weapon. In the best sense of the word, this new weapon bears the stamp of his personality. Its successes during the war are due to him.

In peacetime he at first stood alone when he insisted that the 'break-through' of tanks should be pressed long and deep, and at first without regard to exposed flanks. On countless journeys and in countless conferences he injected this idea - even into the actual tank commanders.

If Guderian was not always successful in carrying out his theories everywhere during the war, it was due to the struggle against the mistrust of so many elderly officers who knew nothing, or little, about tanks.

He was the creator and master-teacher of our Armoured Forces - and I lay particular stress on the word 'master'.

(5) Wilhelm von Thoma, commander of 2nd Panzer Division, claimed that there were five main reasons why German tactics were so successful at the beginning of the Second World War.

1. The concentration of all forces on the point of penetration in co-operation with bombers.

2. Exploiting the success of this movement on the roads during the night - as a result, we often gained success by surprise deep in, and behind, the enemy's front.

3. Insufficient anti-tank defence on the enemy's part, and our own superiority in the air.

4. The fact that the armoured division itself carried enough petrol for 150-200 kilometres - supplemented, if necessary, with supply of petrol to the armoured spearheads by air, dropped in containers by parachute.

5. Carrying rations sufficient for three days in the tanks, for three more days in the regimental supply column, and three more days in the divisional supply column.

(6) Tom Wintringham, New Ways of War (1940)

One thing admitted by all observers of the German attacks is that they use most of their bombers as a flying artillery. The second thing that enters into the German formula of warfare, all observers agree, is the use of heavy tanks, so powerfully armoured that they are not vulnerable to light anti-tank weapons.

The third main factor in the success of the German tactics and strategy is that they have employed and developed the tactics known as "deep infiltration." This means that their army does not attack strung but in a line, and maintaining contact all the time between its advanced units and its main forces. It does not hit like a fist, but like long probing fingers

with armoured finger-nails. Each separate claw seeks a weak spot if it can drive through this weak spot, it does not worry about its flanks, or about continuous communications with the forces following it. It relies for safety upon surprise, upon the disorganisation of its opponents due to the fact that it has broken through to the rear of their position.

(7) Arthur Harris, Bomber Command (1947)

The Germans had won their victories in circumstances entirely different from any that we could contemplate for our own forces they had used their air force against armies which had scarcely any air protection or air support and were very ill-provided with anti-aircraft guns, but this would not be the case if we encountered the German army in the future.

Admittedly the specialised army co-operation types of aircraft might be rather more suitable on special occasions than the general-purpose bombers and fighters we were proposing to build, but they could not by themselves gain or maintain air superiority. The German dive-bombers were a case in point. They were no doubt accurate and alarming when used against undefended troops, but they were so easily shot down by efficient anti-aircraft fire, or, of course, by any normal fighter.

(8) Colonel Korotkov of the Red Army, wrote about the German Army and its Blitzkreig tactics in the book, Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War (1943)

The Soviet Command is countering the German tactic of wedges and pincers by the tactic of flank blows. It is applying the method of crushing one side of the wedge as a result of which the other side loses its force. This is vividly demonstrated in the counter-blow delivered by the Soviet forces on the German 39th Tank Corps. The Nazi corps suffered a defeat and the operation of the German 3rd Tank Group, of which this corps was a part, was deprived of its striking force.

Compared with the fighting in France in 1940, what we see here is the reverse process. French resistance weakened as the enemy advanced, whereas the resistance of Soviet troops grows continuously, and their counter-blows become more effective. The result is that the Germans suffer tremendous losses. In the fighting in the western direction alone over 20 German infantry, panzer and motorized divisions have been smashed or have suffered considerable losses up to August.

As the war develops. Soviet troops devise new and successful methods of combating the Fascist tank wedges. A brilliant example of this is provided by the defeat and complete annihilation of some 300 enemy tanks by one Soviet rifle division. Having studied the enemy's tactics, the commander of the division ordered a sham retreat on one sector of the front, boldly allowed the German tank column to advance through his lines and then surrounded and destroyed it by concentrated artillery fire.

(9) Lieutenant-General Mishulin of the Red Army fought against the German Army during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

During recent attacks the German tanks have been attempting to operate mainly in small groups: in forces ranging from a company to a battalion, and very rarely in large numbers. This allows them greater flexibility in their operations, permits them to manoeuvre and ensures the possibility of passing rapidly from one form of fighting to another.

At the same time, however, this weakens the blows of their tank troops. Only rarely now does the German Command concentrate larger forces in a frontal attack for a decisive thrust with a large number of mobile forces (several tank divisions) as was the case, for instance, in the Briansk direction.

The speed of German tanks has also slowed down. The former tactics of deep "wedges" are practically no longer practised. This is explained by the fact that German tank units now forge ahead of their infantry less resolutely than they did in the early part of the war. They prefer to operate in closer co-operation with the infantry, supported by strong artillery and mine-thrower fire and aircraft.


Kyk die video: Russia 1942 Battles of Rzhev Ржевская битва. Vyazma 1 1st Panzer Division. Panzer Regiment 1